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ABSTRACT 
Systems Engineering (SE) is being used increasingly in rail projects, with the aim of creating 
better systems in better ways, thus generating a return on the effort invested. However, it is 
not entirely clear what exactly that return will be or how to maximise it. This thesis contains 
the results of research into the relationship between the adoption of SE in rail projects and 
project outcomes. 
The writer shows that determining the success of a project, and thus the impact of SE, by 
simply measuring its cost and duration and assessing the performance of the system that it 
delivers, is problematic. He argues that the adoption of an SE approach can lead to decisions 
to correct faults in the system design and make other desirable changes being taken earlier, 
which will improve the outcome in most cases. Theoretical reasons and practical experience 
lead him to believe that many of the benefits of applying SE on projects will be enjoyed as a 
consequence of reducing change latency, where change latency is defined to be the 
unnecessary delay in deciding to make a change. A tentative theory of how SE can reduce 
change latency is proposed and tested against data collected from nine rail projects. The 
data corroborate several proposed causal mechanisms in the tentative theory but also 
suggest that the reduction in change latency achieved depends upon other factors, 
particularly the contractual and quasi-contractual relationships between the parties to the 
project. 
For practitioners considering whether to apply SE on a project, the research findings provide 
encouragement but also a warning that the full benefits of applying SE will only be enjoyed if 
other pre-requisites for sound decision making are in place. The findings also provide 
guidance on how to adapt SE practices when applying them to rail projects, in order to 
maximise the benefits enjoyed. 
The writer argues that change latency is a valuable metric for both practitioners and 
researchers and that formulating and refining explicit theories about the manner in which SE 
delivers benefits can assist researchers investigating these benefits to build upon each 
other’s work. 
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SPECIALIST TERMS 
Term Definition 
atomicity When talking about requirements, the condition of being atomic. A 
requirement is atomic if it cannot be logically decomposed into 
multiple requirements. 
change latency A measure of the unnecessary delay in taking a decision to make a 
change. 
context 
specification 
A logical artefact that documents all relevant, significant facts and 
assumptions about the environment in which the system will operate, 
including the physical, commercial, economic and regulatory aspects of 
the environment. 
core SE The totality of all project activities that affect or use SE artefacts in at 
least one of the following ways: 
 they create proposed content of the SE artefacts; 
 they control change to the SE artefacts; 
 they check the correctness or assess the implications of the SE 
artefacts; or 
 they check the system and its sub-systems against the SE 
artefacts. 
decision latency In the context of a change, the time taken to recognise that there is an 
issue that will require a change. 
detection latency In the context of a change, the time taken from recognising that there 
is an issue to reaching the decision to make the change. 
external validity The extent to which research conclusions may be generalised to other 
situations. 
internal validity The extent to which research conclusions are free from the challenge 
that alternative explanations might have been provided for the same 
effects. 
interpretive A description of research methods that study the understanding that 
people have of the world. 
left shift The ‘left shift’ hypothesis is the hypothesis that effort invested early in 
a project and, in particular, in the SE activities that occur in early stages 
will yield savings in effort later in the project that outweigh the 
investment. 
logical artefact One or more physical artefacts or parts of physical artefacts that 
contain a defined part of the output of SE activities. 
 Term Definition 
observation-first An approach to research in which the researcher allows the theory to 
arise from observations. 
physical artefact A document, drawing or database that contains the results of SE 
activities. 
realist A description of research methods that assume an objective world that 
exists independently of observers and seek objective truth about it. 
requirements 
specification 
A logical artefact that documents all project requirements from all 
project stakeholders, including requirements on the cost and schedule 
of the project. 
root document When considering the latency of a change, the most basic document in 
the project hierarchy that must be materially revised in order to 
implement the change. 
snowball effect The mechanism whereby a change to one part of the design of a 
system results in many changes to other parts of the design. 
sub-system A system wholly contained within a larger system. 
sub-system budget A logical artefact that specifies a commitment to deliver a sub-system 
within a certain maximum cost. 
sub-system 
schedule 
A logical artefact that specifies a commitment to achieve delivery of a 
sub-system and, possibly, other intermediate milestones within certain 
windows of time. 
sub-system 
specification 
A logical artefact that specifies what sub-system must be built, 
including specifications of external interfaces for that sub-system. 
system A combination of interacting elements organised to achieve one or 
more stated purposes. 
system budget A logical artefact that specifies a commitment to complete the project 
within a certain maximum cost. 
system schedule A logical artefact that specifies a commitment to achieve completion of 
the project and possibly other intermediate milestones within certain 
windows of time. 
system 
specification 
A logical artefact that contains a specification of the system to be built. 
If the system is to be introduced into service in a number of stages 
then the interim states of the system should be specified as well as the 
final one. 
  
Term Definition 
Systems 
Engineering  
An interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization of 
successful systems. 
theory-first An approach to research where the research is grounded in theory 
before data collection starts. 
validation Defined in ISO/IEC 15288 (ISO/IEC, 2002) to be: 
Confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence, that the 
requirements for a specific intended use or application have been 
fulfilled. 
In this thesis, this is interpreted as referring to confirmation that a 
system or some part of the system, its design or specification, is 
consistent with the overall requirements for the system. 
verification Defined in ISO/IEC 15288 (ISO/IEC, 2002) to be: 
Confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence, that 
specified requirements have been fulfilled. 
In this thesis, this is interpreted as referring confirmation that some 
part of the system, its design or specification, is consistent with the 
requirements placed on the item. 
Weltanschauung 
(plural 
Weltanshauungen) 
A world view or philosophy about the nature of the world. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the research 
In 2002, I took a job at Atkins, a design, engineering and project management consultancy, 
where I was responsible for raising the capability of its rail business in the area of Systems 
Engineering (SE). I had spent much of the previous 10 years helping the UK rail industry to 
raise its capability in system safety engineering, through editing a handbook of good practice 
in this area (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2007) and delivering associated training and 
consultancy. 
SE is not always well understood and those that do understand it do not always agree about 
precisely what it is. I devote the whole of chapter 5 to exploring the different 
characterisations of SE and deciding upon a characterisation to use for research purposes. 
The reader, however, is entitled to some working definition before we go on. With 
assistance from my supervisors, I wrote an article in a professional journal to help railway 
people understand what SE is (Elliott, Roberts, Schmid and Shannon, 2012), during which we 
concluded that, in a railway context “SE may be thought of as ‘the business of getting the 
parts of the railway to work together to do what we want them to’” and that it “provides 
proven and well-grounded methods to put some common-sense ideas into practice and a 
framework within which to apply them.” For now, I hope that the reader will find it sufficient 
to know that SE is a collection of tools, techniques and methods that support the delivery of 
systems. 
For the purpose of this thesis, I consider the deliverables of engineering projects to be 
systems that are composed of hierarchies of sub-systems. The tools, techniques and 
methods of SE tend to focus on general, abstract notions such as requirements, functions 
and interfaces and, it is claimed, complement the tools, techniques and methods of project 
management and traditional engineering disciplines. In 2002, there had been several 
decades of experience in applying SE in sectors such as defence and aerospace but very little 
experience of applying it in the rail sector. 
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Over time, it became clear to me that the theoretical underpinnings of the venture were 
shallow and that this would have to be corrected, if progress was to be sustained. 
There were two questions in particular that colleagues asked me and that I knew that I could 
not answer properly: 
 ”If I apply SE to this project, will I see benefits that justify the cost?” 
 ”How should I adapt SE practices that have been developed in other sectors to make 
them work well on my project?” 
The questions are linked. The answer to the first question must be, “It depends”, because 
the two extreme positions, firstly, that applying SE can be justified on all projects and, 
secondly, that it can be justified on none, are both untenable1. It follows that achieving a 
better understanding of the causal mechanisms by which SE delivers benefits or 
disadvantages would help to answer both questions. 
I sought a better understanding of these causal mechanisms in the literature. In 2006, having 
failed to find what I was looking for and with the encouragement of my manager at the time, 
Ian Shannon, I embarked upon the research described in this thesis. 
1.2 Generic objectives for the research 
I set the following two generic objectives at the outset of the research: 
 To demonstrate that SE can be used to build better rail systems and to build rail 
systems better, aiming for measurable improvement. 
 To gain an improved understanding of how to adapt SE to yield optimum results in 
major rail projects. 
Making progress towards these objectives would help me provide better answers to the 
questions stated above. This, admittedly, is true only on the assumption that SE can deliver 
benefits that justify the cost. That was my belief before I started the research although I did 
commit myself to adjusting my belief if my findings required that. 
                                                     
1
 I justify this assertion later. 
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The generic objectives were intended as general signposts for the direction to be followed 
and they have served that purpose: the research has remained aligned with them. I 
acknowledged when I set these objectives that it would be necessary to develop narrower 
and more refined, specific objectives to guide the research and this is what has happened, as 
I explain below. In narrowing and refining the objectives my touchstone has been utility to 
practitioners: I wish to compile knowledge that is useful to people involved in railway 
projects. 
1.3 The structure of this thesis 
The account of my research is presented in the remainder of this thesis in the following 
chapters. 
In chapter 2, The nature of the research problem, I reflect upon the research objectives and 
observe that all the objects of study are in the field of human activity, may vary from 
observer to observer and are subject to continual change. I follow the implications of these 
observations for the research. 
In chapter 3, Prior work, I look at the research that has been carried out to date into the 
benefits of adopting SE approaches. This has recently been strengthened by two quantitative 
studies but I conclude that the prior work does not yet deliver my objectives in full and that 
further work is required. 
Chapter 4 is entitled A workable characterisation of systems engineering. In order to 
proceed with the research, I need a way of characterising SE which is precise enough that I 
can take any project activity and determine whether it is an SE activity or not. I observe that 
there are many ways in which people characterise what SE is but I find each of these 
characterisations fails to meet my needs because it is too imprecise, because it is too broad, 
because it presumes a certain process or for some other reason. I propose a definition of 
core SE, based upon identifying the types of intellectual products that are at the heart of SE. 
I argue that this definition is of value because it includes the types of activities that are 
common to a number of characterisations of SE. 
In chapter 5, The nature of rail systems and rail projects, I reflect upon experience of rail 
systems and rail projects. I suggest some ways in which the balance of concerns in rail 
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projects differs, on the average, from those encountered by projects in the traditional 
sectors for SE. I do not suggest that the fundamentals of SE vary between sectors but I do 
suggest that some traditional SE practices require adjustment for the rail sector if they are to 
be effective in a new domain. 
Chapter 6 is entitled A workable characterisation of ‘better’. I am trying to understand how 
SE might result in better projects and better systems and in order to explore that I need 
some objective characterisation of ‘better’. Other researchers attempt to do this in terms of 
the cost and duration of projects and the performance of systems. However, these concepts 
are hard to evaluate in an objective and standard manner and it is hard to separate the 
effects of the different factors that influence them. Readings and a preliminary survey lead 
me to postulate that one of the ways in which SE may deliver benefits is by eliminating 
changes to project direction or allowing these changes to be decided upon earlier. I define a 
measure of the unnecessary delay in taking a decision to make a change and I refer to this 
measure as change latency. I argue that this is a useful measure of the potential that SE has 
to deliver benefits because reduced change latency can contribute to reduced cost and 
duration and increased performance. I also argue that change latency is a methodologically 
useful measure. 
At this point, my broad objectives, to explore the relationship between SE and project 
outcomes, can be replaced by specific objectives to explore the relationship between core SE 
and change latency. 
In chapter 7, Methodology, I outline my approach to exploring these specific objectives, 
which is (i) to construct a model of how SE interacts with other project activities, (ii) to 
construct a tentative theory of how SE can contribute to reduced change latency and (iii) to 
test this tentative theory, by applying qualitative and quantitative methods to field data 
collected for the purpose and to published project accounts. 
Before describing the results of following this methodology, I look, in chapter 8, A case 
study, at one example of the application of SE to a rail project and illustrate how rigorous 
analysis of cases can produce useful results – in this case showing that a simple-minded 
tentative theory about the benefits of SE is untenable and must be refined. 
Introduction  Chapter 1 
 5 
Chapter 9, A model and tentative theory, contains a model of how SE interacts with other 
project activities, presented as a diagram using a process-modelling notation called IDEF0, 
and a tentative theory of how SE contributes to reduced change latency, presented as 
conjectures about causal mechanisms associated with the model. 
The findings of two exercises designed to test the tentative theory are presented in the next 
two chapters. 
In chapter 10, Testing the tentative theory against data collected from projects, I describe 
an exercise to collect and analyse data about five railway projects and the major changes 
that occurred on them, via interviews and the inspection of project records. 
In chapter 11, Testing the tentative theory against published data, I describe an analysis of 
published data concerning four further railway projects. 
In both of these chapters, I reflect upon the extent to which the data confirm the tentative 
theory, the extent to which they contradict it and the refinements to the tentative theory 
that the data suggest. 
In chapter 12, Conclusions and recommendations, I record my findings. I look at the refined 
research objectives and consider to what extent they have been met. I then relate these to 
the original research objectives and consider to what extent these have been progressed. I 
record what has been learnt about SE, about rail projects and about the effects of adopting 
SE approaches on rail projects. I also reflect on the research methodology, the model and 
the tentative theory and their value to research of this type. For the researcher I recommend 
promising directions for future research activity and for the practitioner I suggest ways in 
which the results of the research to date can be applied. 
Some detailed supporting information is provided in appendices and is referred to in the 
main text. 
1.4 A note on style 
Having declared my ambition to compile knowledge of value to people involved in railway 
projects, I have, I believe, an obligation to present my research in a way that makes it as 
accessible as I can to people wishing to apply my findings. I have therefore written this thesis 
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in a style that is nearer to everyday English than is customary for academic documents, in 
order to make it easier for people outside academia to read it. I hope that readers who are 
expecting a different style will excuse me. 
1.5 Key points 
To help the reader follow the logical arguments running through this thesis, I provide a 
summary of key points at the end of each chapter. I give each point a unique identifier to 
make it easier to refer to it. 
The key points from this chapter are as follows: 
1A The research was motivated by the absence of satisfactory answers to the following 
questions: 
 ”If I apply SE to this project, will I see benefits that justify the cost?” 
 “How should I adapt SE practices that have been developed in other sectors to 
make them work well on my project?” 
1B The outline objectives of this research are: 
 To demonstrate that SE can be used to build better rail systems and to build rail 
systems better, aiming for measurable improvement. 
 To gain an improved understanding of how to adapt SE to yield optimum results 
in major rail projects. 
1C I wish to compile knowledge of value that is useful to people involved in rail projects. 
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2 THE NATURE OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
I am an engineer and, when I think about academic research, my initial instinct is to take 
what I know about the development of scientific knowledge as a starting point. I think of 
Robert Boyle, whose careful measurements resulted in his name being attached to the ‘law’ 
that, other things being equal, the volume of a certain mass of an ideal gas varies inversely 
with its pressure. It is tempting to imagine an ‘Elliott’s Law’, relating the effectiveness of a 
rail project to some measure of the amount of SE performed on it. I had to discard that 
vision as an unrealistic ideal but it still held a grip on my thinking for some considerable time 
as an ideal to be approached, if not achieved. 
Gradually, though, it dawned on me that the objects that I was studying were a very, very 
long way away from ideal gasses. That has important implications for the research methods 
that I use, as I explain in chapter 7, but, even more profoundly, it affects the sort of 
knowledge that it is practical to compile. I discuss the objects within the field of study in this 
chapter and draw conclusions as to what it is possible to know about them. 
2.1 Observations on the field of study 
It is helpful to reproduce my general research objectives. These are: 
 To demonstrate that SE can be used to build better rail systems and to build rail 
systems better, aiming for measurable improvement. 
 To gain an improved understanding of how to adapt SE to yield optimum results in 
major rail projects. 
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I have highlighted, in bold type, three nouns – SE, project and system - which are objects 
within the field of study. For now, the following descriptions will suffice: 
 SE is a collection of tools, techniques and methods, bound together by some shared 
ideas2. 
 A project is a social activity in which people work together towards a common goal, 
which will be taken to be the delivery of a system3. 
 A system is a combination of interacting elements organised to achieve one or more 
stated purposes4. 
I have also highlighted the word better. ‘Better’ systems and projects are presumably 
associated with lower costs, greater benefits or both and so costs and benefits are objects of 
study. 
Figure 1 shows the principal objects within the field of study implied by the research 
objectives. 
                                                     
2
 This is compatible with the definition provided by the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE, 2010), which 
is “an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization of successful systems”. 
3
 This is compatible with the definition in a manual of project management (Office of Government Commerce, 2002), which 
is “a management environment that is created for the purpose of delivering one or more business products according to a 
specified Business Case”. 
4
 This is the definition provided in (INCOSE, 2010). 
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Figure 1: The main objects in the field of study 
The figure also depicts the principal relationships between the objects: 
 The project delivers a system. 
 The application of SE to the project results in a set of SE activities which are a subset 
of the project activities. 
 The application of SE to the project will have costs and may or may not result in 
benefits for the project (which may perhaps be completed more quickly) or for the 
system (which may please its stakeholders more than it would have done otherwise). 
I make four important observations about these objects that have implications for the 
research: 
 The objects in the field of study do not easily permit controlled experiments. 
 The objects in the field of study are defined differently by different observers. 
 The objects in the field of study are drawn from populations of great variety. 
 The objects in the field of study studied are subject to continual change. 
I now discuss each observation in turn. 
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2.2 The objects in the field of study do not easily permit controlled experiments 
Boyle could seal a fixed mass of gas within a flexible container, vary the pressure placed on 
the gas and measure its volume. It is very hard to see how an experimental researcher could 
run a realistic rail project multiple times with different levels of SE. SE researchers generally 
have to work with observations of the real world and work with the variation that the real 
world provides. 
The limited role for experiments is recognised in several other fields, including economics, 
see for instance Mayer (1995; page 20). 
2.3 The objects in the field of study are defined differently by different observers 
All the objects in the field of study are constructs that people place on the real world and all 
these constructs may vary from observer to observer. This is most dramatically exemplified 
in the context of benefits where the general manager of a metro line and a driver on that 
line may have very different views on the benefits of a project to introduce driverless 
operation. We shall also see (in chapter 5) that there is a bewildering multiplicity of ways of 
describing SE. 
The fact that systems have a physical reality may suggest that they are more objectively 
defined. However there is more to a typical system than its physical components and we can 
still find disagreement about exactly what its components are. Ask different people 
questions like, “Is the design of the system part of the system?” or “Should the operators 
and maintainers be considered within the boundary of the system?” and you may receive 
different answers. The same fuzzy boundaries may be experienced for projects and the 
programmes of SE activities within them. In organisations that develop products and then 
use them in projects to build systems, the boundary between product development activity 
and project activity may also be the subject of dispute. And, if a mechanical engineer is 
attending an SE workshop to refine requirements, are they doing mechanical engineering or 
systems engineering? 
That is why clouds are appropriate symbols in Figure 1. Ask two people whether there are 
clouds in the sky and they will probably give you the same answer. Ask the same people how 
many clouds are in the sky and you may get different answers. 
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There are research methods, often referred to as ‘interpretive’, which abandon the attempt 
to compile knowledge about an objective world that exists independently of observers and 
instead study the understanding that people have of the world – see, for instance, Lings and 
Lee (2008; page 60). I do not see how such methods may be applied to compile knowledge 
of the practical utility desired. There appear to be two other strategies to cope with this 
problem: 
 To define objective concepts with some useful relationship with the range of 
subjective concepts in general discussion and then to discuss the objective concepts. 
 If the difference between what different people mean by particular terms is small 
enough, to use the everyday terms in the conduct of the research and to accept that 
variation in what people mean by the terms is a source of ‘experimental error’ in any 
data collected. 
In practice, it seems to be necessary to use a mixture of both strategies and that is what I 
do5. 
2.4 The objects in the field of study are drawn from populations of great variety 
Finally, projects and systems are drawn from populations of great variety, differing in 
countless ways. 
In practice this makes it virtually impossible to prove that a particular cause will always have 
a particular effect. So a fair answer to the question that I discussed above, “If I apply SE to 
this project, will I see benefits that justify the cost?“ is unlikely to be a definitive ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. 
The best one can hope for is to be able to say that, on a number of projects that appear to 
be similar in important respects, the benefits of applying SE justified the cost. That indicates 
that the benefits are likely to justify the costs for the project in question. However, one can 
never rule out the possibility that some difference between the particular project and the 
other projects may impair the ability of SE to deliver benefits to the same degree. 
                                                     
5
 As we shall see in chapter 3, other researchers working in the area, including Elm and Goldenson (2012) and Honour (2013) 
take this approach. 
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This problem is encountered in many other fields, for example, in business studies, where 
statistical inference is used to draw probabilistic conclusions rather than universal 
conclusions – see for example Lings and Lee (2008; page 292). 
However, being unable to compile definitive, universal knowledge is not an obstacle to 
compiling useful knowledge. Thoughtfully-analysed, well-grounded knowledge of the type 
described above is, potentially, of great utility. That utility is increased if researchers take the 
trouble to identify and document significant features of the sample of projects from which 
they draw conclusions so that those using these conclusions can judge the relevance to their 
own situation. That utility is also increased if, when researchers suggest that an application 
of SE can produce a certain benefit, they suggest the mechanisms by which that benefit is 
delivered so that practitioners can judge whether these mechanisms are likely to operate on 
their own projects. 
2.5 The objects in the field of study are subject to continual change 
Finally, the objects under study are affected by continual change in the following ways: 
 SE changes over time as its practitioners work to improve it. 
 The values that underpin benefits change over time. For example, it is common at 
the time of writing to regard a reduction in the cost of materials and labour on a 
large infrastructure project as a benefit. In the foreseeable future it may become 
unthinkable to perform this calculation without adjusting for the effect of the project 
on the natural environment. 
 The environment in which projects exist includes the knowledge and beliefs of the 
people involved and these change over time. 
As a consequence, it is not only difficult to reach universal conclusions, it is also difficult to 
reach timeless ones. Anything that may be concluded about some subset of projects may be 
rendered untrue, or at the very least irrelevant, by some development in the future. 
An interesting example of this limitation encountered in economics is the ‘Lucas critique’ 
(Stanley, 2000) that “any change in policy will systematically alter the structure of 
econometric models”. 
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2.6 Reflections 
The nature of the field of study, then, means that the knowledge that we can compile about 
it will almost certainly be imprecise, limited in applicability and subject to revision in the light 
of changing circumstances. 
However, this should not stand in the way of accumulating a useful body of knowledge. For 
that body of knowledge to be truly useful though, it will be necessary to incrementally 
increase and refine it over time. I acknowledge that I only have the resources to make a 
limited contribution to that body of knowledge but, in order to maximise the value of that 
contribution, I set myself a specific research objective to carry out my research in a way that 
helps others to refine and build upon my findings. 
2.7 Key points 
2A The objects in the field of study are in the realm of human activity and, therefore: 
 do not easily permit controlled experiments; 
 are defined differently by different observers; 
 are drawn from populations of great variety; and 
 are subject to continual change. 
2B The knowledge that we can compile about the field of study will almost certainly be 
imprecise, limited in applicability and subject to revision in the light of changing 
circumstances. 
2C I have set myself a specific research objective to carry out my research in a way that 
helps others to refine and build upon my findings. 
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3 PRIOR WORK 
In this chapter, I review prior research into how SE contributes to project outcomes and 
some relevant but more general research into project outcomes and the factors that 
influence them. The review is not restricted to the rail sector. 
This chapter does not contain a comprehensive list of the prior work that I refer to. Other 
chapters draw upon work from a variety of different areas; in this chapter, I discuss prior 
work that is directly relevant to my research objectives. 
I look first at research into the outcomes enjoyed by projects, then at theories about how SE 
may contribute to projects and then at the empirical evidence for the effect of SE on 
projects, before, finally, reflecting on the overall state of knowledge. 
3.1 The outcomes enjoyed by projects 
There is no difficulty finding evidence that there is scope for improvement in the 
performance of large engineering projects. In this section I present papers that suggest that 
a significant number of these projects overrun, deliver systems that do not provide the 
benefits expected of them or just fail to deliver at all. There is evidence that SE could have 
prevented some of the disappointments. 
The CHAOS reports produced by the Standish Group, for example (Standish Group, 2010), 
are widely-cited in support of the potential value of SE. The reports contain analyses of 
information about IT and software development projects. At the time of compiling this 
thesis, the most recent publicly available report (Standish Group, 2010) contained an 
assertion that 24% of such projects are failures while a further 44% did not fully meet all 
their targets. 10 ‘factors of success’ are put forward, which include at least two, ‘Clear 
Business Objectives’ and ‘Optimizing Scope’, that may be delivered through the adoption of 
SE approaches. 
Observers such as Glass (2006) express reservations about the weight that can be given to 
the CHAOS findings on the grounds that the underlying data are not open to independent 
scrutiny and that the manner in which projects are selected may favour those that 
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performed badly. However, even if these criticisms are valid, the conclusion that many 
projects disappoint survives them. Moreover, other studies reveal that this conclusion is 
valid in other domains. 
For example, Hertogh et al (2008) find consistent results in large European infrastructure 
projects. They report findings from the NETLIPSE (NETwork for the dissemination of 
knowledge on the management and organisation of Large Infrastructure ProjectS in Europe) 
research project. They describe an activity to gather and analyse information on 15 large 
European infrastructure projects, of which 7 were rail projects, with a total value in excess of 
€40 billion. Once again there is clearly room for improvement. In section 4.3 of their report, 
they observe that large infrastructure projects “do not have a good reputation with respect 
to cost and time control” and cite facts that justify this reputation. 
They make some attempt to explain the reasons for this and their explanation suggests that 
SE approaches may have the potential to reduce overruns. They observe that “the origin of 
reasons for cost overrun and time delay can more often be found in the planning rather than 
in the construction phase” and, amongst these reasons, cite poor definition of requirements, 
estimates based upon uncertain principles and focussing too little on external stakeholders. 
From its research, the project team has formulated 63 findings and 46 “best practices and 
lessons learnt”, essentially, recommendations for future large infrastructure projects. Some 
of these are in areas such as financial management and contracting, that fall outside SE but 
others align with good SE practice in establishing and managing requirements, modelling, 
simulation and controlling change. 
More specifically, scope for improvement has been found in the performance of rail 
projects. Flyvbjerg (2007) studied a number of rail projects and found that: 
 they suffered average cost escalation of 44.7%; 
 75% of the projects suffered cost escalations of at least 24%; and 
 25% of the projects suffered cost escalations of at least 60%. 
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3.2 Theories about how SE contributes to project outcomes 
3.2.1 Theories of how SE delivers benefits 
Sheard (1996b) suggests that SE adds value to a project in four ways: 
 by activities that contribute directly to the product of the project; 
 by increasing efficiency and effectiveness of other people’s work through better co-
ordination; 
 by contributing to setting a vision for the project, and to guiding and leading the 
project; and 
 by reducing risk. 
This is a classification of the types of value that are claimed for SE. The first three are 
associated with better systems or better (that is cheaper and quicker) projects, while the 
final point reminds us that organisations cannot be certain what the outcomes of their 
projects will be and a reduction in the variation encountered in any of these dimensions may 
be considered a benefit even if the mean average is not improved. 
However Sheard’s categorisation does not of itself constitute a theory of how SE might 
produce benefits. Given the significant resources expended upon SE, it is surprisingly difficult 
to find a clear exposition of such a theory. Nevertheless, three general types of hypothesis 
may be discerned in the literature: 
 ‘The control of complexity’ (RAEng, 2007; American Society of Civil Engineers, 2009; 
McNulty, 2011). The hypothesis that, it becomes impossible to realise systems that 
have surpassed a certain threshold in complexity without using SE, at least without 
unacceptable levels of rework. 
 ‘Whole system optimisation’ (Hitchins, 1998; Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter, 
2003; ProRail and Rijkswaterstaat, 2008). The hypothesis that SE provides a means of 
optimising the system as a whole that is not provided to a satisfactory degree by 
other disciplines. 
 ‘Left shift’ (Honour, 2013; INCOSE, 2010). The hypothesis that effort invested early in 
a project, and in particular in the SE activities that occur in the early stages will yield 
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savings in effort later in the project that outweigh the investment, presumably 
because SE pre-empts expensive problems. 
Each of these hypotheses is discussed in turn. The hypotheses are clearly not mutually 
exclusive and to some extent overlap. 
The control of complexity 
In many different sectors, the systems that people are building are becoming steadily more 
complicated (RAEng, 2007). We have seen that the projects that deliver these systems are 
prone to expensive technical hitches. There is a widespread belief that some of these hitches 
are the consequence of increasing complexity and that some form of systems approach may 
provide at least partial protection against these problems. 
Such a belief is held by UK and US engineering institutions. The UK Royal Academy of 
Engineering published a paper (RAEng, 2007), ‘Creating systems that work: Principles of 
engineering systems for the 21st century’ which espouses an approach to ‘integrated system 
design’ that is consistent with many SE approaches. On the other side of the Atlantic, the 
American Society of Civil Engineers concluded in a recent report (American Society of Civil 
Engineers, 2009) that, “Critical infrastructure must be planned, funded, designed, 
constructed, and operated as a system that is appropriately integrated with all other 
interdependent systems.” McNulty (2011), reporting the results of a government-funded 
inquiry into the cost of UK railways, recommends methods for achieving better value for 
money that include systems approaches. 
Whole system optimisation 
Hitchins (1998) asserts that trying to maximise the values of individual parts of a system on 
their own will disturb the other parts and result in a system that has less value than it could 
have. In his view, SE contributes to better systems, at least in part, by providing mechanisms 
for finding the best overall system; mechanisms that are not provided by other disciplines. 
Some support for at least part of Hitchins’s hypothesis can be found in Flyvbjerg’s, 
Bruzelius’s and Rothengatter’s analysis of very large infrastructure projects (Flyvbjerg, 
Bruzelius and Rothengatter, 2003). Their recommendations for improving the outcomes of 
such projects include procuring against ‘performance specifications’. A performance 
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specification is a specification of the performance to be delivered by a system and is 
contrasted with the traditional practice of specifying the form and function of the system. 
The benefit of using performance specifications is that this allows the system supplier a 
greater range of solutions to optimise over. 
There is even more explicit support for this hypothesis from the Netherlands. The Dutch 
government has taken a decision to transfer some responsibility for the design of 
infrastructure projects to the private sector. In response, ProRail and Rijkswaterstaat, who 
together manage Dutch railways, roads and waterways, are actively promoting SE because it 
makes it possible to “focus the solution on producing maximum performance and quality 
(efficiency)” (ProRail and Rijkswaterstaat, 2008; page 13). 
Left shift 
Honour (2013) presents an orthodox view of the ‘left shift’ hypothesis when he describes the 
“intuitive understanding of the value of SE” in the following terms, “In traditional design, 
without consideration of SE concepts, the creation of a system product is focused on fixing 
problems during production, integration, and test. In a ‘system thinking’ design, greater 
emphasis on the front-end system design creates easier, more rapid integration and test. The 
overall result promises to save both time and cost, with a higher quality system product.” 
The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) is an international professional 
society for SE. It publishes an SE Handbook (INCOSE, 2010; pages 14ff) that contains a graph 
which illustrates the hypothesis by showing that, while the costs incurred on a project rise 
most rapidly in the later stages of the project, the costs committed by decisions rise most 
rapidly in the early stages. The authors of the Handbook assert that the cost of removing 
errors is lower if they are removed earlier in the project and argue that SE will reduce cost by 
providing information that supports better earlier decisions. 
3.2.2 Theories of how SE might do harm 
One would expect that SE is sufficiently well-established by now that it should have 
attracted some fundamental challenges. So far, while my literature search has discovered 
many papers written by authors who believe that current SE practice can be improved upon, 
I have yet to find an author who believes that the concept is fundamentally flawed and 
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needs to be thought out again from scratch. The nearest that I can find is Hoos (1976), see 
Beishon and Peters (1976; page 168), who asserts that SE “cannot claim unqualified success” 
because it had been used on a number of well-publicised engineering disasters but restricts 
himself to mild scepticism when he writes that the “predominance of systems engineering 
may have obscured other, perhaps more promising approaches.” 
If direct criticism of SE is hard to find, the existence of some harm associated with applying 
SE may be inferred from other writers’ work. The SE approach is generally associated with 
meticulous planning and preparation and, via left shift, with taking decisions earlier than 
would otherwise be the case. Some writers question whether meticulous planning and early 
decision making always deliver benefits. After studying a number of organisations that carry 
out highly reliable operations, Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) ascribe this reliability, in part, to 
‘mindfulness’ – a state which they conclude can be impaired by over-preparation. After 
studying a number of large engineering projects, Miller and Lessard (2000) conclude that 
taking decisions at the right time is critical to project success and state that, sometimes, it is 
best to postpone decisions in order to keep options open. These findings might suggest that 
adopting SE approaches without sufficient thought might do harm, however, there seems to 
be no reason why a thoughtful application of these approaches should not avoid these 
pitfalls. 
In general, there is little reason to believe that, if applied well, SE is likely to result in harm. 
The questions upon which a decision about whether to adopt SE are likely to hinge are likely 
to be, ‘Will the benefits outweigh the costs?’ and ‘Are there other, less-expensive ways of 
achieving the same benefits?’ 
3.2.3 What else might affect the benefits accruing from using SE? 
In truth, the question is not, “Does SE deliver benefits on projects?“ but rather, “On which 
types of project does SE deliver benefits?“ There must be projects on which it delivers 
benefits. For example, consider a project which, through mistakes in thinking, is building a 
system that will not solve the problem it is designed to solve. A clear articulation of the 
requirements may well be sufficient to reveal the mistake and save the project from 
disaster. Equally, there must be projects that are beyond help from SE. For example, 
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consider the same project just described but now make the project manager obdurately 
wedded beyond reasoned argument to the flawed specification. Neither scenario is outside 
the range of human experience. 
So the benefits, if any, that will result from adopting SE on a project must depend upon 
other factors. I have found four distinct types of factors discussed in the literature: 
 How well SE is performed (Kludze, 2004; Honour, 2013); 
 The relationship between SE and other project functions (Ade, 2007; Barker and 
Verma, 2003); 
 The motivation of the players (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter, 2003); and 
 The size of the project (Boehm, Valerdi and Honour, 2008). 
Each of these is discussed in turn. 
How well SE is performed 
It would be extraordinary if the benefits of SE did not depend upon how well it was done. 
There is published evidence that the benefits of SE do depend upon how well it is done. 
Kludze (2004) provides a possible example of poor SE leading to poor outcomes. He 
describes a study to establish the value of SE within NASA which includes an analysis of a 
number of case studies from which he concludes that SE assists in the development of cost-
effective systems, reduces risk and has a considerable impact on technical performance. 
However, his case studies include an anonymous NASA project that was delivered a year late 
at twice the estimated cost, even though the project team performed a lot of SE. Kludze 
observes that the SE practitioners were inexperienced and hypothesises that a good process 
in this case did not compensate for a lack in knowledge and skill. If that is the case then 
presumably this lack resulted in poor execution of SE that, in turn, produced the 
disappointing outcome. 
Honour (2013), when correlating the outcomes of projects with the expenditure on SE, 
chooses to adjust this expenditure with a quality factor and finds that project success is 
correlated more strongly with adjusted expenditure than with unadjusted expenditure. 
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The relationship between SE and other project functions 
SE is not directly responsible for creating any concrete part of a delivered system; it can only 
deliver benefits indirectly by helping those who are responsible for these deliveries. 
Therefore, the relationship between the people performing SE and the rest of the project 
members must affect SE’s effectiveness. 
The relationship between SE and project management is of particular interest. Some people 
think that this relationship has to be sound before the benefits of SE can be fully enjoyed. As 
an example, Ade (2007) reports on a panel discussion at an INCOSE conference that came to 
the conclusion that SE and project management cannot function effectively or efficiently 
unless the two are integrated. 
Some empirical evidence for this hypothesis has been reported by Barker and Verma (2003), 
who describe a comparison of productivity data with data on SE activities from eight IT 
projects and report that “Results do not provide conclusive evidence that systems 
engineering (on its own) enhanced productivity on specific projects. However, preliminary 
information indicates that application of formal systems engineering practices and methods, 
in conjunction with effective project management and test processes, can significantly 
improve development and integration productivity." These findings appear to corroborate 
the common-sense view that the benefits of SE must depend on how well it is integrated 
into the rest of the project. 
The motivation of the players 
One of the ways in which SE may be able to help projects deliver more efficiently is by 
revealing precisely what needs to be done so that it can be accurately planned and 
estimated. But the causal link here only works if those in charge are motivated to produce 
accurate estimates. Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter (2003) challenge this assumption. 
They studied a large number of large infrastructure projects and concluded that some of the 
chronic mismatch between estimated and actual costs and benefits of these projects was 
the result of deliberate manipulation of the estimates. 
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The size of the project 
In a study of software projects that is discussed in more detail below, Boehm, Valerdi and 
Honour (2008) find that the effect of variations in the amount of SE performed was greater 
on very large projects than on small projects. 
3.2.4 If SE delivers benefits why is not applied more widely? 
All the theories for the benefits of adopting SE are of a general nature and would predict 
that these benefits would be enjoyed in a large number of sectors. All the same, SE is only 
commonly applied in a few sectors. Some writers suggest explanations for the limited 
adoption in some areas. 
Ackoff (2006) suggests reasons why SE is not taken up more. He points out that one must 
admit to one's mistakes before learning from them. He suggests that Western management 
and accounting systems measure errors of commission but not of omission and that this 
predisposes Western management to inactivity. He also suggests that systems engineers are 
introverted by nature and must learn to talk to its potential users in a language that they 
understand. I agree with the latter point. Jargon is an obstacle to communication between 
any pair of communities but it is the responsibility of those selling an idea to speak the 
language of the prospective customers. I was a member of an international rail SE working 
group that concluded (Armitage et al, 2008) that excessive use of technical vocabulary by 
systems engineers was a real obstacle to the uptake of SE. 
Adopting SE in areas where it is not traditional requires investment and Sheard and Miller 
(2000) suggest that an executive under cost pressure will find it hard to adopt a strategy of 
investing in one area in order to save money overall. 
By contrast, Sheard, Lykins and Armstrong (2000) describe six barriers to the adoption of SE 
ideas that are all associated with flawed thinking or action. These are: 
 a tendency for organisations to regard themselves as exceptions to the rule; 
 the lack of a generally acknowledged definition of SE; 
 working towards the appearance of adopting SE rather than the reality; 
 over-reliance on training for process improvement; 
 assigning insufficient resources for process improvement; and 
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 not setting priorities for the introduction of new ideas. 
Taken together, these provide sufficient potential obstacles to the migration of SE 
approaches from sector to sector that the fact that this rate of migration appears to be slow 
does not undermine any of the theories proposed above. 
3.3 Empirical evidence 
There is increasing empirical evidence for the benefits of SE. Firstly there is evidence in 
support of some of the underlying theories: 
 Werner Gruhl, in the Office of Comptroller at NASA HQ, compiled data from a study 
of NASA projects that showed a clear negative correlation between the percentage of 
effort spent in the early phases and cost overruns. These data were originally 
included in a presentation. I cannot find the original but the data are widely 
reproduced, for instance by Hoffman and Lawbaugh (1996; page 18), in support of 
the ‘left shift’ hypothesis. 
 Miller and Lessard (2000) present the findings of a study of 60 large engineering 
projects. They found that the success of these projects was correlated with (a) 
investing in the initial, ‘shaping’ stage of a project and (b) defining the objectives in a 
manner that creates options about how they can be met. Their findings provide some 
empirical evidence for the theories of left shift and whole-system optimisation. 
To be precise, neither of these analyses provides direct evidence that SE will deliver benefits 
but, in providing some corroboration for the theories of left shift and whole-system 
optimisation, they provide indirect support for such a conclusion. 
Until recently, evidence of a correlation between the adoption of SE practices and project 
outcomes has been derived only from studies of small populations of projects: 
 Frantz (1995) describes a serendipitous experiment concerning three projects at 
Boeing to develop handling machines. The projects delivered similar products but 
happened to employ varying degrees of SE. He found that the project which 
employed the most SE was completed in a third of the time that the project that 
employed the least SE took and that the projects that performed more SE delivered 
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better products. This exercise comes close to the ideal of a scientific, double-blind 
experiment but the sample size is small. 
 Gharatya (2006) used a survey approach to collect data in rail and non-rail projects 
from which he concludes that project cost and schedule improve with the proportion 
of overall budget spent on SE, up to an optimum point that appears to be in the 
range 5-7% for the rail sector. He finds an average of 4.3% spent on SE in the metro 
rail projects that he looked at, compared with 7.6% in the defence projects looked at. 
With these data, he succeeds in constructing a business case that satisfies London 
Underground’s investment rules for increasing SE expenditure in some scenarios. 
Gharatya also finds that the degree of satisfaction of requirements improves with SE 
expenditure. He acknowledges that, with the survey approach taken, there are 
concerns about the validity of the (often subjective) data supplied and the 
representativeness of the sample. 
 Kludze (2004) describes a study to establish the value of SE within NASA that includes 
an analysis of a number of case studies from which he concludes that SE assists in the 
development of cost-effective systems, reduces risk and has a considerable and 
positive impact on technical performance. His analysis suggests that SE may shorten 
or lengthen the duration of the project. Like Gharatya, Kludze collected much of the 
underlying data by interviewing people and his findings are subject, therefore, to the 
same reservations about subjectivity. As I have already noted above, his case studies 
include one, anonymous NASA project that is an apparent counter-example. It was 
delivered a year late at twice the estimated cost despite performing a lot of SE. 
 Goldenson and Gibson (2003) report results that “provide credible quantitative 
evidence that Capability Maturity Model® Integration (CMMI®)-based process 
improvement6 can result in better project performance and higher quality products.” 
The data were collected in 12 case studies in different countries, in different sectors 
and in projects of different sizes, but Goldenson and Gibson acknowledge that the 
                                                     
6
 CMMI is a framework for supporting improvement in a range of processes that include SE processes. 
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degree of detail varied between the organisations and I wonder what else might have 
varied and whether the organisations that took part may have selected themselves 
on the grounds that their reports were not too negative. It is also acknowledged that 
this result is limited to software-intensive systems. 
 Barker and Verma (2003) describe a study of 8 IT development projects over a period 
when both SE and project management processes were being improved. They found 
that the projects that had adopted more formal approaches to SE and project 
management enjoyed productivity levels 30% higher than the other projects. They 
conjecture that the improvements in SE and project management produced the rise 
in productivity but accept that the small sample size does not yield conclusive 
evidence for this conjecture. 
 Boehm, Valerdi and Honour (2008) report a different approach. COCOMO is a 
parametric model used to estimate the effort required to complete software projects 
software. It is more than two decades old and is underpinned by a library of data 
collected from 161 software projects. Some of the parameters for which data was 
collected may be regarded as indicators of the amount of SE performed on these 
projects. After normalising for the effect of other parameters, the authors found that 
these parameters were correlated positively with productivity, measured in lines of 
code produced per person-day. Moreover, they found that the effect of SE 
parameters on productivity was greater for the larger projects than for smaller ones. 
 I lead an INCOSE group that compiles case studies of the application of SE in 
transportation. At the time of writing, the published library of case studies (INCOSE 
Transportation Working Group, 2013) contained descriptions of 11 transportation 
projects, of which 7 were rail projects. With one exception, which was prepared from 
public domain sources, these descriptions were written by people not involved in the 
projects, from the results of interviews with people who had taken part in the 
projects. Each case study records reasoned beliefs that the adoption of some aspects 
of SE on the project benefitted the project. There is no suggestion that the sample of 
projects is representative – on the contrary, the projects were chosen to make the 
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case for SE – and the conclusions are based upon subjective testimony. However, 
there is evidence here that SE has been of benefit to the projects in question. 
Taken individually, the findings of each of the studies described above must be treated with 
circumspection because at least one of the following is true: 
 the studies looked at a small sample of projects; 
 the sample of projects was restricted to one sector; 
 the sample of projects was not representative of the wider populations; or 
 conclusions are drawn on the basis of people’s opinions. 
Taken as a whole, though, the studies make a compelling case that adopting SE has been of 
benefit to projects across a wide range of domains. 
Recently two studies with larger samples have been published: 
 Elm and Goldenson (2012) present the results of a study containing an analysis of 
survey data from 148 projects, mostly performed by US defence suppliers, which 
shows a positive correlation between the adoption of SE practices and project 
performance. 
 Honour (2013) describes the results of a statistical study of more than 90 projects in 
which he demonstrates a strong correlation between the percentage of the project 
budget spent on SE activities and certain metrics of project success, with the greatest 
success associated with projects spending 15-20% of their budget on SE. The projects 
studied were drawn predominately from the defence sector. 
Honour shows that the correlation between the percentage of the project budget spent on 
SE activities and certain metrics of project success can be improved still further if the 
measured percentage is adjusted according to other factors that characterise the project. He 
searches for adjustments that optimise this correlation. He finds that the five changes to 
factors that most increase the percentage used are: 
 more detailed definition at start; 
 higher system level of integration; 
 more development autonomy; 
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 smaller system size; and 
 greater proof difficulty. 
He conjectures that this provides some insight into the factors that affect SE effectiveness. 
By selecting a population of projects that is dominated by one or two sectors, the 
researchers in both studies have reduced one dimension of unwanted variability at the cost 
of producing results that may not be representative of other sectors. I do not criticise these 
decisions, indeed, I regard such specialisation as necessary in order to make progress. 
Elm, Goldenson and Honour employ fairly standard statistical hypothesis-testing techniques 
and obtain statistically-significant results but cannot escape the fundamental limitations that 
are associated with carrying out research in the field and that were set out in the previous 
section. Both obtain a significant proportion of their data from the testimony of interviewees 
and survey correspondents and the points of view of the contributors introduce an unknown 
amount of distortion and inconsistency into the data. The sample of projects studied is 
drawn predominately from certain sectors and countries and biased to an unknown degree 
by the fact that it is selected by the organisations concerned and these organisations may 
prefer to discuss more successful projects. 
3.4 Reflections on the state of knowledge 
The two larger studies provide corroboration of the conclusion already reached that 
adopting SE has been of benefit to projects across a wide range of domains. 
The studies performed by Honour, Elm and Goldenson also provide some indication of the 
magnitude of these benefits and some of the factors that influence this magnitude, which 
could be of real value to someone planning out a new project. However, if I repeat the two 
naïve questions that initiated this research: 
 ”If I apply SE to this project, will I see benefits that justify the cost?” 
 ”How should I adapt practices that have been developed in other sectors to make 
them work well on my project?” 
then it is clear that the studies settle neither question completely. They increase the 
confidence that the answer to the first question will be ‘Yes’ and they provide indications of 
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the circumstances in which this is most likely to be the case. Honour’s work could be used to 
suggest the optimal amount of a project budget that should be spent on SE. However, 
beyond that, the second question is hardly tackled at all. 
3.5 Planning a way forward 
There is scope, I conclude, to progress the research objectives further than has been 
achieved so far. However, a plan is needed to make progress. Four preparatory steps are 
identified: 
 to carry out preliminary investigations into the nature of rail systems and projects in 
order to tighten the focus of the research; 
 to achieve a workable definition of what SE is; 
 to achieve a workable definition of (some aspect of) what ‘better’ might mean in the 
context of ‘better rail systems’ or ‘building rail systems better’; and 
 to define an appropriate research methodology. 
These points are discussed in the next four chapters, before I proceed to describe the results 
of applying the methodology chosen. 
3.6 Key points 
3A There is evidence that there is room for improvement in the outcome of engineering 
projects across a wide range of domains, including the rail sector. 
3B There are theoretical reasons for expecting that SE can benefit engineering projects, 
including the theories of: 
 the control of complexity; 
 whole system optimisation; and 
 left shift. 
3C There is empirical evidence that adopting SE has been of benefit to projects across a 
wide range of domains, including the rail sector. 
3D There are theoretical and empirical grounds for believing that the benefits resulting 
from adopting SE depend upon factors other than the degree of adoption. 
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3E The research into the benefits of SE that has been carried out to date does not yet 
achieve the objectives that I have set for my research. 
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4 PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS 
When I defined my general research objectives (see key point 1B), I knew that it would be 
necessary to develop narrower and more refined objectives in order to establish an 
achievable research programme. I came to the research with prior knowledge of rail projects 
and systems but, in order to improve this knowledge and to expose my emerging ideas to 
comparison with the real world, so that they could be refined and developed, I carried out 
two preliminary studies, early on in the research. I also carried out some investigations into 
how the nature of rail projects should affect the manner in which SE principles are applied. 
In this chapter I explain why I carried out these investigations, what I did and what I found. 
4.1 First preliminary study 
In order to make progress towards my generic research objectives, I knew that I needed a 
better understanding of: 
 the nature of SE; 
 levels of application of SE; 
 which outcomes mattered to project stakeholders; 
 a causal relationship between application of SE principles and project outcomes; and 
 other factors that affect project outcomes. 
In the first preliminary study, I carried out a small survey, acknowledging that this was 
unlikely to deliver information of sufficient reliability upon which to base conclusions, 
because it provided an efficient way to advance my understanding in these areas. 
I carried out a brief review of good practice in questionnaire-based surveys, looking at 
guidance published by the Market Research Society (2006) and Peterson (2000). I took this 
guidance into account when preparing a questionnaire, which I tested on two occasions. 
I interviewed 13 people whom I knew and whose opinions I valued, in order to survey their 
experience of and opinions about the application of SE to projects. Most of my interviewees 
were current and past colleagues but some were people with whom I had had contact at 
INCOSE. 11 were based in the UK, 1 was based in Canada and 1 was based in the US. 
Preliminary investigations   Chapter 4 
32 
Interviews were carried out using a questionnaire. In each interview I discussed a particular 
project on which the interviewee had taken a senior role. During the interview I asked a 
number of specific questions under five general headings: 
 What sort of a project was it [that will be discussed]? 
 What SE activities were carried out [on this project]? 
 What were the most important success criteria7 for the project and to what degree 
where they met? 
 How did SE relate to the project outcomes? 
 Is there anything else? 
The questionnaire used is reproduced in appendix C. In formulating the questions about SE 
activities, I drew upon Atkins guidance on SE which I had prepared for the business before 
the start of the research. 
Nine of the projects were in the rail sector, two were in the highways sector and two were in 
the aviation sector. 
The responses to the questions about SE activities revealed that the rail projects had a lower 
uptake of SE practices than the non-rail projects but that the uptake was nonetheless 
significant: more than half of the activities inquired about were found to be put into practice 
by more than half of the projects, albeit in some cases with reservations expressed by the 
interviewee. 
When I asked people what the success criteria were for their project, four responses were 
provided by more than half of the respondents (while no other factor was mentioned more 
than three times). These success criteria are reproduced in Table 1 below. 
                                                     
7
 I phrased the question in terms of critical success factors, which was perhaps the wrong term but the examples clarified my 
meaning and the responses indicated that the interviewees understood what I meant. 
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Table 1: Most commonly mentioned success criteria 
Response Count Mean 
Performance 
Compliance with written requirements 10 2.5 
Cost to complete project 9 0.5 
Time taken to complete project 8 1.1 
Actual performance in the field 7 2.1 
Table 1 also contains a mean average indication of a score for the interviewee’s impression 
of the performance of the project against these success criteria, using the following scoring 
scheme for the options from which they selected: 
Table 2: Scoring scheme for project performance 
Response Score 
Significantly exceeded expectations 4.0 
Exceeded expectations 3.0 
Met expectations 2.0 
Fell below expectations 1.0 
Fell significantly below expectations 0.0 
Clearly there was scope for improvement in the perceived cost and time performance. 
I asked interviewees how they believed that SE activities related to the project outcomes, 
seeking their views as to how the SE actually performed had contributed in practice and how 
more SE could have contributed. Interviewees generally believed that there was a positive 
correlation between SE activities and project outcomes, particularly for the following SE 
activities: requirements management; verification and validation; and configuration 
management / change control8. 
                                                     
8
 By ‘requirements management’ I mean the activities associated with the ‘Stakeholder Requirements Definition’ and 
’Requirements Analysis’ processes in (ISO/IEC, 2002) which comprise activities to compile and structure requirements, 
resolve problems with them and keep them up-to-date. 
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Interviewees also believed that there was a positive correlation between project outcomes 
and: 
 how well the SE activities carried out were integrated with other project functions; as 
well as 
 how early they were carried out. 
4.2 Second preliminary study 
I have already stated that my generic research objectives were too general to pursue in their 
full breadth and that I needed to define additional specific research objectives. The second 
preliminary study was designed to explore the relationship between: 
 requirements management; verification and validation; and configuration 
management / change control, as input parameters; and 
 the volatility of key project input and output documents, as output parameters. 
By the volatility of a document, I mean the sum of the size of all changes made to the 
document over the period from its first issue as a basis for formal work until the end of the 
project, expressed as a proportion of the document’s final size. So a document which had 
100 pages of content in its final issue and was subject to three changes in which 1, 2 and 3 
pages, respectively, were added or changed, would have a volatility of (1+2+3)/100 = 6%. 
In calculating the volatility of a document, I only take account of ‘normative’ content – 
content that directly affects the work depending upon the document. I do not take into 
account front sheets, glossaries, introductions and so on. I measure the content either in 
number of pages, or, where the document content is expressed as a number of short, 
numbered clauses, in the number of clauses. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
By ‘verification and validation’ I mean the activities associated with the ‘Verification’ and ‘Validation’ processes in (ISO/IEC, 
2002) which comprise activities to check the system and its documentation against the requirements and design for the 
system. 
By ‘configuration management / change control’ I mean the activities associated with the ‘’Configuration Management’ 
process in {ISO/IEC, 2002) which comprises activities to maintain the integrity of the system and its documentation by 
establishing baselines and controlling changes to these baselines. 
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The volatility of requirements, in the sense described above, is a metric that is collected for 
software projects for management and research purposes. My definition is consistent with 
that proposed by Loconsole (2008). 
I chose requirements management; verification and validation; and configuration manage-
ment / change control as input parameters because the first preliminary study suggested 
that these were the aspects of SE that had the greatest effect on project outcomes. 
I chose a measure of change because the rail projects that I worked on had been beset by 
unnecessary change, some of which I thought could have been forestalled by better SE. 
Moreover, the three most prevalent theories for the manner in which SE can benefit projects 
(control of complexity, whole-system optimisation and left shift, see key point 3B) all suggest 
that SE should be able to forestall change, because: 
 The ‘control of complexity’ hypothesis (RAEng, 2007; American Society of Civil 
Engineers, 2009; McNulty, 2011), which states that it becomes impossible to realise 
systems that have surpassed a certain threshold in complexity without using SE, at 
least without unacceptable rework, implies that, without SE, expensive system-level 
faults will remain in the system and that late changes will be required to remove 
them. 
 The ‘whole-system optimisation’ hypothesis (Hitchins, 1998; Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and 
Rothengatter, 2003; ProRail and Rijkswaterstaat, 2008) suggests that SE provides a 
means of optimising the system as a whole that is not provided to a satisfactory 
degree by other disciplines and some of these optimisations will result in changes 
whose desirability would otherwise only have become evident after the system had 
been realised. 
 Some of the savings that the ‘left shift’ hypothesis (Honour, 2013; INCOSE, 2010) 
suggests will accrue from investing in the early stages of a project will be associated 
with the elimination of latent change. 
I chose volatility rather than the total volume of change because it is a normalised measure 
which can be compared between projects. 
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In the second preliminary study, I looked at 6 UK rail projects. I interviewed senior members 
of each project. Interviews were carried out using a questionnaire, in which specific question 
were organised under the headings of five general questions: 
 What sort of a project was it [that will be discussed]? 
 What requirements management and V&V activities were performed [on this 
project]? 
 What configuration management activities were performed [on this project]? 
 How much rework was performed on the project? 
 To what extent was the final system fit for purpose? 
 Is there anything else? 
I prepared the questionnaire and a data collection procedure in advance. The questionnaire 
used is reproduced in appendix C. In formulating the questions about SE activities, I drew 
upon an analysis of the relevant parts of an SE standard (ISO/IEC, 2002) and a configuration 
management standard (ISO, 1997) to prepare detailed questions about the activities 
performed. 
All these projects had maintained registers of changes and I made an estimate of the 
volatility of input and output documents by reviewing the description of each change, 
estimating the number of pages or clauses of change to the normative content of the 
document (excluding document control sections, glossaries and so on), adding up the total 
volume of change for the whole document and dividing by the total volume of normative 
content in the final version of the document. 
I found no clear correlation between volatility and the degree of adoption of good practice in 
the aspects of SE that I asked about. This was not surprising, perhaps, given the small size of 
the sample, the number of confounding factors and the fact that, on one project, volatility 
had been driven upwards by the fact that the project organisation was learning how to meet 
new SE requirements from its customer (that is, adding SE to this project increased 
volatility). 
However the volatility figures that I calculated were striking: 
 The volatility of input documents varied between 0% and 74%, with a mean of 49%. 
Chapter 4 Preliminary investigations 
 37 
 The volatility of output documents varied between 57% and 225% with a mean of 
118%. 
A mean volatility of 118% for output documents would mean that a normative clause or 
page from the consolidated set of output documents would have changed at least once, on 
average, during the course of the project. 
A volatility of more than 200% for output documents (and there were two projects that had 
such a volatility) would mean that a normative clause from the output documents for this 
project would have changed at least twice on the average during the course of the project. 
The estimating method was inexact and some changes to documents may not have been 
associated with changes to the system being built. Nevertheless, every change to a 
document must be made by someone and checked by someone and, if the document is 
being used as the basis of further work, read, understood and acted upon by a number of 
other people. 
At the time I was surprised by how high these figures were but I have since learned that they 
are not inconsistent with the volume of change experienced in other industries. Pickard, 
Nolan and Beasley (2010) found that more than half of the requirements for control systems 
for gas turbines typically change between the first major design review and entry into 
service. Sterman (2000; pages 58-59) reports on research that found that the fraction of 
work done correctly first time was 34% for defence projects and 68% for commercial 
projects. 
The levels of volatility, in output documents especially, are high enough to suggest that 
there was room for significant reductions in volatility on these projects and that such 
reductions would have resulted in significant reductions in cost. 
What the initial study suggested and, as we shall see, what other data will corroborate, is 
that, on some rail projects at least, change is a significant source of avoidable cost and delay 
and that, as a consequence, it would be fruitful to explore the potential for SE to reduce this 
cost. This is in fact the way in which I chose to direct my research, as I describe in chapter 6 
below. 
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4.3 The nature of rail systems and projects 
One of my generic objectives (see key point 1B) was, “To gain an improved understanding of 
how to adapt SE to yield optimum results in major rail projects”. The high volatility 
encountered on a small sample of rail projects suggested that this was a fruitful area to 
research. But the same logic leads to the conclusion that it is a fruitful area for the 
practitioner to focus SE upon. This suggests that a partial and provisional answer is, “To 
achieve optimum results in major rail projects, focus SE on avoiding unnecessary costs of 
change”. 
Some writers claim a need to tailor SE for the rail sector. Williams et al (2004), describing 
experience of employing SE in projects undertaken on the London Underground, report as a 
lesson learnt that “there is a need to established [sic] a systems engineering model 
specifically tailored to the railway environment and its supply chain”. Moreover, Gharatya, as 
reported in (Sullivan, 2007), states that London Underground had chosen to “tailor their SE 
methodology to fit the unique needs of their internal and external stakeholders”. 
It is the case that SE practice in the rail sector is evolving in a manner that departs in some 
respects from practice in other sectors. For example, a recent set of guidelines on the 
application of SE to public works, including rail infrastructure, in the Netherlands (ProRail 
and Rijkswaterstaat, 2008) is based upon an international SE standard (ISO/IEC, 2002) but 
supplements it with sector-specific guidance. 
I drew upon my experience and the experience of colleagues to investigate how the nature 
of rail systems and projects might make some adaptation of SE practices desirable. 
In collaboration with my supervisors and with Anne O’Neil, then Chief Systems Engineer for 
New York City Transit (NYCT), I published a paper in the peer-reviewed journal ‘Systems 
Engineering’ with the title, “Overcoming barriers to transferring systems engineering 
practices into the rail sector” (Elliott, O’Neil, Roberts, Schmid and Shannon, 2012). In this 
paper, my co-authors and I argued that the balance of concerns differs between a typical 
project in the rail sector and one in the domains in which SE was developed and that this 
difference, together with a lack of agreement on the scope of SE and differences in tradition 
between SE and the established rail disciplines, raises barriers to the effective and efficient 
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importation of SE ideas into the rail sector. My co-authors and I went on to argue SE 
practices should be adapted in order to overcome these barriers. 
The full text of the paper is reproduced in appendix D. In this section, which includes 
sections of text taken with varying degrees of modification from the published paper, I 
reflect on the nature of rail systems and rail projects and suggest ways in which this nature 
may justify adaptations to the SE practices developed in SE’s traditional sectors. 
Although I do not contend that rail systems or rail projects are fundamentally different from 
those in the sectors in which SE has traditionally been applied, I do argue that the balance of 
concerns differs between a typical project in the rail sector and one in the domains in which 
SE was developed because rail projects have to cope with two major complicating factors. 
Firstly, rail projects are better understood in terms of enhancing existing systems than 
creating new ones. 
In SE’s traditional domains it is often possible to draw a boundary around the system that is 
being created and to make progress in a self-contained manner, albeit only with the proviso 
that due attention is paid to the interactions with other systems and with the surrounding 
environment and respecting the constraints that these interactions impose. 
By contrast, railways are highly-interconnected systems. Railway infrastructure components 
have a myriad of mechanical and electrical connections between them. Moreover, the 
presence of trains travelling across the network multiplies the complexity by introducing 
long-distance interactions. Consequently, it is necessary to consider a significant part of the 
whole railway, if not all of it, as the system being worked upon and, apart from the very rare 
projects that create brand new railways, rail projects are always changing existing systems. 
Secondly, the difficulty of carrying out rail projects is exacerbated by the fact that the railway 
must usually continue to operate as it is being changed. Mott et al (2005) highlight the 
importance of this when they assert that “The trickle of railways requiring upgrades for a 
variety of reasons has now become a flood, and railway suppliers and authorities worldwide 
increasingly need to deal with the requirements of metros where signalling and train control 
has to be upgraded – without stopping the running railway." 
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The team for a project that is changing a railway while it remains in service must map out a 
migration path that splits the overall change down into a sequence of smaller changes, each 
of which can be accomplished within a short period, a weekend perhaps, and each of which 
will leave the railway in a state that allows operations to resume. 
I identify a third reason why adapting SE practices may be beneficial: Existing rail disciplines 
already perform tasks that deliver some of the objectives of a traditional programme of SE 
activities. However, because the rail and traditional SE approaches have evolved separately, 
they sometimes deliver the same objectives in different ways. For example, it has been 
common practice in multidisciplinary projects at NYCT and in Britain for some considerable 
time to subject elements of the design to an ‘inter-disciplinary check’ – a review by all the 
disciplines involved. The purpose of this check clearly overlaps the purpose of the design 
reviews that are common in multi-disciplinary defence projects. Where effective practices 
already exist, it is likely to be inefficient to change them to fit traditional SE practices and 
more efficient to adapt traditional SE practices to fit with what is already done. 
I argue that, as a consequence of the observations made above, some SE practices that have 
been developed in other industries require adaptation if the objectives that they serve are to 
be achieved efficiently and effectively in the rail sector. In particular I suggest that, when 
taking SE practices developed in another sector and applying them on a rail project, 
practitioners should: 
 look for proven practices in use within the organisation that deliver the same 
objectives as the ‘foreign’ SE practices and retain existing practices unless there is a 
clear benefit in changing; 
 be prepared to be flexible about the scope of what is referred to as SE and to exclude 
functions that are satisfactorily performed by existing rail disciplines; 
 plan to expand significantly the ‘foreign’ functions concerned with migration from 
one stage to another; and 
 take account of the fact that many design decisions about the structure of the system 
will already have been taken in the context of the railway as a whole (and often 
recorded in standards) and adjust the ‘foreign’ design processes to reflect this. 
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4.4 Key points 
4A In a small sample of projects, the most commonly mentioned success criteria were: 
 Cost to complete project 
 Compliance with written requirements 
 Time taken to complete project 
 Actual performance in the field 
4B In a small sample of rail projects, the volatility of input and output documents was 
found to be high. 
4C The levels of volatility are high enough to suggest that there was room for significant 
reductions in volatility on these projects and that such reductions would have resulted 
in significant reductions in cost. 
4D It would be fruitful to explore the potential for SE to reduce the avoidable cost of 
change. 
4E Focussing SE on reducing avoidable costs of change may assist with maximising the 
benefits that it provides to rail projects. 
4F Because of the nature of rail projects, practitioners seeking to maximise the benefits 
that SE provides to rail projects would be well advised to: 
 look for proven practices in use within the organisation that deliver the same 
objectives as the ‘foreign’ SE practices and retain existing practices unless there is 
a clear benefit in changing; 
 be prepared to be flexible about the scope of what is referred to as SE and to 
exclude functions that are satisfactorily performed by existing rail disciplines; 
 plan to expand significantly the ‘foreign’ functions concerned with migration from 
one stage to another; and 
 take account of the fact that many design decisions about the structure of the 
system will already have been taken in the context of the railway as a whole (and 
often recorded in standards) and adjust the ‘foreign’ design processes to reflect 
this. 
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5 A WORKABLE CHARACTERISATION OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
5.1 Introduction 
Opinions vary about what SE is. In order to study the effects of adopting SE approaches on 
project outcomes, I need a characterisation of SE that meets the following criteria: 
A. it can be applied objectively to divide project activities into SE activities and other 
activities; 
B. it includes activities that are broadly recognised as SE activities; but 
C. it does not include so much as to draw large areas of what is regarded as project 
management into the scope of SE 
I seek a characterisation that also meets the following additional criterion: 
D. it is the subject of broad consensus. 
In this chapter I look for existing characterisations that meet these criteria but, finding none, 
I define a new characterisation for use in my research. My new characterisation is not itself 
the subject of broad consensus but there is broad consensus that the activities that it covers 
are indeed part of SE. 
5.2 SE in the wider systems movement 
Before trying to characterise SE, I look at its relationships with other related areas of activity; 
it may help in characterising SE to understand some related things that it excludes. 
SE has been part of a wider systems movement for a long time. Von Bertalanffy (1962) 
characterises SE as one of a number of fields of applied system science, together with 
Operations Research and Human Engineering, which he then contrasts with fields of system 
theory, including cybernetics, information theory, game theory, decision theory and general 
system theory. The paper is reprinted in a book (Beishon and Peters, 1981) that is devoted to 
describing this broad ‘systems movement’. See page 61 for the characterisation cited. 
Emes et al (2005; figure 3) locate SE in a broader landscape. They draw a map of SE and 
‘competing’ disciplines that shows overlap between SE, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
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operations research, project management, systems analysis, system dynamics, control 
theory, soft systems methodology, industrial engineering, general engineering, information 
technology and economics, among others. 
Checkland (1999) delineates one boundary on this map that is of particular interest. He 
applies his soft systems methodology to ‘human activity systems’, which are systems of 
people working together. He distinguishes these systems from ‘hard’, or technical, systems. 
He observes that, when dealing with 'soft' systems, one cannot assume a system and a set of 
requirements for it, albeit initially hidden and to be revealed by discussion. Instead one 
starts with a problem situation, which may include the fact that different people see 
different problems; one chooses one or more appropriate systems to work with and then 
one negotiates agreement on a change to be made. The methodology that he has developed 
for this purpose looks very unfamiliar to a conventional systems engineer and yet has a 
record of three decades of application. 
There is considerable discussion within the SE community on the application of SE to 
‘enterprises’, that is to say, to organisations. Indeed the September 2007 edition of ‘Insight’, 
the newsletter of the society, was devoted to this theme. There is clearly no sharp boundary 
between 'hard' and 'soft' systems – dealing with the 'soft' issues is a part of every 'hard' 
systems deployment but there is a general tendency for systems thinking to move further 
into ‘soft’ territory. 
For example, systems thinking has been applied to considering societies as systems. Buckley 
(1968) provides a thoughtful review of early attempts to do this. History teaches that a 
society that persists over any length of time will constantly restructure itself to adapt to 
changing circumstances. In this field, the focus shifts from studying the structure of the 
system to understanding the processes that allow it to adapt itself effectively. 
5.3 Existing characterisations of SE 
There is no shortage of potential characterisations to choose from - in fact the abundance of 
possible characterisations is an acknowledged problem for the practice of SE and research 
into its effects. Emes, Smith and Cowper (2005) argue that SE “still doesn’t know very well 
what it is” and that, if it is to prosper, it should “take a strategic view on which […] fields it 
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wants to embrace” in order to develop a clear “brand”. Hoos (1976) – see (Beishon and 
Peters, 1976l page 163) – ascribes a certain amorphousness to the entire systems approach 
of which SE is a part: 
“[...] both strength and weakness lie in its [the systems approach's] myriad forms and 
manifestations, the very variety of which is encouraged by the latitude of interpretation 
as to what actually constitutes the systems approach. There is strength, because a 
concept so generously dimensioned and so encompassing in scope not only has 
widespread usefulness in many contexts but, through vagueness, maintains a kind of 
featherbed resilience against attack and, hence, a marked invulnerability to criticism, 
But lack of articulation conveys weakness, too, the more so because high among the 
attributes claimed for the systems approach is its precision, in the designation of 
parameters, identification of objectives, and measurement of inputs and outputs.” 
Honour and Valerdi (2006) note that this lack of agreement poses a difficulty to the 
researcher. They write, “One of the greatest difficulties in quantifying SE is the lack of such a 
shared conceptualization on the field of study”. 
One obvious way of characterising SE is to look for an agreed definition. Buede (2000; page 
9) lists seven different definitions of SE. The SE Handbook published by INCOSE (2010; page 
7) lists three definitions. 
The common entry in these two lists is INCOSE’s own definition, “Systems engineering is an 
interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization of successful systems.” This is 
more of a description that a definition and does not meet my criterion (A). 
In passing, I note that INCOSE’s definition is not wholly consistent with its own usage as the 
organisation has working groups (INCOSE, 2008) looking at the application of SE to 
sustainment of successful systems as well as their realisation. This is not a problem in the 
context of this research, which is however concerned wholly with projects, but further 
erodes confidence in the definition. 
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It is clear that there is no definition of SE that meets all my criteria so I look at other 
approaches to characterising SE. Four further approaches can be identified: 
 as a process; 
 as a discipline; 
 by activities or roles; and 
 by principles. 
Each is now discussed in turn. 
5.3.1 Characterising SE as a process 
By a ‘process’, I mean a set of activities together with some indication of how they are 
ordered or how information flows between them, or both. 
SE standards and handbooks describe SE in terms of a process, which might suggest that, at 
heart, SE can be usefully regarded as a process. But, if so, which is the real SE process? The 
processes are different. 
It is not that there is a shortage of descriptions of SE. More than a decade ago, Sheard and 
Miller (2001) reported that there was “a dizzying array of software and system process 
standards, recommended practices, guidelines, maturity models, and other frameworks.” 
There remain many descriptions. Some, such as (ISO/IEC, 2002; EIA, 1998; IEEE, 1998; 
INCOSE, 2010) are independent of any sector while others, such as (ECCS, 2004, London 
Underground Limited, 2009; ProRail and Rijkswaterstaat, 2008) are specific to a single 
sector. 
INCOSE (2014) publishes a ‘Consensus of the SE Fellows’ on what SE is, based upon 
conversations with senior systems engineers and analysis of standard reference books. The 
consensus is expressed in terms of a process, which is termed SIMILAR from the names of its 
steps (State the problem, Investigate alternatives, Model the system, Integrate, Launch the 
system, Assess performance, and Re-evaluate). Presumably this was created to resolve the 
problem of which process to choose but it just adds another process from which to choose 
and one that seems to be at odds with other standards in having no home for SE activities 
that cut across the life cycle. 
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Wymore (1993) proposes a rigorous set-theoretical treatment of SE as an activity founded 
on modelling. His description includes an SE process. His approach starts from the premise 
that a system’s interaction with its environment can be usefully modelled as a series of 
inputs and outputs and that the system can be modelled as a state machine. I am not 
convinced that this is valid for railway systems. I cannot see how one usefully models as 
inputs and outputs the gauging and electromagnetic interactions between trains and 
infrastructure or the interactions between train sub-systems that give rise to power 
requirements and axle loadings. However, Wymore's approach could be generalised to 
resolve these concerns. Although Wymore describes an SE process, his approach can be 
distinguished from those seen so far by the fact that significant intellectual content would 
remain if the process were to be removed. 
There have been efforts to harmonise these standards for some time (Kitterman, 2007) but, 
in the meantime, there are divergent forces at work. Hybertson and Sheard (2008) 
distinguish old (mechanistic) SE from a new (organic) SE, which concerns systems that 
experience continual change, are autonomous and self-organising, and which has a radically 
different approach to change, risk, uncertainty, control and contradiction. They argue that 
the two types of SE should be unified, principally through modelling. The papers cited in this 
section suggest that there is likely to be a backlog for those working on harmonisation for a 
considerable period of time. 
The processes described are not consistent with each other and, as there is no consensus on 
which process is the right process, it follows that each must exclude approaches to SE that 
are used in practice. I conclude that there is no characterisation of SE as a process that 
meets criterion (D). 
5.3.2 Characterising SE as a discipline 
The relevant definition of 'discipline' in Collins Concise Dictionary is “a branch of learning or 
instruction”. 
Aslaksen (2007) describes a debate between senior members of INCOSE about aspects of SE, 
in particular the degree to which it has intellectual content of its own, acknowledging that SE 
shares a lot of its intellectual content with established engineering disciplines. Aslaksen 
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argues that SE involves reasoning about requirements and functions as abstractions and that 
this is something that established engineering disciplines do not do. Wymore (1993) 
provides examples of such reasoning. I find Aslaksen’s argument convincing. 
When Honour (2013) writes “In many ways, however, less is understood about SE than 
nearly any other engineering discipline,” he clearly assumes not only that SE is a discipline 
but also that it is an engineering one. Stoddart (1999) seems to accept that SE is a branch of 
engineering but questions whether it is a separate discipline. 
A recent project has compiled an SE Body of Knowledge as an online encyclopaedia (SEBoK, 
2013). 
INCOSE publishes a handbook of SE (INCOSE, 2010) and uses this as a syllabus for a program 
for the certification of SE professionals and several universities offer SE degree programmes, 
so it is difficult to challenge SE's status as a discipline. It is, however, quite possible to 
challenge its status as an engineering discipline, given that Emes, Smith and Cowper (2005) 
identify overlaps of SE with operations research, systems analysis and project management, 
among several other non-engineering disciplines. 
Dixit and Valerdi (2007) explore the related question, ‘Is SE a profession?’ and conclude that 
it has not yet demonstrated that it meets the criteria for being regarded as a profession but 
that it may satisfy these criteria in the future. 
I do not need to answer the question “Is SE a discipline?“ to further the research and I 
choose to express no opinion on the matter. Given that overlaps between SE and other 
disciplines have been identified, it is clear that, even if SE were a discipline, attempting to 
use the coverage of the discipline as a basis for dividing project activities into SE activities 
and other activities would result in including an excessive amount of activities that common 
sense would ascribe to other functions, such as project management. These 
characterisations therefore do not meet criterion (C). 
5.3.3 Characterising SE by activities or roles 
I am using ‘process’ to denote a set of activities together with some indication of how they 
are ordered or how information flows between them, or both. If we remove the indications 
of ordering and information flows, we are left with just a set of activities. That seems an 
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attractive approach for my purposes and other researchers into the value of SE have come 
to the same conclusion. Honour and Valerdi (2006) define a taxonomy (they call it an 
‘ontology’) of SE activities that classifies them under the following headings: 
 Mission/purpose definition 
 Requirements engineering 
 System architecting 
 System implementation 
 Technical analysis 
 Technical management/leadership 
 Scope management 
 Verification and validation 
Honour (2013) uses a small variant on this taxonomy (with ’System implementation’ 
replaced by ’System integration‘) in his research into the return on investment in SE. 
It is still not clear that this taxonomy is sufficiently general to encompass the practice of SE in 
the rail sector. For example, transition into service, which is a significant SE issue for railway 
systems, has no clear place in the taxonomy. 
Another way of defining the activities associated with SE is indirectly, by defining them to be 
the activities carried out by people performing certain roles. A discussion on the value of SE, 
during which the participants seemed to be talking about entirely different definitions of SE 
led Sheard to write a pair of papers (Sheard, 1996a, 1996b) in which she characterises SE 
activities in terms of twelve roles that those performing SE activities might play and then 
explores the way in which each might contribute value to a project. This is an interesting 
variant on the approach taken by Honour and Valerdi but one on which there is no clear 
consensus. 
So, I find no characterisation of SE by activities or roles that meets criterion (D), although, 
when I come to creating my own characterisation of SE, I choose to express it in terms of 
activities. 
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5.3.4 Characterising SE by principles 
An interesting and even more abstract way of characterising SE is by articulating the 
principles that underpin it. In its very early days, INCOSE (1993) published a set of ‘pragmatic 
principles’, organised under eight headings: 
 Know the problem, the customer, and the consumer; 
 Use effectiveness criteria based on needs to make system decisions; 
 Establish and manage requirements; 
 Identify and assess alternatives so as to converge on a solution; 
 Verify and validate requirements and solution performance; 
 Maintain the integrity of the system; 
 Use an articulated and documented process; and 
 Manage against a plan. 
The principles are statements such as, “Don't assume that the original statement of the 
problem is necessarily the best, or even the right one.” The idea appears to have been 
abandoned and, in any case, would be difficult to apply to separate SE activities from non-SE 
activities and so I find no characterisation of SE by principles that meets criteria (A) and (D). 
5.3.5 Further remarks 
It is possible, of course, that the term ‘SE’ might cover more than one thing. Sheard (2000) 
implies that this is the case when she distinguishes three types of SE, “Discovery, a discipline 
or specialist type that involves significant analysis, particularly of the problem space; 
Program Systems Engineering, a coordination or generalist type that emphasizes the 
solution space and technical and human interfaces; and Approach, a process type that can 
(and should) be performed by any engineer”. 
‘Approach’ would occupy the overlap between SE and other engineering disciplines and 
would, presumably, be practiced by engineers doing ‘Discovery’ or ‘Program SE’ as well. 
‘Discovery’ and ‘Program SE’ appear to be discernible flavours of SE and, where the delivery 
of a system is contracted, to correspond to the activities performed by customer and 
supplier, respectively. 
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If one looks at a commonly-used SE standard (ISO/IEC, 2002), for example, one finds that the 
first process in the SE lifecycle, ‘Stakeholder Requirements Definition’, includes an activity to 
elicit stakeholder requirements by talking to stakeholders. This surely is written from the 
supplier’s point of view because it leaves implicit the question of central importance to the 
customer: which of the many, many things that stakeholders want are we going to try and 
deliver with this system? 
Hitchins (2003) describes an approach to SE that seems to represent the customer’s point of 
view and to align with ‘Discovery’. He describes SE in a manner that emphasises its value in 
terms of defining the optimal system to meet certain general wants and needs rather than in 
terms of delivering against a specification. 
5.3.6 Discussion 
The literature makes clear not only that there is no consensus on the precise answer to the 
question, “What is SE?” but that aspects of the answer are explicitly disputed. No existing 
characterisation has been found which meets all my criteria. 
It is therefore necessary to create a new characterisation to support the research. However, 
the farther that I depart from the characterisations that are in common use, the less value 
the research will have and, so, I wish to minimise this distance. Comparison of the 
characterisations above suggests that if one were to pose the question, ‘Which types of 
project activities are SE activities?’ to a number of authorities on SE one might expect there 
to be a common set of activities that are present in the majority of the answers. 
In the next section, I propose a definition of ‘core SE’ that is designed to capture this 
common set of activities. 
5.4 Core SE 
5.4.1 Defining core SE 
There may be many different characterisations of SE but they are not completely different. 
The sets of project activities that they define tend to overlap significantly, with differences at 
the margin, as Figure 2 illustrates. I seek a coherent and principled definition of a set of ‘Core 
SE’ activities (as illustrated by the central blue circle in Figure 2) within that shared overlap. 
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It would be possible then to claim that there was broad consensus that the core SE activities 
were SE activities, even if accepted characterisations differed about what other activities 
should also be regarded as SE activities. 
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Figure 2: Core SE in the context of other characterisations of SE 
Software engineers are taught that understanding the data underpinning a programme’s 
operation often provides a quicker, surer and more enduring grasp of the programme than a 
view focussed on its functionality. The characterisations of SE that I have discussed are 
generally phrased in a way that is related to what systems engineers do, that is to say, in a 
way that is related to function. 
When transferring ideas from software to project processes, the counterpart of data would 
be intellectual artefacts (documents, drawings, databases and so on) that are produced, 
used and updated during these processes. I attempt to define SE in terms of artefacts. 
In general terms, my approach to characterising SE is to identify a number of core SE 
artefacts that I find in the majority of the characterisations of SE that I have seen and then to 
Chapter 5 A workable characterisation of SE 
 53 
define core SE to be the activities that create, change or check these artefacts. However, this 
simple account of my approach needs to be refined in two ways: 
 Firstly, I acknowledge that there is very considerable variation in practice when it 
comes to deciding how to partition content between physical artefacts (documents, 
drawings, databases and so on) and so I work with ‘logical artefacts’, which are 
defined by their content and which may correspond to one or more physical artefacts 
or parts of physical artefacts. 
 Secondly, in presenting a coherent account, I find it convenient to define SE logical 
artefacts in the context of a number of project management artefacts. 
In the text below, I list the key SE and project management artefacts. I organise the list in 
three levels that correspond to major phases of a typical project. 
The descriptions of the artefacts should be read as definitions of the terms in bold text. If the 
terms are interpreted on a real project then the extent of the defined logical artefact will be 
the physical artefact, physical artefacts or parts of physical artefacts that correspond to the 
definition, no matter what the project members choose to call them. 
The SE and project management artefacts are illustrated in Figure 3. 
At the requirements level, the following logical artefacts exist: 
 A requirements specification, which is intended to document all the requirements 
from all the stakeholders. These will include requirements on the cost and schedule 
for the project. 
 A context specification, which is intended to document all relevant, significant facts 
and assumptions about the environment in which the system will operate, including 
the physical, commercial, economic and regulatory aspects of the environment. 
At the system level, the following logical artefacts exist: 
 A system specification, which is a specification of the system to be built. If the 
system is to be introduced into service in a number of stages then the interim states 
of the system should be specified as well as the final one. 
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 A system budget, which specifies a commitment to complete the project within a 
certain maximum cost. 
 A system schedule, which specifies a commitment to achieve completion of the 
project and possibly other intermediate milestones within certain windows of time. 
I assume that the system is divided into sub-systems. At the sub-system level the following 
logical artefacts exist for each sub-system: 
 A sub-system specification, which specifies what sub-system must be built. It is 
common to create interface specifications to define the interface between two or 
more sub-systems. For the purpose of this model, I take these as shared components 
of the specifications of all sub-systems that engage in the interfaces. 
 A sub-system budget – a maximum cost for the delivery of the sub-system. 
 A sub-system schedule against which the sub-system must be delivered. 
At the sub-system level the following logical artefacts exist for the project as a whole: 
 A system design, which explains how the sub-systems work together within the 
environment in which the system will operate in order to achieve compliance with 
the system specification. 
 A process model, which describes the definition, design, implementation and 
transition into service of a system to a level that makes clear the information that 
must flow between the project teams and delivery functions. 
I regard the specifications, the system design and the process model as SE artefacts. This 
classification is consistent with my general understanding of SE and something that I will 
justify shortly, when I compare core SE with two well-known SE standards. I regard the 
budgets and schedules as project management artefacts. That is a common sense definition 
and one that is consistent with PRINCE 2, a well-used project management method (Office of 
Government Commerce, 2002) that includes these items within the Project Plan, a product 
of applying the method. 
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Figure 3: SE and project management artefacts 
I then define core SE to be the totality of all project activities that affect or use the SE 
artefacts in at least one of the following ways: 
 they create content of the SE artefacts; 
 they control change to the SE artefacts; 
 they check the correctness or assess the implications of the SE artefacts; or 
 they check the system and its sub-systems against the SE artefacts. 
For the purposes of my research, I work through this definition of core SE to produce six core 
process areas – three that create SE artefacts, two that check them and one that controls 
change to them. These process areas are defined in Table 3. Table 4 indicates how the 
process areas cover the range of activities included within the definition above. The 
partitioning is chosen to align with the division of SE set out in well-used SE standards. 
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Table 3: The process areas within core SE 
Core SE Process Area Description 
Model (the project) processes The preparation and maintenance of the process model. 
Manage requirements and specify 
the system 
The preparation and maintenance of the context specification, 
requirements specification and the system specification. 
Design the system  The preparation and maintenance of the systems design and sub-system 
specifications. 
Model, simulate and analyse the 
system 
Modelling, simulation and analysis of actual and potential alternative 
system designs. 
Verify and validate the system Activities to check the system and its components against the SE 
documents. 
Manage change Activities to log requests for change, support decisions about what to do 
and to track the implementation of agreed decisions. 
Table 4: The relationship between core SE process areas and SE artefacts 
SE Artefacts 
Create content of 
artefact 
Check the artefact 
Check system 
against artefact 
Manage change to 
artefact  
Context Spec. 
Manage requirements and 
specify the system 
Model, 
simulate 
and 
analyse 
the 
system 
Verify and validate 
the system 
Manage change  
Requirements Spec.  
System Spec. 
System Design. 
Design the system 
Sub-system Specs. 
Process Model Model (the project) processes 
I have said that I wish the definition of core SE to capture activities that are shared by 
widely-used characterisations of SE and, in defining SE and articulating its component areas, 
I have tried to achieve this by keeping these characterisations in mind. To test whether I 
have succeeded, I compare it with two widely-used SE standards: 
 ISO/IEC 15288 (ISO/IEC, 2002) contains definitions of 25 processes. It is, in my 
experience, the most widely used SE standard – the INCOSE handbook is structured 
around its processes, for example.9 
 EIA-632 (EIA, 1998) is another well-established and well-known SE standard. It is the 
standard that Valerdi and Wheaton (2005) referred to when creating a standard SE 
                                                     
9
 Actually, to be quite precise, the INCOSE handbook is structured around the processes in the 2008 version of the standard. 
Both versions remain in use: the 2002 version remained the version adopted as a British Standard at the time of writing. The 
differences between the lists of processes defined by the two versions are not significant. 
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work breakdown structure for the purposes of research into estimating methods. It is 
structured in a slightly different way from ISO/IEC 15288. It contains definitions of 13 
SE processes, each of which is associated with one or more requirements. Each 
requirement, in practice, defines a sub-task within the parent process. 
Table 5 identifies the aspects of the two SE standards cited above that are considered to fall 
within the six core SE process areas. 
EIA-632 is structured around a number of requirements and the table lists the requirements 
(or, in some cases, parts of requirements) that relate to the core SE process area. These 
requirements are given serial numbers in the standard and the serial numbers are 
reproduced in the table. 
ISO/IEC 15288 is structured around a number of processes and the table lists the processes 
(or, in some cases, parts of processes) that relate to the core SE process area. 
The table also contains, in a row at the bottom, a list of the processes and requirements that 
were not mapped to any core SE process area.  
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Table 5: Mapping the core SE process areas to the requirements of SE standards 
Core SE 
Process Area 
ISO/IEC 15288 Processes EIA-632 Requirements 
Model (the 
project) 
processes 
System Life Cycle Process Management 
(as it relates to a particular project) 
Project Planning 
4: Process Implementation Strategy 
7: Technical Plans 
Manage 
requirements 
and specify 
the system 
Stakeholder Requirements Definition 
Requirements Analysis 
Verification (of the items above) 
Validation (of the items above) 
Transition (as it relates to the migration 
sequence) 
 
14: Acquirer Requirements 
15: Other Stakeholder Requirements 
16: System Technical Requirements 
25: Requirements Statements Validation 
26: Acquirer Requirements Validation 
27: Other Stakeholder Requirements Validation 
28: System Technical Requirements Validation 
32: Enabling Product Readiness (as it relates to the 
migration sequence) 
Design the 
system  
Architectural Design 
Verification (of the items above) 
Validation (of the items above) 
12: Outcomes Management  
(Item d: interface management) 
17: Logical Solution Representations 
18: Physical Solution Representations 
19: Specified Requirements 
21: Transition to Use 
29: Logical Solution Representations Validation 
30: Design Solution Verification 
Model, 
simulate and 
analyse the 
system 
Decision-making 
Risk Management 
12: Outcomes Management 
22: Effectiveness Analysis 
23: Trade-off Analysis 
24: Risk Analysis 
Verify and 
validate the 
system 
Verification (of the system and its 
components) 
Validation (of the system and its 
components) 
31: End Product Verification 
33: End Products Validation 
Manage 
change 
Configuration Management 12: Outcomes Management  
(Items b and c: configuration management and 
change management). 
None Acquisition 
Supply 
Enterprise Environment Management 
Investment Management 
Resource Management 
Quality Management 
Project Assessment 
Project Control 
Information Management 
Implementation 
Integration 
Operation 
Maintenance 
1: Product Supply 
2: Product Acquisition 
3: Supplier Performance 
5: Technical Effort Definition 
6: Schedule and Organisation 
8: Work Directives 
9: Progress Against Plans and Schedules 
10: Progress Against Requirements 
11: Technical Reviews 
13: Information Dissemination 
20: Implementation 
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It is clear that each core SE process area can be related to activities governed by both 
standards and I conclude that these process areas describe activities that it is generally 
agreed fall within SE. 
Moreover, the activities in the final row of Table 5, which do not relate to any core SE 
process are, in my view, generally activities that could reasonably be claimed by 
management or commercial functions and therefore activities that I do not wish to include 
within core SE. This is partly the consequence of my defining core SE as a subset of what 
others choose to regard as SE but also a consequence of the fact that the two standards 
define the activities necessary to engineer a system and include within these activities that 
are claimed for project management, for instance by PRINCE 2 (Office of Government 
Commerce, 2002) and which, in my experience, most systems engineers would regard as 
falling outside the scope of SE. 
Having shown this, I argue that the definition of core SE is useful because, if a correlation can 
be shown between adopting core SE practices and enjoying benefits then a similar 
correlation can be inferred between adopting SE practices according to most other common 
SE characterisations and enjoying benefits. 
5.5 Good practice in core SE 
I have defined what activities are included within core SE but I also need to be clear what I 
take as good practice in carrying out these activities. For a statement of good practice one 
would normally turn to the relevant professional society or to international standards. In this 
case, the relevant professional society, INCOSE, publishes a handbook (INCOSE, 2010) which 
is structured around ISO/IEC 15288 (ISO/IEC, 2002). I take these two documents as con-
sistent statements of good practice - ISO/IEC 15288 at a high level and the handbook at a 
more detailed level. 
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5.6 Key points 
5A I need a characterisation of SE that can be applied objectively to divide project 
activities into SE activities and other activities; includes activities that are broadly 
recognised as SE activities; but does not include so much as to draw large areas of 
what is regard as project management within the scope of SE. 
5B There are many characterisations of SE but none meets all the criteria I set for my 
research. 
5C I list a number of SE artefacts and define ‘core SE’ to be the set of activities that create, 
change or check these artefacts. 
5D I partition core SE into 6 process areas. 
5E I show that these process areas correspond to processes or requirements within two 
well-used SE standards. 
5F I argue that the definition of core SE is useful because, if a correlation can be shown 
between adopting core SE practices and enjoying benefits then a similar correlation 
can be inferred between adopting SE practices according to most other common SE 
characterisations and enjoying benefits. 
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6 A WORKABLE CHARACTERISATION OF ‘BETTER’ 
One of the objectives for this research is, “to demonstrate that SE can be used to build 
better rail systems and to build rail systems better, aiming for measurable improvement.” 
“Better” is of course a wholly subjective term the meaning of which may differ substantially 
from observer to observer. If the objective is to be met in any useful way, it is necessary to 
replace the concept with something that can be defined more objectively. 
In this chapter, I look at some commonly-used notions of how well a project has turned out 
but decide instead to define a measure of the delay in taking decisions to make changes, 
which I term ‘change latency’, where lower change latency is better. 
I acknowledge that reduced change latency is not a comprehensive measure of goodness 
and that it is possible that SE might deliver benefits that are not associated with reduced 
change latency. I argue however that it is a useful measure for the practitioner, because 
lower change latency can be used to obtain a range of other benefits. I also explain why it is 
a useful measure for the researcher. 
6.1 Characterising ‘better’ in terms of time, cost and performance 
More than forty years ago, Dr Martin Barnes used a triangle with Cost, Time and Quality at 
its corners to illustrate the space available in which a project manager could trade 
objectives. Barnes subsequently concluded (The PM Channel, 2013) that the corner that he 
initially labelled ‘Quality’ should be labelled ‘Performance’ instead, indicating the degree to 
which the deliverable of the project does what it is supposed to do. 
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In various forms and under various names, 
including ‘The Iron Triangle’, this diagram 
has been reproduced widely since 
(including to the right) and the notion that 
the key objectives of a project relate to the 
cost and duration of the project and the 
performance of what it delivers has 
become accepted wisdom within project 
management, at least as a useful 
simplification. 
Time
Cost Performance
 
Figure 4: The ‘Iron Triangle’ 
The 13 systems engineers whom I interviewed in my first preliminary survey (see Key Point 
4A) were in broad agreement. The success criteria that they mentioned most often were: 
 cost to complete project; 
 time taken to complete project; 
 compliance with written requirements; and 
 actual performance in the field. 
Both of the last two points may be broadly aligned with ‘performance’ and the success 
criteria are therefore consistent with the ‘Iron Triangle’. 
This suggests attempting to define ‘goodness’ as a multi-dimensional parameter where the 
dimensions are time, cost and performance. This is an approach that has been taken by 
researchers, including by Elm and Goldenson (2012) and by Honour (2013) but there are 
problems with creating measures in each of the three dimensions. It is hard to standardise 
and normalise measures of time, quality and performance in a way that allows meaningful 
comparisons to be made between projects. One can compare the ratio of the actual cost to 
the cost outcome but, if this is lower for project A than for project B does this mean that 
project A was delivered more efficiently or just planned more realistically? 
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Moreover, and for the purposes of this research most importantly, time, cost and 
performance are the results of many factors in combination, including the influence of 
events outside the control of the project. It is very hard to disentangle the contribution of 
one factor, such as the adoption of SE approaches. 
It would be useful to have some measure of ‘goodness’ that could be more tightly connected 
with the factors that influence it. 
Having found evidence that there is room for significant reductions in avoidable costs of 
change on rail projects (see key point 4C) and noting that the three most prevalent theories 
for the manner in which SE can benefit projects (left shift, whole-system optimisation and 
control of complexity, see key point 3B) all suggest that SE should be able to control these 
costs, it is interesting to look for measures of ‘goodness’ that are related to change. 
6.2 Characterising ‘better’ in terms of volume of change 
One obvious measure to explore is the volume of change. Change costs time and money and 
so the volume of change is a candidate measure of ‘badness’. Volatility can be defined as a 
normalised measure of the volume of change which can be compared between projects. 
In my first preliminary study carried out early in my research, I found high levels of volatility 
(see key point 4B). 
Others have reached similar findings in related domains. More than 15 years ago, Dale and 
Plunkett (1999; pages 62-63) suggested that engineering change within manufacturing 
companies was a topic worthy of attention. They wrote, “To anyone investigating costs in 
manufacturing industry, striking features are (a) the large amount of time and money spent 
on modifications and engineering changes, and (b) an apparent acceptance, in particular 
amongst design, engineering and technical personnel, that they are facts of organizational 
life that one must learn to live with. The impression given is that this is the way organizations 
go about their respective businesses.” They added, “There can be no doubt that between 
concessions, modifications and engineering changes there is a sizeable quality-related 
activity escaping the quality cost net in most organizations.” 
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However, the volume of change is a problematic measure of ‘badness’ because it is clear 
that not all change is bad – some changes are improvements and other project changes are 
necessary reactions to changes in the outside world. The NETLIPSE report (Hertogh et al, 
2008), which was mentioned in chapter 3, contains some remarks about the inevitability of 
change. For instance, section 4.4 contains the following remarks about Large Infrastructure 
Projects (abbreviated ‘LIPs’): 
“The project has to deal with changes in the context. If there were NETLIPSE 
researchers who thought at the start of the research that the development of LIPs is 
linear and can be foreseen beforehand, the NETLIPSE research showed that nothing is 
less true. LIPs have a 'non-linear' development of the implementation process, as was 
illustrated by the previous examples. As mentioned, external context factors have a 
decisive influence on their development. We believe that unexpected or changing 
conditions, for instance new legislation on fire regulation in runnels or on safety 
systems on railway lines, will always occur and will impact projects.” 
So, in order to use volume of change as a measure of badness, one would have to find some 
way of separating those changes that were indicative of things going well from those that 
were indicative of things going badly. Some distinctions have been proposed that seem to 
approach this need. For example, Eckert, Clarkson and Zanker (2004) draw a distinction 
between ‘emergent change’, caused by problems in the design and ‘initiated change’, 
initiated by parties outside the project such as customers or regulators. 
However this is still not discriminating enough. If a manufacturer alters its products to 
comply with new regulations in an orderly and timely manner then that is an initiated 
change according to the distinction and, presumably, a symptom of healthy processes. If the 
manufacturer has to recall a product that has been found to be non-compliant with new 
regulations in order to make the same change, it is still an initiated change but now a 
symptom of unhealthy processes. 
This suggests that what matters is not so much the nature of the change in itself but the 
manner in which it is implemented and, in particular, the time at which it is implemented. 
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Miller and Lessard (2000) also take the view that the manner in which a project responds to 
change is critical to its success. They use the term ‘turbulence’ to describe the unforeseen 
events in the outside world that drive much of this change on large engineering projects. In 
their view, the manner in which these projects handle turbulence is crucial to their success. 
They observe that successful projects tend to keep useful options open and have flexible 
contractual arrangements that can tolerate significant change. Their research supports the 
SE doctrine that time spent at the beginning of a project is repaid later but with a twist. They 
recommend investing this time as much in setting up robust project arrangements as in 
defining the final product. 
It is this reasoning that leads me to use a measure of the unnecessary delay in making a 
change as a proxy for ‘better’ (or more accurately for ‘worse’). 
6.3 Change latency 
The measure of the unnecessary delay in making a change that I have developed to use as a 
proxy for ‘worse’ in carrying out the research is change latency. Change latency is a property 
not of a project but of a change that a project has chosen to make to its technical direction. 
The notion is illustrated in Figure 5. In case 1, the project heads off along trajectory AC but, 
at point Y, something in the outside world changes that makes B a more desirable 
destination. If the project does not change course until X then the change latency in this case 
is the period between Y and X. In case 2, the project heads off along trajectory AC but 
realises at X that B had been a more desirable destination from the outset. The change 
latency in this case is the period between A and X. In both cases, the fact that the project 
‘goes the long way around’ reflects the fact that proceeding longer than necessary in the 
‘wrong’ direction introduces unnecessary work and rework. 
I define the root document associated with a change to be the first authoritative 
specification or plan that committed the project to the course of action being changed. 
I define the latency of a change as follows: 
 if sufficient information was available to determine that the change was desirable at 
the point when the root document was issued then the time interval between issuing 
A workable characterisation of ‘better’ Chapter 6 
66 
the root document and the time when it was actually decided to make the change; 
and 
 otherwise, the time interval between the earliest time when sufficient information 
was available to determine that the change was desirable and the time when it was 
actually decided to make the change. 
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outside world
changes
Case 1 Case 2
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C
Change
latency
Y
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X
Root document issued
Decision taken 
to make 
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Figure 5: Change latency 
For the purposes of understanding the reasons for change latency, I divide it into two 
components: 
 Detection latency is the portion of change latency that elapses before the project 
explicitly recognises that there is an issue in the area of the change and starts to 
address it. 
 Decision latency is the time taken from recognising that there is an issue to reaching 
a decision to make the change. 
By definition, for any specific change: 
Change latency = Detection latency + Decision latency 
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On occasions where it takes more than one go to resolve an issue, that is to say, where there 
is a sequence of changes in which the second and subsequent changes are only required 
because the earlier ones did not resolve the issue that they were designed to resolve, I 
choose to regard the sequence as one compound change and calculate the latency of the 
final component change. The situation is illustrated in Figure 6, where component changes 
X1, X2 and X3 are regarded as part of one compound change. 
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Figure 6: Latency of a compound change 
I have not found the concept of change latency defined in this manner elsewhere, but other 
researchers, for example, Nolan and Pickard (2013), draw N2 charts, showing the project 
stages at which faults are found and should be found, and the change latency is related to 
the distance of entries on this chart from the diagonal. 
6.4 The utility of change latency to the practitioner 
A researcher is at liberty to define the concepts into which he or she intends to carry out 
research as he or she wishes. But a researcher, like me, who has set out to compile 
knowledge of value to practitioners, has an obligation to show that these definitions do not 
destroy that value. 
Proceeding with the research using reduced change latency as a proxy for ‘better’ is clearly 
losing the ability to perceive certain sorts of potential benefits of adopting SE approaches – 
an example would be if SE resulted in a design with reduced running costs. 
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Moreover, it is possible to imagine scenarios in which reduced change latency results in 
worse outcomes for some stakeholders. For example, realising that an expensive change is 
necessary to make a system work may lead to the cancellation of a project, even though it 
remains a sound investment. However most of these scenarios involve some degree of 
irrationality. Reduced change latency is generally associated with improved knowledge 
about how things are. In most cases, improved knowledge opens up options that may be 
worth pursuing and that might not otherwise have been considered; it will rarely close off 
options. 
Nonetheless, there are two good reasons for concluding that reduced change latency is a 
good thing in general: 
 Change is expensive. 
 The cost of making a change rises rapidly with time. 
Both of these reasons are now discussed further. 
6.4.1 Change is expensive 
Most practising engineers and managers understand that knowledge and options have value 
and that time is money. Experience (as reported below) suggests both that changes consume 
a significant proportion of the budget of engineering projects and that postponing decisions 
to make changes can be expensive. 
For example, Fricke et al (2000) were told when studying German manufacturing companies 
that about 30% of work efforts are due to changes of all sorts. They found that insufficient 
communication within these companies contributed both to the number and average cost of 
changes. 
Terwiesch and Loch (1999) report consistent results in another sector. They found that 
engineering change consumed one third to one half of engineering capacity in automobile 
development. They found that delays in processing engineering change were not routinely 
measured and not a priority for some manufacturers. However, they propose a number of 
principles to be followed in order to reduce the cost of engineering changes and ‘reducing 
delays’ is one of these principles. They found five major factors contributing to delay in 
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processing engineering change: a complex engineering approval process; limits on 
engineering capacity; setups and batching; the ‘snowball effect’ and organisational issues. 
6.4.2 The cost of making a change rises rapidly with time 
The ‘snowball effect’, mentioned in the previous section, refers to the scenario whereby a 
change to one part of the design results in many changes to other parts of the design. Fricke 
et al (2000) also see this effect, “A characteristic of changes is that the steps cause-change-
effect are not serial, but build a network, where an effect may also be a cause for new 
changes and all may be somehow interconnected." Clearly, this means that the cost of 
making a change will increase rapidly with time as more and more affected design work is 
carried out and then has to be reworked later. 
There have been attempts to model the ‘snowball effect’ quantitatively. Clarkson, Simons 
and Eckert (2004) have attempted to model change propagation in modified Design 
Structure Matrices. In these modified matrices, the names of the elements of the design are 
used as both column and row headings and each cell contains an indication of the 
probability that a change to one element will require a change in the other and an indication 
of the proportion of the affected element that is likely to be affected. A trial of this matrix on 
the design of a helicopter predicted results that were similar to those experienced in 
practice. The probabilities and proportions in the matrix vary significantly, implying 
significant variation in the degree to which changes propagate through the design. This 
variation corroborates the common-sense view that the cost of postponing different 
changes will rise at different rates. The cost of changing the colour of a train may not start to 
rise until the paint is ordered because there is low change propagation. On the other hand, 
reducing the maximum axle weight for a train may have high change propagation and 
require a fundamental redesign of practically everything, with the result that the cost of 
making this change may rise very quickly indeed. 
Even if it is impossible to define a single cost escalation profile for all changes, some rules of 
thumb have been formulated from experience in several domains that suggest that this 
escalation can be rapid. 
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Boehm’s studies into the cost of fixing software problems are much quoted. One publication 
cited is (Boehm and Basili, 2001), which contains the assertion that, “Finding and fixing a 
software problem after delivery is often 100 times more expensive than finding and fixing it 
during the requirements and design phase." The factor of 100 is striking but it should be 
noted that the authors add that, “For this updated list, we have added the word ‘often’ to 
reflect additional insights about this observation. One insight shows the cost-escalation 
factor for small, noncritical software systems to be more like 5:1 than 100:1." 
This is consistent with a table of the average relative cost of fixing software defects based on 
when they are introduced in McConnell (2003; page 29). This contains the entry “10-100” for 
the same factor. Noland and Pickard (2013; figure 7) suggest that the cost to make a change 
to the control system software for a gas turbine is 250 times as much after entry into service 
as it would be if found by initial reviews and modelling. 
Boehm, Valerdi and Honour (2008) reviewed data on the cost of fixing software defects and 
found similar ratios. In particular they found that “relative to an effort of 10 units to fix a 
requirements defect in the Code phase, fixing it in the Requirements phase involved only 
about 2 units of effort, while fixing it in the Operations phase involved about 100 units of 
effort, sometimes going as high as 800 units." 
Similar results have been found in other engineering areas. Fricke et al (2000) observe that 
manufacturing engineers apply ‘The Rule of Ten’, the rule of thumb that the costs of a 
change increase tenfold with each phase of the lifecycle. Eckert, Clarkson and Zanker (2004) 
also found that the costs of change rose when manufacturing products in the aerospace 
sector. They write, “As deadlines drew closer and the design problems became more 
complex, the cost of amending problems rose steadily due to the increase in the number of 
constraints and the greater degree of integration. The later they occur in the design process 
the more costly changes can become. This is due to the fact that (a) the process becomes 
more time critical and (b) the product becomes more integrated." 
‘The Rule of Ten’ may have exceptions. It does appear to be possible to control the rate of 
escalation. Clark and Fujimoto (1991) studied US, European and Japanese automobile 
manufacturers. They found (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; page 187) interesting variations 
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between the costs of engineering changes to the dies used to press bodywork panels. In the 
US, the cost of these changes was 30-50 per cent of the total cost of a die, whereas in Japan 
it was at most 20 per cent. They ascribed the lower Japanese costs in large part to a quicker, 
more collaborative relationship between the manufacturer and tool maker. 
6.4.3 Conclusions 
I conclude that change latency is a useful concept for practitioners because, in many 
circumstances, reducing change latency has the potential to deliver significant reductions in 
the cost and duration of the project, and the released budget and schedule may be used, in 
some circumstances, to deliver increased performance (or at least to avoid having to reduce 
performance by cutting out scope). 
6.5 The utility of change latency to the researcher 
Change latency, has certain practical advantages for the researcher as a measure of 
outcomes: 
 It is a property of a change not of a project and, because one project will typically 
undergo several changes, this increases the number of opportunities for learning 
compared with looking at a property of a project. 
 It is relatively objective, compared with, for example, a rating of the performance of 
a system. The date on which a decision was taken to make a change is normally a 
matter of record and, while different observers may initially disagree about the date 
on which sufficient information was available to determine that the change was 
desirable, this disagreement can, in principle, be resolved by rational discussion. 
 Because it is a measure of time, a physical quantity, the latencies of two changes may 
be directly compared and one can calculate mean averages and standard deviations 
without hesitation if one has the latencies of a number of changes. 
 It is not necessary to divide changes into fault corrections and other changes in order 
to measure change latency – the measure can be applied to any sort of change. That 
is an advantage because the decision on whether a change is a fault correction or not 
is often related to the question of who should pay for it and, as a consequence, can 
be fraught. 
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6.6 Going forward 
Having chosen workable characterisations of SE and ‘better’, it becomes possible to narrow 
and refine the research objectives. The generic objectives were: 
 To demonstrate that SE can be used to build better rail systems and to build rail 
systems better, aiming for measurable improvement. 
 To gain an improved understanding of how to adapt SE to yield optimum results in 
major rail projects. 
The refined, specific objectives become: 
 To demonstrate that core SE can be used to reduce change latency in major rail 
projects. 
 To gain an improved understanding of how to adapt core SE to produce the greatest 
reduction in change latency in major rail projects. 
In the next chapter, I describe and justify the research methodology used to tackle these 
objectives. 
6.7 Key points 
6A Time, cost and performance are widely accepted success criteria for projects but are 
difficult to measure and are the results of many factors in combination. 
6B The cost of engineering change has been found to be a significant proportion of overall 
costs in several engineering sectors. 
6C The cost of making an engineering change has been found to rise significantly with 
time in several engineering sectors. 
6D Volume of change is a difficult measure of ‘goodness’ because it is difficult to separate 
‘good’ change from ‘bad’ change. 
6E I choose to use ‘change latency’ as an indicator of the ‘badness’ of project outcomes, 
where change latency is a measure of avoidable delay in deciding to make a change. 
6F I divide change latency into two components: detection latency and decision latency. 
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6G Change latency is a useful concept for practitioners because, in many circumstances, 
reducing change latency has the potential to deliver significant reductions in the cost 
and duration of the project, and the released budget and schedule may be used, in 
some circumstances to deliver increased performance. 
6H Change latency has practical advantages for the researcher as a measure of outcomes: 
 It is a property of a change, which increases the number of opportunities for 
learning compared with looking at a property of a project. 
 It is relatively objective. 
 Because it is a measure of a physical quantity, the latencies of two changes may 
be directly compared and one can calculate mean averages and standard 
deviations without hesitation. 
6J My refined specific research objectives are: 
 To demonstrate that core SE can be used to reduce change latency in major rail 
projects. 
 To gain an improved understanding of how to adapt core SE to produce the 
greatest reduction in change latency in major rail projects. 
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7 METHODOLOGY 
In chapter 2, I observed that the field of study presented the SE researcher with a number of 
fundamental challenges. I argued that these challenges made it impossible to compile 
timeless, universal knowledge about the benefits of SE. 
Other researchers have noted other challenges. Valerdi and Davidz (2009) acknowledge that 
the relative immaturity of the field, a lack of appreciation of empirical research, the difficulty 
of accessing data and the lack of accepted metrics raise obstacles in the path of the SE 
researcher. 
In this chapter I describe the methodology that I have chosen to employ and explain how it 
has been designed to overcome the challenges intrinsic to the field of study while respecting 
the constraints that my status as a lone researcher places on what I can do. 
7.1 Methodological options 
Because SE generally draws from the traditions of physical science and engineering, it is 
tempting to adopt the research methods of physical science without exploring the options. 
Brown (2009) suggests that the exploration of these options by SE researchers is not 
thorough enough. She argues that “atheoretical pragmatism” is not a sustainable position 
for the SE researcher and that the “establishment of formal methodologies in systems 
engineering research is not only important, but that it is critical for the growing maturity and 
credibility of the discipline”. She exhorts researchers to take note of the methods used by the 
social sciences and contrasts the realist and interpretive traditions, but leaves the reader to 
choose between them. I take Brown’s advice. In this chapter, I set out the main options and 
then make a reasoned choice between them. 
Lee and Lings (2008) provide a readable account of the major options open to a researcher, 
which, while written for readers carrying out business research, is more generally applicable. 
From their account, I distil three important choices: 
 They distinguish the realist and interpretive ontological positions, which I discuss in 
the next section. 
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 They distinguish qualitative research from quantitative research and observe that, 
while a quantitative approach tends to be associated with a realist one, the realist-
interpretive and qualitative-quantitative decisions may be taken independently. 
 They encourage the researcher to research existing theories and take a theoretical 
position before starting to collect data, an approach that I shall label, ‘theory-first’. 
However they observe that there are research methods, such as Grounded Theory, in 
which the researcher allows the theory to arise from the observations, an approach 
that I shall label ‘observation-first’. 
Lee and Lings also define two useful measures of the validity of research methods: 
 The ‘internal validity’ of research is the degree to which conclusions are free from the 
challenge that alternative explanations may have been provided for the same effects. 
 The ‘external validity’ of research is the degree to which the conclusions may be 
generalised to other situations. 
They observe that the classical experiments of the physical science set the ‘gold standard’ 
for internal and external validity but that other fields are forced to settle for methods with 
lower internal and external validity. 
I discuss each of the three main choices listed above in turn. 
7.2 Realist and interpretive methods 
Realist methods assume an objective world that exists independently of observers and 
attempt to obtain objective truth about it while interpretive methods study the 
understandings that people have of the world (Lee and Lings, 2008). 
Having observed that concepts such as ‘SE’ and ‘benefits’ are subjective, there is a choice to 
be made between applying interpretive methods to these ideas in people’s heads or 
replacing the subjective concept with more objective concepts in order to apply realist 
methods. 
Other researchers in the field, such as Valerdi and Davidz (2009), take a robustly realist 
stance. They characterise the three key underlying principles of the scientific process as 
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empiricism, objectivity, and control and argue that these should be applied rigorously to 
research into SE. 
Honour (2013) and Elm and Goldenson (2012) also follow realist approaches to their 
research. They create definitions of SE and the value that it adds, either explicitly or 
implicitly, by defining how they will measure it; establish hypotheses about the relationship 
between the two and then collect data in order to test these hypotheses using statistical 
methods. Honour found “a quantifiable relationship between systems engineering effort 
levels and program success” while Elm and Goldenson found “strong statistical relationships 
between project performance and several categories of specific SE best practices.” Anyone 
making use of this research needs to bear in mind that the relationships found are between 
SE on the one hand and performance or success on the other, as the researchers define 
these things and check how closely the researcher’s and user’s objectives align and to adjust 
for any areas in which the project to hand differs from the population studied. Both Honour 
and Elm and Goldenson acknowledge limitations on internal and external validity but claim 
real learning, claims that I find convincing. 
Interpretive methods have been applied in related areas. Checkland (1999) draws a 
distinction between ‘hard systems thinking’, which is concerned with delivering an 
engineered, technical system to meet certain defined objectives and ‘soft systems thinking’ 
that is concerned with adjusting ‘human activity systems’ in order to resolve certain 
perceived problems. His research is concerned with methodologies to resolve ‘soft’ system 
problems. 
Checkland (1999; pages 278-280) compares realist and interpretive approaches to this 
research and declare his sympathies to be with the latter. He declares that his methodology 
“accepts that any real-world purposeful human activity will be describable in many different 
ways within many different Weltanschauungen [world views]”. He notes that these different 
descriptions may lead to defining systems in different ways. 
From the outset, Checkland chose to carry out ‘action research’ in which the researcher 
abandons all attempts to conduct research as an independent observer and engages with 
the objects of study to try both to be of practical use and to learn from the experience. 
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Checkland observes that, when the objects of study are human activity systems, the states of 
these systems include the knowledge and beliefs of the people within them and that any 
research of any value will change this knowledge and these beliefs so that the researcher as 
independent observer is a chimera. 
In trying to be of use in a problem situation, Checkland is quite happy to proceed with 
multiple, competing definitions of the systems of interest. 
I find these conclusions about the nature of ‘soft’ systems compelling. I wonder whether so-
called ‘hard’ systems are quite as ‘hard’ as people like to believe but that is of no direct 
consequence to my research. Even if the products of SE can be considered to be ‘hard 
systems’, it is perfectly clear that SE itself, as an object of study, is a soft system. 
However, while I have great respect for Checkland’s intellectual position, I see no way of 
applying interpretive methods in a way that will deliver the knowledge of practical utility 
that I have set out to compile and so I reconfirm my decision to use realist methods in my 
research. 
7.3 Quantitative and qualitative methods 
7.3.1 Quantitative methods 
The quantitative methods of the physical sciences are the methods with which most SE 
researchers will be most familiar. Typically, some relationship between measurable 
properties of a population of items will be hypothesised and then these properties will be 
measured for a sample of that population so that statistical methods can be used to test the 
hypothesis. 
Sheard and Miller (2000) sound a note of warning about the application of quantitative 
methods to research into the value of SE. The abstract of their paper summarises their 
warning clearly: 
“Many INCOSE members are dismayed that there are no hard numbers to justify 
implementation of systems engineering process improvement. This paper shows that: 
1. There are no ‘hard numbers’. 
2. There will be no hard numbers in the foreseeable future. 
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3. If there were hard numbers, there wouldn’t be a way to apply them to your 
situation, and 
4. If you did use such numbers, no one would believe you anyway.” 
Their fourth point simply acknowledges that there are always barriers to change rather than 
questioning the possibility of demonstrating the benefits of SE. Their grounds for the other 
points are that: 
 companies are reluctant to publish bad news and therefore data obtained from them 
is likely to be biased; 
 the supporting data for any demonstration is likely to be confidential; 
 data is collected differently in different organisations and it is difficult to compare; 
 definitions of SE vary greatly; and 
 there is uncontrolled variability in factors other than the manner in which SE is 
performed on a project. 
All these points correspond to real and challenging difficulties. Moreover, if by ‘hard 
numbers’ Sheard and Miller mean numbers that could support a quantitative model of the 
precision and reliability of those underpinning the natural sciences then I would agree that 
they are unlikely to be obtained. However, the majority of the difficulties set out above also 
bedevil quantitative approaches to quality improvement, see for instance (Deming, 2000), 
but nonetheless real progress is made in this field. 
Honour (2013) also seems to think that the obstacles posed by Sheard and Miller can be 
overcome. He concludes at the end of his doctoral thesis that his work “demonstrates that it 
is possible to obtain meaningful and quantifiable data about systems engineering and 
success through empirical methods. The implication of this demonstration is that further 
empirical research is indeed possible, that can observe the SE discipline to the point of 
formulating effective underlying theory.” 
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7.3.2 Qualitative methods 
There are alternative qualitative methods, of which one is the rigorous analysis of cases, or 
‘case study’ research. Flyvbjerg (2006) writes an apologia for case study research in which he 
sets out and refutes five misunderstandings about it: 
 General, theoretical knowledge is more valuable than concrete, practical knowledge. 
 One cannot generalize from an individual case. 
 Case studies are useful for generating hypotheses but not testing them. 
 Case study research is biased towards confirming preconceptions. 
 It is difficult to develop general theories from specific case studies. 
Friedman and Sage (2004) consider the challenges of doing case study research in SE. They 
acknowledge that it is difficult to achieve high internal and external validity. They also 
suggest two other challenges. One is to ensure the validity of the concepts used in the case 
study. The other is to ensure that the methods used are such that different researchers 
would reach the same conclusions. Nonetheless, their objective is to encourage good case 
study research into SE, rather than to deter its use and they offer practical advice on 
responding to these challenges. 
7.3.3 Evaluation and selection 
I am convinced that good case study research is in no sense a second-class research method 
(the Theory of Evolution rests upon good case study research) and that it has its place in SE 
research. 
So, on this question, I have come to support both options: I believe that both quantitative 
and qualitative research methods, and specifically case study research, have their place and, 
indeed are complementary. 
Good quantitative research is generally of higher external validity than qualitative research. 
If one has made a general hypothesis about SE, then, at some point, if it is practical, this 
hypothesis should be tested in a quantitative study. Nevertheless, if a series of case studies 
could have contradicted a hypothesis but did not then this does provide some corroboration 
for the hypothesis. Moreover, as Flyvbjerg (2006) asserts and I show in the next chapter, a 
single case study can show that a general hypothesis is inadequate. 
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Quantitative research can test for the existence of correlations but is of less value in 
establishing the causal links that produce these correlations. In practice, theoretical 
knowledge is used when interpreting empirical results. From a purely formal point of view, 
the data accumulated by Honour and by Elm and Goldenson support the alternative 
hypothesis that project performance/success results in a greater adoption of SE practices. 
This can be rejected however on the wholly reasonably grounds that an effect cannot be the 
result of a cause that occurs later. 
The internal validity of both quantitative and qualitative methods is generally low when 
researching the benefits of SE because there are so many other factors that could produce 
benefits but there are occasions when study of a case study can produce an account of cause 
and consequence that is so clear cut that conclusions of high internal validity may be drawn 
from it. 
Qualitative research can unravel the causal links and produce theories that quantitative 
research can test. Or, bearing in mind Flyvbjerg’s correction above, it would be more precise 
to say that qualitative research can unravel the causal links and produce and initially test 
theories that quantitative research can test further. 
Qualitative case study research also facilitates progress by researchers with limited 
resources because the quantum of research is a single case rather than a large number of 
cases. 
I use a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods in my research.10 
I acknowledge however that the internal and external validity of these methods is limited. 
This, I argue (see key point 2B), is the consequence of the nature of the field of study, rather 
than of a flaw in the methods. However, if the methods cannot produce results that are 
wholly reliable then, it seems to me, that it is of great importance (see also key point 2C) 
that researchers should carry out their research in a manner that helps others to build upon 
                                                     
10
 I acknowledge that, as a consequence of the small size of my samples, my research findings derive almost entirely from 
qualitative methods – the value of the quantitative methods to my research is in demonstrating methods that could be 
scaled up to larger samples. 
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and refine their findings. In the next section, I argue that articulation of theories has a part to 
play in achieving this. 
7.4 Theory-first or observation-first 
As I have already noted, Lee and Lings (2008) encourage the researcher to research existing 
theories and take a theoretical position before starting to collect data. Friedman and Sage 
(2004) take the same position when discussing case study research. In doing so, these 
researchers set themselves in opposition to the approach of Grounded Theory, at least as 
propounded by one of its creators, Glaser (1992), in which it is considered important to let 
the theory emerge from the observations without preconceptions. 
I think it is too late to apply pure Grounded Theory to the benefits of adopting SE 
approaches. The theories, as was seen in chapter 3, are out in the open now. If they are 
impairing thinking and crowding out better theories, the damage is done. 
More positively, I think that articulating theories is essential to making sustained progress in 
understanding SE. I have explained why compiling reliable knowledge about SE is difficult 
and why the researcher may have to be content with making small, preliminary increments 
to this body of knowledge. However, if the theory underpinning these increments is made 
explicit then it can serve as the starting point for future research that can refine and correct 
it. 
Lee and Lings (2008; page 123) draw a useful distinction between a theory and a model, 
“Theories attempt to explain phenomena, whereas models by themselves are like laws in that 
they can only describe.” I will use this distinction in the remainder of this thesis. With this 
distinction, one can say that SE is rich in models – most SE papers contain at least one – but, 
in my opinion, is poorly furnished with theories. 
Perhaps this lack of theories restricts the rate of progress in research into SE. Progress in SE 
research does seem to be slower than progress of research into related fields. Boehm, 
Valerdi and Honour (2008) claim that “Despite its recognition since the 1940s, the field of 
systems engineering is still not as well understood as the much later field of software 
engineering." I think that one can claim that both fields were gestated during the Second 
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World War, but, as someone familiar with both fields, the suggestion that knowledge of SE 
has not advanced as fast as knowledge of software engineering rings true. 
An example may illustrate the progress made in software engineering. Many of the 
programmes that people interact with on their computers, tablet and mobile telephones are 
written in object-oriented programming languages and, if one looks at the structure of these 
languages one can trace it back to ideas developed over the previous half decade, including: 
 the idea that programmes should be structured to make them easy for people to 
understand, not just for machines to execute; 
 the idea that data-processing programmes can be made more maintainable if the 
structure of their code matches the structure of their data; 
 the idea that programming languages should be designed to facilitate detection of 
programmer’s errors; and 
 the idea that programmes should be divided into modules in a way that maximises 
the internal coherence of the modules and minimises the coupling between them. 
I struggle to establish such a rich genealogy for modern SE thinking – there are always new 
ideas but I find it difficult to perceive underlying threads that link these ideas together – and 
so I find myself in agreement with Valerdi and Honour. 
I observe that the ‘ideas’ in my software engineering example are, in fact, outline theories 
and I suggest that a greater willingness on the part of the SE community to articulate the 
theories underpinning its beliefs might allow it to make faster progress. 
I choose not only to make my research methods theory-based, but to put theory at the heart 
of my approach. 
7.5 Refuting and refining theories 
Some of my peers have criticised my decision to formulate theories on the grounds that a 
single, repeatable counter-example will refute a theory. This is logically true. A favourite 
logician’s example is the ‘theory’ that ‘all swans are white’, which held across Europe, Asia 
and Africa and the Americas but was refuted when visitors to Australia first encountered a 
black swan. 
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However refutation is not the same as demolition. The zoologists do not have to radically 
rethink their whole approach to swan colour, they simply refine their ‘theory’ to read ‘all 
swans are white or black’. A small increment has been added to human knowledge and new 
research questions such as, ‘Do swans take other colours and, if not, why not?’ emerge. 
The theories that I shall be articulating are of the form ‘Adopting such-and-such an SE 
approach on rail projects results in such-and-such a benefit’. If this turns out to be 
universally refuted then I will have learnt something. 
However this is unlikely. What is more likely is to find that the causal link applies for some 
projects and not others. Analysing the counter-examples may suggest reasons why the 
causal link did not apply that may in turn suggest conditions that must hold for it to apply. As 
a result the theory is refined to become ‘Adopting such-and-such an SE approach on rail 
projects results in such-and-such a benefit under such-and-such a set of conditions’. 
Such methods fall below the rigour of the methods used in the natural sciences. Popper is 
often cited as a reference for these methods, although the methods that he prescribed 
turned out to be too rigorous for even modern physics to use (Lee and Lings, 2008; page 30). 
However, Popper believed neither that such methods were appropriate for non-scientific 
subjects nor that the methods used in other subjects should be completely different. In 
(Popper, 1994; pages 140-141), he wrote: 
“But almost everyone else seems to be quite sure that differences between the 
methodologies of history and of the natural sciences are vast. For, we are assured, it is 
well known that in the natural sciences we start from observation and proceed by 
induction to theory. And is it not obvious that in history we proceed differently? 
“Yes, I agree that we proceed very differently. But we do so in the natural sciences as 
well. 
“In both we start from myths - from traditional prejudices, with error - and from these 
we proceed by criticism: by the critical elimination of errors. In both the role of evidence 
is, in the main, to correct our mistakes, our prejudices, our tentative theories – that is, 
to play a part in the critical discussion, in the elimination of error. By correcting our 
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mistakes, we raise new problems. And in order to solve these problems, we invent 
conjectures, that is, tentative theories, which we submit to critical discussion, directed 
to the elimination of error. The whole process can be represented by a simplified 
schema, which I may call the tetradic schema: 
P1 → TT → CD → P2 
“This schema is to be understood as follows. Assume that we start from some problem 
PI - it may be either a practical, or a theoretical, or a historical problem. We then 
proceed to formulate a tentative solution to the problem: a conjectural or hypothetical 
solution - a tentative theory. This is then submitted to critical discussions, in the light of 
evidence, if available. As a result, new problems, P2, arise.” 
This accurately describes the method that I use, with the small modifications that (a) critical 
discussion becomes critical discussion and testing and (b) this yields a revised tentative 
theory as well as a new problem so that the tetradic schema becomes: 
P1 → TT1→ CDT → P2 + TT2 
My principal objective becomes neither to prove nor disprove a tentative theory but to 
improve it by exposing it to test and criticism. On the basis of the corroborative and 
contradictory evidence, the tentative theory is refined. 
But there is a danger with refining theories to deal with contradictory evidence and that is to 
fall into the error of what Popper (1959; pages 61ff) of ‘conventionalism’ – rescuing theories 
by the ad hoc addition of ‘auxiliary hypotheses’. Popper acknowledges that auxiliary 
hypotheses are sometimes necessary but recommends that the theorist should observe the 
discipline of requiring that auxiliary hypotheses should increase the explanatory power of 
the theory. I follow this recommendation and commit myself to only making changes to my 
tentative theory which have a sound basis in common-sense situational analysis of projects 
and which would be generally applicable to projects. 
I conclude then that the criticism raised against a theory-based approach is unjustified and 
persist in my decision to use such an approach. 
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7.6 Going forward – a summary of my research methodology 
I have declared that: 
 I am using realist methods, to explore the relationship between adopting core SE 
practices and change latency; 
 I am using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods; and 
 I am formulating an explicit tentative theory to underpin my research. 
The final phase of my research has three phases. 
In the first, theoretical phase, I propose a tentative theory of how core SE contributes to 
(reductions in) change latency based upon a model of how core SE contributes to project 
execution. 
In the second, empirical phase, I collect data about real projects and analyse it in order to 
test the tentative theory. Data is collected from two sources: 
 from a number of interviews with senior figures on recent rail projects and from 
change records on these projects; and 
 from publicly available reports on rail projects. I seek the same sort of information 
from the written reports as I collect from interviews but, of course, I am constrained 
by what is documented. 
I find that these two sources complement each other, particularly as the publicly available 
reports include some forensic analyses of troubled projects whose members might be 
reluctant to discuss them in interviews. 
Data is analysed in two ways: qualitatively and quantitatively. The qualitative analysis is 
based upon considering each major change made by a project for which I have data and 
searching for: 
(a) Any evidence corroborating the causal mechanisms postulated in the tentative 
theory; 
(b) Any evidence contradicting the causal mechanisms postulated in the tentative 
theory; and 
(c) Any evidence suggesting additional causal mechanisms affecting change latency. 
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Evidence of type (b) and (c) is used to refine the tentative theory. Evidence of type (a) is 
accumulated to allow a picture of the overall strength of the evidence supporting each 
mechanism to emerge. 
The quantitative analysis is focused upon the data collected from interviews. I use these data 
to estimate the proportion of the change latency attributable to a number of types of cause 
– some related to the SE performed on the project and some related to other factors. I 
explore the correlation of apportioned change latency with aspects of the SE performed to 
see if the relationships suggested by the tentative theory are visible or not. 
In the third and final phase, I reflect upon the analysis of the data and formulate conclusions 
and recommendations for the researcher and for the practitioner in the field of railway SE. 
These three phases are discussed in turn in chapters 9, 10 and 11. Before that, I look, in the 
next chapter, at one particular case study that serves to illustrate the manner in which case 
studies can help to refine theories. 
7.7 Key points 
7A I choose realist research methods over interpretive methods because I see no way of 
applying interpretive methods in a way that will deliver the knowledge of practical 
utility that I have set out to compile. 
7B I choose both qualitative and quantitative research methods because they seem to me 
to be complementary and because qualitative methods facilitate progress by 
researchers with limited resources. 
7C I acknowledge that my methods have limited internal and external validity 
7D I choose theory-driven methods because they can compile reliable knowledge over 
time by allowing incremental refinement of theories. 
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8 A CASE STUDY 
In this chapter I look at one application of case study methods and illustrate how rigorous 
analysis of cases can produce useful results – in this case showing that a plausible tentative 
theory about the benefits of an aspect of SE is untenable and must be refined. 
8.1 A common-sense tentative theory 
The following tentative theory about the benefits of requirements management is plausible 
and some version of it is claimed by the vendors of requirements management tools, 
training and consultancy and is believed by their customers: 
Adopting good requirements management practice leads to more accurate and 
comprehensive requirements and forestalls significant rework occurring in the later 
stages of a project and arising from discovering that requirements were wrong or that 
the scope of the project was not aligned with the requirements. 
8.2 The case study 
The case under study is the West Coast Route Modernisation (WCRM) project. 
The West Coast Main Line connects the UK’s largest cities, including London, Birmingham, 
Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow and Edinburgh. The WCRM project carried out a significant 
volume of work on the line between 1998 and 2008, delivering increased capacity and 
reduced journey times as well as replacing worn-out parts of the railway (NAO, 2006). 
The project had a disappointing start. By May 2002 the forecast of its final cost had risen 
from £2.5 billion (in 1998) to £14.5 billion. In January 2002, the UK Secretary of State for 
Transport instructed the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA), a UK government department, to 
intervene (NAO, 2006). 
The project and the SRA’s intervention were the subject of an investigation by the UK 
National Audit Office (NAO) which published its findings in a report (NAO, 2006). The report 
lists areas of weakness in the original project, describes the actions that the SRA took to 
remedy these weaknesses and contains the following conclusion (NAO, 2006; page 8): 
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“The Strategic Rail Authority’s intervention from 2002 turned around the West Coast 
Programme. It worked with Network Rail [the UK rail infrastructure controller] and the 
industry to develop a deliverable Strategy and establish appropriate programme 
management.” 
This case study is valuable because it contains authoritative and independent evidence that, 
on the same project, a change in practices led to improved outcomes. 
The report does not describe the requirements management practice adopted by the project 
before the SRA’s intervention but an article published by Dick (2000) reports that, in 2000, 
the WCRM project: 
 was trying to apply “the principles of systems engineering, and particularly 
requirements management” and had deployed a proprietary requirements 
management software package; 
 was adopting a “structured approach” that included “establishing clarity of 
requirements, having traceability, ensuring that we have all the essential elements 
contributing to business benefits”; 
 was working to “ensure that high-level business needs were translated into detailed 
requirements for each system element”; and 
 had determined “which conditions are essential” to meet high-level requirements as 
well as “those that contributed little and might have been over-specified” and had 
been able to “make adjustments as necessary”. 
That, I conclude, describes a project that has adopted good requirements management and 
my personal knowledge, derived from discussions with colleagues who carried out WCRM 
requirements management, corroborates that conclusion. 
However the project did carry out significant rework after the SRA intervention that arose 
from discovering that requirements were wrong or that the scope of the project was not 
aligned with the requirements. The NAO (2006) reports that the changes arising from the 
SRA’s intervention included: 
 A “more intrusive regime of obtaining possession of the track for engineering work 
through extended blockades” that “were crucial to delivery of Phase 1 by September 
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2004 as access had been the programme’s key constraint and one of the key cost 
drivers”. 
 Removing the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS), new signalling 
technology, and the Network Management Centre from the scope of the 
programme, after spending £350 million on these items. 
 Identifying “opportunities to reduce the programme cost by over £4 billion”, for 
instance, identifying that “faster running north of Preston could be achieved without 
the need to replace the signalling”. 
It is hard to escape the conclusion that, in 2000 and the years immediately afterwards, good 
requirements management practice was being used to manage the wrong requirements, or 
at least requirements that did not correctly balance cost with other business objectives. 
So, the tentative theory at the top of this chapter is contradicted – good requirements 
management practice did not forestall significant rework arising from requirements flaws 
during this phase of the project. 
Why not? 
Well, the NAO report describes features of the project that together appear sufficient to 
explain why the potential benefits of adopting requirements management practice were not 
realised: 
 It is obvious from the escalation in the cost of the project that the project was unable 
to accurately forecast the cost of delivering the requirements that it had established. 
It would presumably have reached a different balance between aspirations and cost 
had it had access to accurate forecasts. 
 The NAO (2006; page 12) reports that, “Railtrack [Network Rail’s predecessor] lacked 
the engineering expertise to be able to participate in Alliances as an informed and 
equal partner and to challenge contractor-developed scope.” Good requirements 
management practice requires access to competent domain specialists to be 
effective. 
 The NAO (2006; page 11) says that “Failure to engage stakeholders in support of the 
programme” was a key deficiency and noted that “Railtrack had been unable to 
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persuade train and freight operators to agree to blockades”. It follows that it was 
known that the optimal strategy involved blockades but the relationships between 
Railtrack and the operators did not allow this strategy to be put into practice. 
As the remedies prescribed by the NAO (2006) included providing “clear direction to the 
programme”, engaging “stakeholders in support of the programme” and “tight specification 
and change control” – all measures that are consistent with good requirements practice, 
there is no reason to believe that good requirements management was incapable of 
delivering benefits on the project (it appears to have helped to formulate the remedies to 
the problems encountered) but it does appear that its value was negated by poor cost 
forecasting, lack of access to competent domain specialists and poor stakeholder 
management 
8.3 A refined tentative theory 
The initial tentative theory was contradicted. A project that appeared to adopt good 
requirements practice articulated requirements that did not reflect what was wanted and 
significant rework ensued. 
Deficiencies in aspects of cost forecasting, processes for reviewing requirements and 
relationships with stakeholders were identified that situational analysis suggests could 
explain the contradiction and would be likely to produce similar results if repeated on other 
projects. 
The case study suggests that the initial tentative theory should be refined as follows 
(additions underlined): 
In the presence of accurate cost forecasting, robust and informed processes for 
reviewing requirements and relationships with stakeholders that allow the solution 
that is best overall to be adopted, good requirements management practice leads to 
more accurate and comprehensive requirements and forestalls significant rework in the 
later stages of a project arising from discovering that requirements were rework 
occurring in the later stages of a project and arising from discovering that requirements 
were wrong or that the scope of the project was not aligned with the requirements. 
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8.4 Final thoughts 
I find this case study a useful prophylactic against the dogmatic belief that just doing more 
SE on a project will always yield benefits. The case study strongly suggests that there are 
circumstances when it is necessary to do other things as well as doing more SE if a proper 
return is to be seen on the investment in additional SE. However, my main purpose in 
discussing the study was to illustrate the process by which theories are developed, which I 
consider in the next chapter. 
8.5 Key points 
8A Application of case study analysis to the WCRM programme has shown that a plausible 
tentative theory about the benefits of adopting good requirements management 
practice is untenable and has suggested how it should be refined (see section 8.3). 
  
A case study Chapter 8 
94 
 
Chapter 9 A model and tentative theory 
 95 
9 A MODEL AND TENTATIVE THEORY 
To paraphrase Lee and Lings (2008; page 123), models describe while theories explain. This 
chapter contains both. It contains a model that describes how core SE interacts with other 
project activities followed by a tentative theory that purports to explain how core SE 
contributes to reduced change latency. The model is presented using process modelling 
notation and the tentative theory is presented as conjectures about causal mechanisms 
associated with the model. 
Before presenting the model, I review prior work in the area of models of SE and theories of 
how SE delivers benefit. 
9.1 Relevant prior work 
9.1.1 Relevant models 
Many of the characterisations of SE that were discussed in chapter 5 are associated with 
models of SE and, in some cases, with models of all the engineering activities required to 
produce a system. 
For example, Honour (2013) uses a straightforward breakdown of SE into eight major 
activities (which I described in section 5.3.3 above). 
As another example, Elm and Goldenson (2012) measure the uptake of SE by selecting a 
number of the work products from Capability Maturity Model Integration - an SE standard – 
and counting how many can be aligned with the work products produced by a project. 
Because Honour, Elm and Goldenson are looking for correlations between the adoption of SE 
practices and project outcomes, without exploring the detailed causal connections that 
produce these correlations, they do not need models that describe the interactions between 
SE activities and other activities. The models of SE underpinning their research are admirably 
simple – just lists of tasks or work products. 
A well-used SE standard, ISO/IEC 15288 (ISO/IEC, 2002) embodies a more complex model of 
SE as a set of linked processes. The standard requires the execution of 8 technical processes 
during the project phase of a system lifecycle. These processes are clearly ordered because 
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each process uses output from the previous processes. Although the standard contains no 
such diagram, it is common practice to arrange these processes, or similar processes, in a V 
shape, in which the horizontal axis represents progress on the project while the vertical axis 
represents the level in the systems hierarchy at which work is being done. The V indicates 
that design activities become progressively more detailed, working at lower and lower levels 
and then, after the components have been produced, they are integrated into progressively 
larger assemblies. The V diagram formed with the 8 project technical processes from ISO/IEC 
15288 is shown in Figure 7 below. 
TEC.1 Stakeholder 
Requirements Definition
TEC.2 Requirements 
Analysis
TEC.3 Architectural 
Design
TEC.4 Implementation
TEC.5 Integration
TEC.6 Verification
TEC.7 Transition
TEC.8 Validation
 
Figure 7: The V diagram 
A richer model that shows the interaction between engineering and management tasks 
involved in realising a system is provided in EIA-632 (EIA, 1998). The standard defines a 
number of processes, partitioned into five groups: Technical Management, Acquisition and 
Supply, System Design, Product Realization and Test and Evaluation. It also shows the main 
flows of information between the groups.  
However, neither of these models nor any other that I have found is concerned principally 
with the interaction between SE and other project activities and I therefore conclude that 
the model that I require will have to be created from scratch. 
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9.1.2 A model of change 
Sterman (2000) describes a model of project change, which, while not a candidate for my 
purposes, is indirectly relevant. The model was used to estimate the consequential costs of 
changes raised by the customer to a contract. At its heart is a diagram, redrawn in simplified 
form in Figure 8 below. 
The thick lines indicate flows of work between the ‘stocks’ represented by rectangles, 
together with some of the influences on the rate of the flow. 
The model reflects a different aspect of the mechanisms that I am studying: it is interested in 
the rates of flow between stocks; I am interested in the time taken to move between stocks. 
The model is generally consistent with my experience, except that, outside the contractual 
environment for which the model was created, it would be more appropriate to replace 
‘customer changes’ with ‘changes in the outside world’ and to acknowledge that these 
changes can move work really done to undiscovered rework as well as to known rework. 
Work to be 
done
Work really 
done
People Productivity
Quality
Undiscovered 
rework
Known rework
Customer 
Changes
 
Figure 8: The rework cycle (after Sterman) 
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9.1.3 Relevant theories 
Hypotheses about how SE contributes to project outcomes were reviewed in chapter 3. It 
may be helpful at this point to recall that they were categorised into three general types: 
 ‘The control of complexity’. The hypothesis that, it becomes impossible to realise 
systems that have surpassed a certain threshold in complexity without using SE, at 
least without unacceptable rework. 
 ‘Whole system optimisation’. The hypothesis that SE provides a means of optimising 
the system as a whole that is not provided to a satisfactory degree by other 
disciplines. 
 ‘Left shift’. The hypothesis that effort invested early in a project, and in particular in 
the SE activities that occur in the later stages will yield savings in effort later in the 
project that outweigh the investment, presumably because SE pre-empts expensive 
problems. 
I note that these types are still fairly general and the precise causal links by which SE would 
produce the benefits claimed remain implicit. I conclude that it is desirable to develop a 
more detailed theory. 
9.2 The model 
The heart of my model is a process map, but before discussing that, it is helpful to define a 
few terms so that the process can be presented more precisely. 
9.2.1 Definitions 
I adopt the definition of system used in the INCOSE Handbook (INCOSE, 2010): “a 
combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one more stated purposes”. That is 
a very general definition but still not the most general one in use. Some people use system 
to cover living organisms that certainly have interacting elements but for which the purpose, 
if any, may be obscure. The words “organized to achieve one more stated purposes” exclude 
such things from the scope of the word and restrict it to man-made things. However, the 
definition is from an authoritative source and is general enough to cover those things that I 
regard as railway systems. 
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A sub-system of a system is a component of a system that is also a system in its own right. 
For my purposes, a simple definition of project will suffice. I define a project to be an activity 
to deliver a system.11 
Some definitions related to requirements help to draw a distinction between SE and project 
management. 
I define a stakeholder in a system to be any individual or organisation with an interest in 
that system. That interest is expressed as one or more requirements. I follow the INCOSE 
Handbook (INCOSE, 2010) definition of a requirement as “A statement that identifies a 
system, product or process characteristic or constraint, which is unambiguous, clear, unique, 
consistent, stand-alone (not grouped), and verifiable, and is deemed necessary for 
stakeholder acceptability.” 
Requirements may also be categorised as follows: 
 A system requirement is a requirement on some aspect of the delivered system, for 
example, to provide certain functionality or to deliver a certain level of reliability. 
 A schedule requirement is a requirement on the schedule. The simplest example 
would be a deadline for achieving a certain milestone. 
 A cost requirement is a requirement on the cost of the project, typically a budget 
that should not be exceeded. 
 A project requirement is a requirement on how the project must be executed which 
is not a schedule or cost requirement. A possible example is a requirement to 
produce a set of plans in a given format. 
For the purposes of the model, I also draw upon the definitions of core SE, requirements 
specification, context specification, system specification, system budget, system schedule, 
sub-system specification, sub-system budget, sub-system schedule, system design, process 
                                                     
11
 This is broadly consistent with but slightly more specialised than the definition in (Office of Government Commence, 2002; 
page 7), which is “a management environment that is created for the purposed of delivering one or more business products 
according to a specific Business Case”. 
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model, SE products and project management products, which were made in chapter 4 and 
the definition of change latency, which was made in chapter 6. 
9.2.2 Notation 
The process map is shown using a diagrammatic notation called Integration Definition for 
Function Modeling or IDEF0, for short. IDEF0 is defined in a draft federal information 
processing standard (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 1993). 
In this notation, functions are shown in rectangles (see the key in Figure 9). The inputs to a 
function are shown as arrows reaching the rectangle from the left and the outputs are 
shown as arrows leaving the rectangle from the right. An arrow reaching the rectangle from 
the top is a ‘control input’, which governs how the function must be performed. An arrow 
reaching the rectangle from the bottom is a ‘mechanism,’ which delivers a resource or some 
other means required to perform the function.12 
FunctionInput Output
Control
Mechanism
 
Figure 9: A key for the IDEF0 notation 
When an arrow goes from function A to function B, this indicates that there is a flow of 
information or material from A to B. Note that a function can start as soon as it has sufficient 
input information or material and so it is quite possible that B may start before A has 
finished. 
The model follows the requirements of the standard fairly closely but I exceed the limit of six 
rectangles per diagram and there are a few occasions where, to avoid tangling the diagram, I 
indicate the start and end of an arrow without connecting the two. 
                                                     
12
 The notation allows a fifth type of arrow – a ‘call’ arrow – which I do not use and do not describe. 
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9.2.3 The process map – the A-0 Context Diagram 
The first stage in creating an IDEF0 model is to draw an A-0 Context Diagram, which is a 
depiction of the overall process as a ‘black box’, showing its inputs and outputs. This diagram 
also contains a declaration of purpose and a viewpoint. In the IDEF0 standard, it is accepted 
that drawings need not be comprehensive and need only show those functions and flows 
that are relevant to the purpose and viewpoint. 
The A-0 Context Diagram is shown in Figure 10 below. The Project Requirements flow ‘forks’ 
off from the Requirements flow. This indicates that the Project Requirements are a subset of 
the Requirements. All Requirements, including Project Requirements, are inputs to the 
project and are taken into account when designing the system. Project Requirements are 
also control inputs and are taken into account when designing the project process. 
DELIVER THE 
PROJECT
Context info
Requirements
Project 
Requirements
System
PURPOSE: To depict the influence of SE and other project functions and circumstances on decision making
VIEWPOINT: The decision-making process on projects
A-0 A-0THE BENEFITS OF ADOPTING SE APPROACHES ON RAIL PROJECTS
 
Figure 10: The A-0 Context Diagram 
9.2.4 The process map - the project processes used to create a system design 
baseline 
The model is strongly focussed on the purpose and viewpoint declared in Figure 10. I omit 
functions and flows that are not relevant to the purpose and viewpoint. For example, money 
is clearly a resource consumed by project activities but, because it is information about 
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money and not money itself that plays a part in decision making, I do not show money on 
the diagram. In addition, I use a single function in the model to represent complex 
collections of functions where the interactions between these sub-ordinate functions are not 
relevant to the purpose and viewpoint. 
The intention is that the model should be as complex as is necessary to achieve the defined 
purpose from the defined viewpoint but no more complex. If the model is to do this, then it 
needs to include the 6 core process areas into which I partitioned core SE in chapter 5. The 6 
core SE process areas are: 
 Model (the project) processes 
 Manage requirements and specify the system 
 Design the system 
 Model, simulate and analyse the system 
 Verify and validate the system 
 Manage change 
Each of these process areas will be represented by an IDEF0 function. However, it is 
convenient in explaining the model to start with a simpler model concerned with creating a 
system design baseline and then to add further functions to cater for change. 
The model of the project processes used to create a system design baseline is presented in 
Figure 11. The grey box is the decision-making process. It is shaded to indicate that it is not 
an SE function. The other four functions correspond to four of the six core SE process areas 
listed above. 
Manage requirements and specify the system and Design the system together generate all 
the SE artefacts listed in chapter 5, except for the project Process Model, which I will return 
to in a moment. These functions must be executed in order to establish a baseline. 
It is considered that all projects must form some idea of what they are trying to achieve and 
some plan for achieving it, no matter how informal, incomplete, inaccurate or misconceived 
and consequently all projects must perform these functions to some extent. Sending out a 
team to dig holes in random places and then fill them in with concrete would fail to meet 
these criteria but that would be a guerrilla art installation, not a project. 
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Model, simulate and analyse the system is an optional part of the process but, if executed, 
provides information both for design and decision making. 
Model (the project) processes defines the processes used to perform the other functions 
and its output is the final SE artefact: the project Process Model. The Process Model is a 
control input to all other functions. Note however that, for clarity, the connections are not 
shown from end to end but instead indicated by arrows which are annotated “(2)” and 
connected at one end only. 
Note. A similar abbreviation is used to indicate that cost and timescale estimates and 
outturns are outputs from many functions and input to Authorise the system design and 
process model. 
The Decisions output from the Authorise the system design and process model function is 
the feedback loop in the control process. Decisions may include selecting from options 
offered and requesting additional options. 
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Figure 11: The project processes used to create a system design baseline 
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9.2.5 The process map – discussion of a key decision 
The decision not to include Authorise the system design and process model within the 
scope of SE has important ramifications and requires justification. 
It may help to be clear that the decision is concerned with the scope of core systems 
engineering and not the responsibilities of systems engineers. Members of a project who are 
called systems engineers may do things that go beyond SE and some SE tasks may be 
performed by people who are not systems engineers. 
Core SE, as I have defined it, clearly includes taking decisions about the system design and 
process model. However these decisions, as I model the world, are preliminary only. On the 
real projects with which I am familiar, these decisions are potentially open to challenge by 
stakeholders and some may be reversed before the project finally approves them, an 
approval that often takes place at some stage gate review. The final decision, therefore, is 
taken by the project manager or some sort of project board.13 
To some extent, this remark applies to anyone with a design role on the project – the 
decisions that engineers in traditional disciples take are also open to challenge and revision 
in principle. In practice it applies with greater force to those doing SE because SE is one step 
further removed from the realised system than traditional disciplines. The drawings 
prepared by a civil engineer may be passed directly to the contractor to build whereas an 
interface description prepared by a systems engineer must be agreed with the designers of 
the sub-systems that are party to the interface before these designers prepare specifications 
and drawings for construction or manufacture. 
So the decision to exclude Authorise the system design and process model from the scope 
of SE seems consistent with common practice on projects. 
It is possible to claim final authority for the system design and process model for SE as a 
matter of principle, regardless of observed practice. However such a claim seems untenable 
                                                     
13
 For example, the PRINCE 2 project management methods (Office of Government Commerce, 2002; page 273) requires that 
changes be approved by the Project Board, unless this authority is delegated. 
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to me. Decisions about the system design and process model almost always have cost and 
time implications and so have to be fully integrated with budget and schedule decisions. 
Giving authority for different sorts of decisions to different people makes about as much 
sense as letting the navigator in a rally car steer while the driver controls the brake, throttle 
and gear changes. 
Some may suggest that this shows that systems engineers should take decisions about 
budget and schedule as well. I think that is a tenable position, although I do not agree with 
it. But, if systems engineers are given that authority then it seems to me that, when they 
exercise it, they must be regarded as doing project governance because, to transfer these 
decisions from project governance to SE leaves neither term aligned with the everyday 
meaning that people attribute to it. 
So in summary: 
 I do not think that authorising the system design and process model can be separated 
in practice from schedule and budget decision, and 
 therefore, I regard this authorisation as outside the scope of SE because any other 
decision would import so much into SE as to leave it unrecognisable. 
If I stretch the rally car metaphor a little further, I have prised SE’s grip from the car’s 
controls and strapped SE firmly into the navigator’s seat. The practical and non-metaphorical 
consequence of this is that SE can only contribute to the outcome of a project via providing 
information to other people. In practice, few if any of those other people will be specialist 
systems engineers. This in turn has two important corollaries: 
 To be effective, those performing SE need to prepare the final work products in a 
way that can be easily understood by the non-specialist. This is a harsher discipline 
than imposed upon traditional engineering disciplines. A civil engineer on a civil 
engineering project, for instance, can reasonably assume that the architect, project 
manager and contractors with whom he or she works can read a standard technical 
drawing and will understand commonly-used technical vocabulary. 
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 If the project’s decision-making process is broken and it is unable to reach timely, 
rational decisions about the project then it is unlikely that increasing the effort spent 
on SE will deliver increased benefits until this process is fixed. 
9.2.6 The process model - the project processes used to manage system change 
The partial model as built up so far describes how the system design baseline is established, 
but it is not sufficient; the processes involved in design change need to be modelled as well. 
The complete model is constructed by extending the partial model. 
Three new functions are added: 
 Design the sub-systems and build the system covers a multitude of detailed design, 
implementation, installation and commissioning activities which need to be reflected 
in the model but play a limited role in it. The rectangle is shaded to indicate that it 
does not depict an SE function. 
 Verify and validate the system is the fifth core SE process area and covers all 
activities to check the system and its sub-systems against the SE documents. Where 
these checks fail, problem reports are raised. For problems requiring localised 
change, the feedback loop to Design the sub-systems and build the system provides 
a route for local correction of the problem. However, for problems that may require 
system change, the problem report will be input to Authorise the system design that 
will cause re-execution of Design the system and possibly of Manage requirements 
and specify the system as well before a change to the system design is authorised. 
 Manage change delivers change management arrangements, which are a mechanism 
for all the other functions. 
Note that changes do not ‘flow through’ the Manage change function. The output of this 
function is a set of change management arrangements. Changes are processed via updates 
to the data flows that were involved in establishing the baseline. For example, if it is decided 
to extend the system to deliver a new requirement, that requirement is input to the Manage 
requirements and specify the system function, which may result in updated requirements 
being input to the Design the system and this, in turn, may result in an updated system 
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design being presented to the Authorise the system design and process model function for 
ratification before being input to Design the sub-systems and build the system. 
Note, also, that the Model, simulate and analyse the system function may continue after 
the initial system design baseline has been established and is a potential source of system 
change. 
The complete process map is shown in Figure 12. It is considered that this map meets the 
criteria set for it: it is as complex enough to achieve the defined purpose from the defined 
viewpoint but no more complex. 
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Figure 12: The process map 
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9.3 A tentative theory of the contribution of SE to reducing change latency 
The model is not of itself a theory of how SE contributes to reduced change latency but it 
constrains that theory. Reduced change latency is the consequence of sounder, timelier 
decisions and these decisions are outputs of the Authorise the system design and process 
model function. The core SE functions provide, as inputs to this function, change 
management arrangements and information in the form of: 
 proposed specifications and designs, for ratification; 
 the process model, for ratification; 
 modelling, simulation and analysis results; and 
 problem reports. 
The tentative theory of how core SE contributes to reduced change latency may be 
summarised as: 
Core SE contributes to reduced change latency by providing the people taking decisions 
about the system design and process model with timely, accurate and comprehensive 
information (including proposed specifications, design and process models) and 
effective change management arrangements. 
The full tentative theory comprises a set of more detailed causal mechanisms through which 
core SE process areas contribute to reducing change latency by directly or indirectly 
contributing to “More timely and sounder decisions”. These are illustrated in a diagram 
before being defined in a table. 
Figure 13 is just an illustration which may help to read the table. It contains a ‘silhouette’ of 
the process model, with the text removed, in the background and blue annotations in the 
foreground. These annotations are associated with flows that are outputs from one function 
and inputs to one or more other functions and are desirable attributes of these flows. 
An arrow between two such annotations asserts the claimed causal mechanism that, all 
other things being equal. If the attribute at the foot of the arrow is present to a greater 
extent, then the attribute at the head of the arrow will be present to a greater extent. 
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The causal mechanisms are articulated in more detail with the justification for believing 
them in Table 6. The serial numbers in Table 6 correspond to the numbers marked on the 
blue arrows in Figure 13. 
Each row should be read: 
‘Cause will produce effect provided that proviso because reason’. 
The theory makes strong predictions: that an effect will certainly be seen if the cause holds 
and any proviso holds. There are no provisos in the initial tentative theory but it is 
considered likely that there will be provisos that have not yet been identified and hence 
unlikely that the theory will be found wholly accurate. Nonetheless, strong predictions of 
this form provide a sounder basis for the refinement that I wish to see. 
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Figure 13: The contribution of SE to reducing change latency in diagrammatic form 
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Table 6: A tentative theory of the contribution of SE to reducing change latency in tabular form 
Serial Cause Effect Proviso Reasons 
1 Timelier, greater adoption of 
good SE practice 
More efficient change management 
arrangements 
 SE practices are explicitly designed to do this 
2 Timelier, greater adoption of 
good SE practice 
More timely, accurate and 
comprehensive requirements 
 SE practices are explicitly designed to do this 
3 Timelier, greater adoption of 
good SE practice 
More timely, accurate and 
comprehensive system design 
 SE practices are explicitly designed to do this 
4 Timelier, greater adoption of 
good SE practice 
More timely, accurate and 
comprehensive modelling, simulation 
and analysis 
 SE practices are explicitly designed to do this 
5 Timelier, greater adoption of 
good SE practice 
More timely, and sounder problem 
reports 
 SE practices are explicitly designed to do this 
6 More timely and thorough 
consultation with stakeholders 
More timely, accurate and 
comprehensive requirements 
 Because this reduces the number of omissions and 
misunderstandings 
7 More timely, accurate and 
comprehensive requirements 
More timely, accurate and 
comprehensive modelling, simulation 
and analysis 
 The modelling, simulation and analysis can be 
focussed on the real requirements 
8 More timely, accurate and 
comprehensive requirements 
More timely, accurate and 
comprehensive system design 
 There is less likelihood of failing to meet a 
mandatory requirement or of delivering a sub-
optimal solution 
9 More timely, accurate and 
comprehensive requirements 
More timely, and sounder decisions  There is less likelihood of pursing options that do 
not meet the mandatory requirements and can 
more accurately assess the relative value of options 
10 More timely, accurate and 
comprehensive system design 
More timely, and sounder decisions  There is less likelihood of unsatisfactory designs 
being presented for approval 
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Serial Cause Effect Proviso Reasons 
11 More timely, accurate and 
comprehensive modelling, 
simulation and analysis 
More timely, and sounder decisions  There is less likelihood of pursing options that do 
not meet the mandatory requirements and can 
more accurately assess the relative value of options 
12 More timely, and accurate cost 
and timescale estimates 
More timely, and sounder decisions  The project is less likely to pursue unaffordable 
options 
13 More timely, and sounder 
problem reports 
More timely, and sounder decisions  Problems can be fixed more quickly and corrected 
without unnecessary iteration 
14 More timely, accurate and 
comprehensive requirements 
More timely, and sounder problem 
reports 
 There are clearer criteria for formulating tests and 
assessing the results 
15 More efficient change 
management arrangements 
More timely, and sounder decisions  Delays due to errors and slow administration are 
reduced 
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9.4 Beyond the tentative theory 
Having articulated a tentative theory, the next stage is to subject it to test against the facts 
in the real world. In principle these facts may corroborate or contradict the tentative theory. 
In practice, the most valuable outcome is probably somewhere in between, where the facts 
generally corroborate the tentative theory but suggest some deficiencies that can be 
corrected by refining it. Nonetheless, the facts are the facts and I must live with what they 
are. 
The testing that I performed is described in the next chapters. However, the tentative theory 
can be explored a little in thought experiments first. 
The tentative theory asserts that core SE contributes to reduced change latency by timely, 
accurate and comprehensive information. So, if that is true, would it mean that a rational 
manager of a project doing little SE should invest in more SE? There are good reasons for 
believing that the answer must be, ‘it depends’. 
One of the things upon which the answer must depend is the relationship between the 
additional costs of performing more SE and the value of the additional intelligence 
generated. There must surely be a law of diminishing returns here. 
At the extreme end of the application of SE lies a project that defines and analyses 
everything in such detail that it never has to change unless something in the outside world 
changes and then it stops work and redefines and reanalyses everything afresh. It 
completely avoids rework but is likely to proceed along the optimal track so slowly and 
expensively that a project with a greater tolerance for rework would deliver an acceptable 
system more quickly and at lower cost. The trajectory of such a project is illustrated in the 
left hand diagram in Figure 14. Performing more SE on such a project would be a waste of 
time and money. I have never encountered a rail project of this sort. 
At the other end lies a project that proceeds with insufficient intelligence and, as a result, 
approaches its target along a trajectory that resembles a random walk, as depicted in the 
right hand diagram in Figure 14. The cost of change on such a project is so large that the 
benefits of more SE are likely to exceed the costs of more SE. 
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It follows that, while the theory provide a framework for understanding the likely effects of 
investing in SE, it is not sufficient on its own to support an investment decision – additional 
information about the magnitudes of the costs and benefits is required. 
A
B
Something in the
outside world
changes
(Possibly) Too Much Intelligence Gathering
A
B
Something in the
outside world
changes
Too Little Intelligence Gathering
 
Figure 14: Project trajectories compared 
9.5 Key points 
9A Existing models of SE are focussed on the components of SE but do not make clear 
how SE contributes to decisions about change. 
9B A model that describes how SE interacts with other project activities is presented using 
the IDEF0 notation. 
9C In this model the function of deciding upon the system design and project process 
model is not regarded as part of SE because any other decision would import so much 
into SE as to leave it unrecognisable. 
9D To be effective, those performing SE need to prepare the final work products in a way 
that can be easily understood by the non-specialist. 
9E If a project’s decision-making process is broken and it is unable to reach timely, 
rational decisions about the project then it is unlikely that increasing the effort spent 
on SE will deliver increased benefits until this process is fixed. 
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9F In summary, the tentative theory proposed is that Core SE contributes to reduced 
change latency by providing the people taking decisions about the system design and 
process model with timely, accurate and comprehensive information (including 
proposed specifications, design and process models) and effective change 
management arrangements. 
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10 TESTING THE TENTATIVE THEORY AGAINST DATA COLLECTED 
FROM PROJECTS 
In this chapter, I describe an exercise to test the tentative theory by collecting and analysing 
data about five UK railway projects and the major changes that occurred on them. The data 
were collected via interviews and inspection of project records. 
Five is a small number. I did not collect data on more projects because the logistics of doing 
so were prohibitive: the negotiation of access and the collection, checking and analysis of 
data for one project requires a significant amount of effort and an even more significant 
amount of time – often as much as six months. This is an intrinsic obstacle to research in this 
area because organisations have some understandable reluctance to allow access to data 
that does not always reflect well upon them and because providing such access has a cost to 
them. 
Because the sample was so small, no meaningful conclusions can be drawn from quantitative 
analysis but I attempt such analysis anyway, in order to indicate how such methods could be 
usefully applied in later research if larger samples were collected. 
Although there were only five projects, these projects provided data on 31 significant 
changes. 
More detailed supporting information about the data collection and analysis is provided in 
appendix A. This appendix has the same section headings as this chapter. For additional 
information about any of the sections below, please refer to the corresponding section of 
appendix A. So, for example, for information on section 10.6, refer to A.6. 
10.1 Conduct of the survey and data collection exercise 
I contacted a number of people known to me at rail organisations that delivered projects 
and had an interest in SE. Five interviewees agreed to take part and each provided data on a 
single UK rail project. 
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Interviewees were assured that the information that they had provided would not be 
disclosed beyond the researcher and his supervisors in a form that would allow someone to 
link it to them or the projects or organisations concerned. 
Data were collected at meetings with interviewees by asking questions using a pre-prepared 
questionnaire and inspecting project records using a pre-prepared data collection 
procedure. Collection of data for one project took between 4 and 8 hours, typically spread 
over 2-3 meetings. 
Most of the questions were associated with a closed list of possible responses. However, 
most of these lists included the response, “Other, please specify” and interviewees were 
encouraged to add general remarks, which I recorded. 
I sent my notes of interviews to the interviewees and gave them the opportunity to correct 
any misunderstandings. 
The questionnaire was organised using three general questions as headings: 
 What sort of a project was it [that will be discussed]? 
 To what extent did the project adopt SE approaches? 
 Is there anything else? 
The first two questions were broken down into more specific questions that were put to the 
interviewees. 
The last question, “Is there anything else?” was asked directly to give interviewees the 
opportunity to add whatever additional information they liked. Not all interviewees took this 
opportunity and most of the additional information provided comprised clarifications about 
the project concerned. None of the responses provided is considered significant for the 
interpretation of the data collected and none is discussed further. 
I then worked with each interviewee to review project change records and select a number 
of changes for analysis. Information was collected for each selected change from project 
records and the interviewee’s memory. This information included a general description of 
change, historical information that could be used to calculate change latency, and the 
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interviewee’s opinions about the main factors that affected change latency and the main 
opportunities to reduce change latency on similar projects. 
The data collected and the analysis of these data are summarised in the six following 
sections, which are organised as follows: 
 Data collected about the projects in general summarises the data collected in 
response to the question “What sort of a project was it?” 
 Analysis of data collected about projects in general summarises analyses of the data 
described in the previous section. 
 Data collected about the SE performed on the projects summarises the data 
collected in response to the question “To what extent did the project adopt SE 
approaches?” 
 Analysis of data collected about the SE performed on the projects summarises 
analyses of the data described in the previous section. 
 Data collected about changes and analysis of these data summarises the data 
collected by inspection of project change records as well as analyses of these data. 
 Further analysis describes further analyses to search for correlations between the 
different types of data. All quantitative analysis is in this section. 
10.2 Data collected about the projects in general 
In this section, I summarise and discuss the data collected about the projects in general, 
excluding data about the SE performed on them and the changes made on them. 
These data do not directly offer any insight into the benefits of SE but they are important 
when interpreting other data. 
Interviewees were asked to describe the project to be talked about in general terms and 
were then asked a number of specific questions to establish the status of the project, the 
parts of the railway involved as well as the size, duration, novelty, volatility and complexity 
of the project, the experience of those performing SE and the degree to which SE functions 
were integrated with the rest of the project. 
Testing the tentative theory against data collected from projects Chapter 10 
122 
A comprehensive account of the questions and responses is provided in appendix A. In 
summary: 
 The projects are a diverse representation of medium-sized and large projects – 
probably as diverse as a sample of five projects could be. Three projects were 
working on metro railways and two were working on mixed-traffic heavy railways. 
Three projects were delivering infrastructure improvements, one was delivering 
rolling stock improvements and one was delivering both. 
 All projects were at an advanced stage at which non-recurring engineering was 
largely complete. 
 For all projects except one, the part of the lifecycle discussed ran from initial 
feasibility studies until bringing the new assets into service and decommissioning 
assets being replaced. The exception was Project 3, which was associated with one 
change that was of significantly greater magnitude than all other changes made on 
that project – a decision, part way through design to radically cut back the scope of 
the project. Knowing that this change would be the focus of the exercise, the survey 
and data collection for this project were limited to the design phase. 
 The duration of the projects varied between 5 and 10 years with a mean average of 7 
years. 
 Projects were of moderate or large size, 50-199 staff at peak or larger. 
 The number of migration stages14 varied between 2 and 13. 
 The experience of the people performing the SE varied significantly between the 
projects. The degree to which these people interacted with the rest of the project 
also varied but to a lesser extent. 
 Volatility of technical strategy varied significantly between the projects. 
Note. Below, I report the finding that the commercial relationships between parties appears 
have a significant effect on change latency. Because I did not know this when I constructed 
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 A migration stage is a significant change to the railway after which the railway is returned to service. 
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the questionnaire and data collection procedure, I did not collect information about this 
aspect of the projects directly. 
10.3 Analysis of data collected about projects in general 
I looked out for outliers that could skew the results. One such outlier is immediately 
apparent: the analysis of Project 3 was restricted to the design phase. This means that the 
maximum change latency is restricted to the duration of this phase and any changes with 
greater change latency would not be analysed. As a consequence, I exclude this project from 
the calculation of correlations between change latency and other parameters. 
I carried out analyses in order to determine whether any project was significantly more 
challenging than the others. These analyses are described in detail in appendix A. No clear 
outlier was identified – if the challenges faced by one project in one area were above 
average this tended to be balanced by lower-than-average challenges in other areas. One 
project, project 5, did appear overall to face greater technical challenges but it also had the 
most experienced and integrated SE team. 
10.4 Data collected about the SE performed on the projects 
Interviewees were provided with 51 statements that might or might not have correctly 
described the SE performed on the project such as, “The project wrote down a description of 
the processes used to define, design, implement, build and commission the system”. The 
statements and additional detail about the data collected are shown in appendix A. The 
parameters were derived from the statements used in the second preliminary survey but I 
returned to ISO/IEC 15288 (ISO/IEC 2002) to create statements reflecting good practice in 
areas of SE not studied in the second preliminary survey. 
For each statement the interviewee was asked to what degree it fairly represented what had 
happened on the project. Each response provided was converted to a figure of merit (FoM) 
in the range 0.0 to 1.0, where 0.0 corresponded to the response ‘Wholly untrue’ and 1.0 
corresponded to the response ‘Wholly true’. Mean average FoMs were calculated for all 51 
statements and these are tabulated in appendix A. 
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11 of these FoMs were at or above the 80th percentile. They fall naturally into the following 
groups: 
 identifying stakeholders; 
 validation; and 
 assessing and monitoring risks. 
These were the areas where the projects adopted good SE practice to the greatest extent. 
A further 11 of these FoMs were at or below the 20th percentile. They fall naturally into the 
following groups: 
 managing interfaces; 
 checking and managing requirements; 
 tracking the implementation of change; and 
 modelling the physical structure of the system. 
These were the areas where the projects adopted good SE practice to the least extent. 
10.5 Analysis of data collected about the SE performed on the projects 
I was interested to see how the degree of uptake in the six core SE processes defined in the 
model that I presented in chapter 9 above varied between projects. If the degree of uptake 
was uniformly high or low across the projects, then this would make it difficult to learn 
whether it affected the outcome. 
To explore this, I associated the 51 statements in the questionnaire (apart from one15) with 
one of the six core SE processes. These are listed below with acronyms that will be used 
below to refer to them: 
 Model (the project) Processes (MP) 
 Manage Requirements and Specify the System (MR&StS) 
 Design the System (DtS) 
                                                     
15
 The model was revised after the list of questions had been finalised. One question – with identifier C – was subsequently 
found not to relate to any core SE process. 
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 Model, Simulate and Analyse the System (MS&AtS) 
 Verify and Validate the System (V&VtS) 
 Manage Change (MC) 
Mean average figures of merit were calculated for each core SE process on each project. An 
overall average SE figure of merit was also calculated for each project and each core SE 
process. The results are shown in Table 7. 
Highlighting is used in this table to indicate a division of the scores for the core SE processes 
into three groups: 
 Cells containing scores of 0.90 or higher are regarded as significantly better than 
average and are highlighted in blue. 
 Cells containing figures of 0.50 or lower or which represent averages of data that 
include at least one FoM of 0.25 (mostly untrue) or 0.0 (wholly untrue) are regarded 
as significantly worse than average and are highlighted in pink. The second part of 
this criterion was included on the basis that omission of or gross deficiency in one 
aspect of which may undermine the value of the other aspects. 
 Other cells are regarded as being approximately average and are not highlighted at 
all. 
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Table 7: Figures of Merit by project and process area 
Core SE 
process 
Project Overall 
1 2 early 2 late 3 4 5  
MP 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.63 0.88 0.78 
MR&StS 0.83 0.76 0.89 0.40 0.68 0.95 0.72 
DtS 0.79 0.46 0.63 0.54 0.75 0.92 0.72 
MS&AtS 0.97 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.53 0.86 0.82 
V&VtS 0.84 0.84 0.94 N/A 0.81 0.91 0.85 
MC 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.35 0.80 0.80 0.78 
Overall 0.87 0.79 0.87 0.53 0.70 0.89 0.78 
Notes: 
 Because I only collected data concerning the design phase of project 3, there was 
insufficient information to calculate a FoM for V&VtS for this project and this is 
indicated by showing the cell with a grey background. 
 Project 2 carried out a number of similar tasks, grouped into three ‘tranches’. The 
interviewee on project 2 provided responses for the initial tranche and also indicated 
where a different response was relevant to the final tranche. This enabled the 
calculation of separate figures of merit for ‘Project 2 (early)’ and ‘Project 2 (late)’. 
All the rows in Table 7, apart from Verify and validate the system, contain blue, white and 
pink cells. The sample then contains examples of low, medium and high uptake of SE 
practice in five of the six core SE processes, which increases the chances of seeing the effect 
of variation in uptake, while that chance is reduced for Verify and validate the system. 
10.6 Data collected about changes and analysis of these data 
10.6.1 An introduction to the data collection 
For each project, the interviewee and I reviewed one or more logs of the changes made on 
that project. With the interviewee’s help, I selected a sub-set of changes that met all the 
following criteria: 
(a) The change had a significant effect on the cost of the project. 
(b) The change affected either the final built system or the staging of the works. Changes 
that only affected project processes were excluded. 
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(c) The change implied some alteration in direction for the project. Changes that 
adjusted the requirements to bring them into line with what the project was already 
doing or planning to do were not included. 
(d) There was sufficient information available to collect the data about the change that I 
had specified. 
The precise interpretation of criterion (a) varied slightly between the projects in order to 
produce a manageable number of changes to analyse in detail. These criteria are discussed 
in appendix A but generally included changes that increased or decreased the cost of the 
project by at least 1% of the final cost. 
I observed that, on three of the projects analysed, the change records were incomplete 
enough that significant changes had to be excluded from the analysis and, on a fourth, 
criterion (a) had to be applied using the interviewee’s judgement because insufficient 
records were available. 
This is a little puzzling because I would expect that adoption of good SE practice would leave 
sufficient records to apply the data collection procedure fully16 and the figure of merit for 
the Managing change process only falls below 0.80 for one project. However, closer 
inspection shows that this average hides significant variation between different aspects of 
change management and, as I noted above, the figure of merit for tracking the 
implementation of change falls below the 20th percentile. 
I noted when reviewing the change records for some projects that they included entries that 
supported one contractual variation that, in turn, covered multiple technical changes. I 
believe change management was used on several of the projects as a commercial tool to 
document the final outcome of commercial negotiations between the parties rather than as 
an engineering tool for ensuring that change was consistently applied. 
                                                     
16
 The requirements for configuration management in ISO/IEC 15288 [ISO/IEC, 2002) include requirements that “Changes to 
items under configuration management are controlled” and “The status of items under configuration management is made 
available throughout the life cycle” and these are reflected in statements E, F, G and H in the study questionnaire (see Table 
27 in Appendix A). 
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For each change selected for analysis, the interviewee and I sought the following 
information from project records and the interviewee’s recollection of events in order to 
estimate change latency, detection latency and decision latency (see key points 6E and 6F): 
 The ‘root document’, by which I mean the most basic document in the project 
hierarchy that needed to change materially in order to implement the change. 
 The date (D0) upon which sufficient information was available to determine that the 
change was desirable. Where sufficient information was available to determine that 
the change was desirable at the time that the root document was issued then D0 was 
taken to be the date of issue of that document. 
 The date (D1) upon which someone identified that there was an issue that might 
require or justify a change and brought it to the attention of those managing the 
project. 
 The date (D4) upon which a decision was made to make the change. 
Change latency and its components may then be estimated as follows: 
Change latency = D4 – D0 
Detection latency = D1 – D0 
Decision latency = D4 – D1 
Notes: 
 These dates were rounded to months before processing and therefore time intervals 
were estimated in round months. Where the date could not be established to the 
nearest month, then the rounding that produced minimum values for change latency 
and detection latency was chosen, that is to say, D0 was rounded to the latest 
possible month while D1 and D4 were rounded to the earliest possible month. 
 If reliable dates could not be established for a change, the change was excluded from 
the analysis. 
 The dates are labelled D1 and D4, because I had originally intended to capture the 
start and end dates of any change assessment and I had reserved the labels D2 and 
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D3 for these dates. However, I found that it was not practical to collect reliable data 
of this sort and abandoned this intention. 
For each change analysed, I also asked the interviewee the following questions: 
 Why was the change made? 
 In your view, was the change for the worse, overall? 
 Please tell me in your own words what you consider to be the main factors that 
determined the latency. 
 Please tell me in your own words what could have been done, if anything, to reduce 
latency. 
Note. I asked whether a change was for the worse because, if any changes fell into this 
category, I would wish to consider them separately. However none of the responses 
provided by the interviewees suggested that any of the changes looked at was for the worse, 
overall. 
10.6.2 Data collected on the reasons for the change and on change latency 
31 changes were analysed in total. Basic data on these changes are presented in Table 8. The 
Root column contains Yes if the interviewee said that sufficient information was available to 
determine that the change was desirable at the time that the root document was issued. 
The changes are tabulated in order of decreasing change latency. In order to keep my 
promise to the interviewees, described above, that the information that they had provided 
would not be disclosed beyond my supervisors in a form that would allow someone to link it 
to them or the projects or organisations concerned, the descriptions of the changes have 
been generalised and the table does not show which project each change was associated 
with. 
It is a long table but I commend it to the reader: reviewing the list of changes provides, in my 
view, a significant insight into the range of issues that result in change on rail projects. 
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Table 8: The reasons for change and the latency of change 
Id Description of change Reason for change Root Detection 
latency 
(months) 
Decision 
latency 
(months) 
Change 
latency 
(months) 
A.  With regard to one sub-system, the customer needed three in quantity and believed 
that they had contracted for three but the supplier believed that they had contracted 
for one only. A contract variation was raised and so presumably there was ambiguity 
in the contract.  
Because, without the change, the system 
would not have worked or it would have been 
unacceptable to a stakeholder 
Yes 26 47 73 
B.  Buttons which passengers could press to raise the alarm were removed because the 
dis-benefits of malicious and inadvertent operation outweighed the safety benefits. 
In order to deliver increased value to a 
stakeholder  
Yes 51 18 69 
C.  The contract included like-for-like replacement of telecommunications facilities while, 
under another contract, the customer was replacing them with new technology. The 
like-for-like replacements were not in fact needed but the contract gave the customer 
no automatic benefit for reducing scope and the facilities were removed from scope 
after most of them had been installed. 
In order to reduce the cost of the project Yes 27 40 67 
D.  Additional facilities were needed to ensure satisfactory performance at an interface 
between the system and another system. 
Because, without the change, the system 
would not have worked or it would have been 
unacceptable to a stakeholder 
Yes 40 19 59 
E.  Additional facilities were needed to ensure satisfactory performance at an interface 
between the system and another system. 
Because, without the change, the system 
would not have worked or it would have been 
unacceptable to a stakeholder 
Yes 32 27 59 
F.  The cables used allowed potentially dangerous crosstalk and had to be replaced. The 
crosstalk could have been predicted theoretically. 
Because, without the change, the system 
would not have worked or it would have been 
unacceptable to a stakeholder 
Yes 51 7 58 
G.  Egress doors had to be modified to ensure satisfactory evacuation rates in an 
emergency. 
In order to deliver increased value to a 
stakeholder through reductions in service 
delays 
Yes 45 9 54 
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Id Description of change Reason for change Root Detection 
latency 
(months) 
Decision 
latency 
(months) 
Change 
latency 
(months) 
H.  A scenario was discovered where the system operator could be misinformed in a way 
that could lead to an accident. 
Because, without the change, the system 
would not have worked or it would have been 
unacceptable to a stakeholder 
Yes 49 2 51 
I.  An option, introduced into the contract at the outset, to extend some train lengths, 
was taken up. 
In order to deliver increased value to a 
stakeholder 
Yes 0 31 31 
J.  An option, introduced into the contract at the outset, to provide air conditioning to 
improve passenger comfort was taken up. 
In order to deliver increased value to a 
stakeholder 
Yes 0 30 30 
K.  Multiple changes were made to the design of the controls for some equipment in 
order to deliver something that was operable. The need for change was ascribed to a 
requirements specification that was unclear and incomplete. 
In order to meet the operational needs of the 
railway 
Yes 17 11 28 
L.  Additional facilities were needed to ensure satisfactory performance at an interface 
between the system and another system. 
Because, without the change, the system 
would not have worked or it would have been 
unacceptable to a stakeholder 
Yes 2 27 29 
M.  The order in which parts of the system were installed was found to be sub-optimal 
and was changed to minimise delays to the project. 
In order to reduce the timescales of the project No 26 3 29 
N.  Multiple changes were made to reduce the transmission of vexatious vibration to 
neighbours to an acceptable level. The transmission of vibration to neighbours was 
not initially discussed in the requirements. 
In order to avoid an unacceptable nuisance to 
neighbours. 
Yes 17 11 28 
O.  Change made to comply with revisions of standards that had been made since the 
start of the project. 
In order to comply with standards change. Yes 25 2 27 
P.  The train roof was lowered because some infrastructure was found to infringe the 
gauge and changing the train was cheaper than changing the infrastructure. 
Because, without the change, the system 
would not have worked or it would have been 
unacceptable to a stakeholder 
No 5 20 25 
Q.  An aspect of the system design was found to be more extensive than was required 
and was cut back to save costs. 
In order to reduce the cost of the project No 15 9 24 
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Id Description of change Reason for change Root Detection 
latency 
(months) 
Decision 
latency 
(months) 
Change 
latency 
(months) 
R.  The change added scope to the project in order to remove gaps at the interface 
between the project and a project to upgrade an adjacent part of the railway. 
In order to remove “Scope gaps “, which I 
consider implies omissions from the scope that 
must be corrected to deliver a railway that 
works and meets the overall requirements 
Yes 13 10 23 
S.  Back-up control facilities were added in order to provide acceptable system resilience. Because, without the change, the system 
would not have worked or it would have been 
unacceptable to a stakeholder 
Yes 3 18 21 
T.  The order in which parts of the system were installed was found to be sub-optimal 
and was changed to minimise delays to the project. 
In order to reduce the timescales of the project No 18 3 21 
U.  The system being delivered used different technology from which assumed by the 
customer's standards and changes to both the system and the standards were 
required to align them. 
Because, without the change, the system 
would not have worked or it would have been 
unacceptable to a stakeholder 
Yes 0 18 18 
V.  Communications antennae were moved to avoid radio dead spots. Because, without the change, the system 
would not have worked or it would have been 
unacceptable to a stakeholder 
No 10 6 16 
W.  The change concerns adjustments to the outline design, carried out by one 
contractor, after claims by another contractor performing detailed design that the 
outline design was not fit for purpose. 
The contractor was unable to meet the original 
programme because of the need to redesign 
parts of the signalling scheme 
Yes 9 6 15 
X.  The project was de-scoped because its projected cost exceeded the budget available. 
This was partly ascribed to inaccurate cost estimates and partly to the fact that the 
apportionment of the costs between budget holders was unclear and budget holders 
thought that their shares were lower than they actually were. 
In order to reduce the cost of the project Yes 11 3 14 
Y.  The original design would have degraded maintainability and the design was changed 
to restore maintainability to the levels before the project was made. 
In order to restore acceptable maintainability Yes 9 4 13 
Z.  Additional telecommunications facilities were added because the telecommunications 
needs of another system were found to be greater than anticipated. 
Because, without the change, the system 
would not have worked or it would have been 
unacceptable to a stakeholder 
Yes 0 13 13 
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Id Description of change Reason for change Root Detection 
latency 
(months) 
Decision 
latency 
(months) 
Change 
latency 
(months) 
AA.  Additional telecommunications facilities were added because the telecommunications 
needs of another system were found to be greater than anticipated. 
In order to future-proof the design No 0 11 11 
BB.  The procurement of another system being procured at the same time was cancelled 
and the contract for the system in question had to be adjusted as a result. 
In order to reduce the cost of the project No 0 9 9 
CC.  Distributed control facilities were collected in one place in order to deliver acceptable 
response times for faults. 
In order to deliver increased value to a 
stakeholder (reduced mean time to repair) 
Yes 3 6 9 
DD.  Telecommunications facilities were upgraded to give acceptable fidelity. Because, without the change, the system 
would not have worked or it would have been 
unacceptable to a stakeholder 
Yes 1 6 7 
EE.  Changes to the system being delivered were required because the customer changed 
the supplier for another system. 
In order to deliver increased value to a 
stakeholder through allowing significant cost 
savings elsewhere 
No 0 5 5 
  AVERAGE  16.3 13.9 30.2 
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One initial finding arises from review of changes I and J: 
Postponing a decision to make a change is a reasonable strategy for some changes and 
therefore reduced change latency is not always a benefit to projects. 
The decisions to make changes I and J were clearly explicitly delayed. The interviewee 
believed that it was possible to determine that the changes were desirable earlier than the 
point at which the decision was made to take them. However, it was not clear when the 
contract was let that there were sufficient funds to implement the changes and it may not 
have been certain that the changes were desirable. 
In addition, one of the interviewees said that, in an infrastructure project, a decision was 
taken not to carry out surveys to search for asbestos in advance of starting the works 
because the cost and disruption of carrying out these surveys was, on the average, greater 
that the cost of disruption associated with carrying out unplanned remedial works when the 
main works found asbestos. 
 
The change latency figures are striking: 
Average change latency was 30 months, more than a third of the average duration of the 
projects studied. 
 
Moreover, average detection latency is a significant proportion of average change latency. 
Average detection latency was more than 50% of average change latency. 
It is one thing to be aware of an issue and to decide to postpone taking a decision about it 
but it is quite another to be unaware of the issue. One has to assume some seriously 
dysfunctional decision making if one is to believe that a project will make better decisions in 
ignorance than if it is fully informed. 
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Finally, I note that: 
About three quarters (74%) of the changes in the projects studied were latent when the 
root document was issued. 
23 of the 31 changes have Yes in the Root column, indicating that, in principle, there was 
sufficient information available when the project set out on its initial course to determine 
that another course was preferable even if it is acknowledged that there may have been 
situations where it was rational to postpone a decision to do something different. 
A significant proportion of the major changes made by projects could, therefore, in principle, 
have been foreseen and incorporated into the original specification and design. 
10.6.3 Data collected on the factors affecting change latency 
As described above, I asked the interviewees two questions about each change: 
 Please tell me in your own words what you consider to be the main factors that 
determined the latency. 
 Please tell me in your own words what could have been done, if anything, to reduce 
latency. 
This yielded, for each change: 
 A list (possibly empty) of specific factors determining actual latency. 
 A list (possibly empty) of specific opportunities to reduce latency on similar projects. 
Although these questions appear to be distinct, in fact the answers provide the same sort of 
information. Consider, as an example, the following two potential responses to the two 
questions: 
 “Change latency was high because we did not consult sufficiently with maintainers 
when drawing up the requirements”. 
 “Change latency could have been reduced if we had consulted the maintainers better 
when drawing up the requirements”. 
These responses have almost exactly the same logical content and both imply that 
consultation of maintainers was a factor that affected change latency on the project. 
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It was valuable to ask both questions because they did not always result in matched answers 
and therefore asking both questions produced more information. However, having asked the 
questions separately, I combined the responses before starting to analyse them. 
I associated each specific factor and each specific opportunity with one or more generic 
factors. 
Six of these generic factors are aligned with the six core SE processes which I have defined 
and which are as follows: 
 Model (the project) processes (MP) 
 Manage Requirements and Specify the System (MR&StS) 
 Design the System (DtS) 
 Model, Simulate and Analyse the System (MS&AtS) 
 Verify and Validate the System (V&VtS) 
 Manage Change (MC) 
A change was associated with one of these processes if a specific factor was associated with 
some deficiency in that process, or a specific opportunity was associated with a potential 
improvement to that process, or both. 
The remaining specific factors and specific opportunities were inspected and the following 
common groups were identified and regarded as further generic factors: 
 The generic factor CONTR covered specific factors and opportunities associated with 
contractual and quasi-contractual relationships between parties to the project. By 
‘quasi-contractual relationships’, I mean agreements between separately-run 
departments within one organisation concerning the division of responsibilities 
between parties and the allocation of funding. 
 The generic factor RES&COMP covered specific factors and opportunities associated 
with the number of people available to perform and allocated responsibility for 
performing tasks, their skill, or their knowledge and understanding of general 
technical matters. This group included causes of the form, ‘No-one was thinking 
about the issue’, on the basis that this suggested that no-one had been assigned 
responsibility for thinking about the issue. 
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 The generic factor COST covered specific factors and opportunities associated with 
determining accurate costs of courses of action. 
 The generic factor VALUE covered specific factors and opportunities associated with 
value engineering. 
 The generic factor TIME covered specific factors and opportunities associated with 
the timing of activities. 
This left a few specific factors and specific opportunities that did not occur more than twice, 
which were placed in an OTHER category, which was treated as a final generic factor. The 
specific factors in the OTHER category included the following: 
 misjudging the implications of delaying a decision; 
 establishing the implications of a change for manufacturing; 
 carrying out market research; 
 delay in spotting the opportunity; 
 underestimation of difficulty; and 
 reluctance to change standards. 
The specific opportunities in the OTHER category included the following: 
 more disciplined behaviour by stakeholders; and 
 more thorough gate review. 
The full results of the analysis are provided in appendix A. Table 9 summarises the number of 
changes associated with each generic factor, in decreasing order. 
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Table 9: The number of changes associated with each generic factor 
Generic factor Number of changes 
MR&StS 16 
CONTR 15 
MS&AtS 11 
OTHER 9 
RES & COMP 5 
TIME 4 
MC 3 
COST 2 
VALUE 2 
DtS 1 
V&VtS 1 
MP 0 
The table paints a clear picture of which generic factors were found to be most significant in 
determining the change latency of the changes studied. Taking into account the fact that the 
OTHER generic factor is in fact a collection of different, infrequent factors, it can be seen 
that each of the MR&StS, MS&AtS and CONTR generic factors appears more than twice as 
often as the next most frequently-occurring factor. 
The most important generic factors affecting change latency on the projects studied were 
therefore found to be: 
 the manner in which the Manage requirements and specify the system core SE 
process was carried out; 
 the manner in which the Model, simulate and analyse the system core SE process 
was carried out; and 
 the nature of the contractual and quasi-contractual relationships between the parties 
involved. 
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10.6.4 Case study analysis of changes made by the projects 
In the next chapter, I describe analysis of documented case studies that includes tests of the 
15 causal mechanisms postulated in the tentative theory and listed in chapter 9. The analysis 
had three steps: 
1. Consider the description of the history of the change and search for evidence that 
contradicts any of the causal mechanisms listed above. 
2. Consider the description of the history of the change and search for evidence of the 
operation of additional significant causal mechanisms that affect change latency 
3. Consider the description of the history of the change and search for evidence that 
corroborates any of the causal mechanisms listed above. 
I applied this process to each of the 31 changes listed above. In summary my findings were 
as follows: 
 None of the 31 changes analysed appeared to contradict any of the causal 
mechanisms in the tentative theory. 
 The following three causal mechanisms, which are not in the tentative theory, were 
found to have had a significant effect in change latency on at least three of the 
changes considered: 
o X1. Efficient, co-operative contractual and quasi-contractual arrangements 
between the parties involved in a project lead to more timely and sounder 
decisions. 
o X2. Having sufficient skilled people available leads to more timely and 
sounder decisions. 
o X3. Having clarity of funding for the project leads to more timely and sounder 
decisions. 
Table 10 indicates the causal mechanisms corroborated by this process and number of 
changes that were found to provide evidence of each causal mechanism. 
Testing the tentative theory against data collected from projects Chapter 10 
140 
Table 10: Corroboration of causal links 
Id Causal mechanism Changes 
6 More timely and thorough consultation with stakeholders will lead to more timely, accurate 
and comprehensive requirements. 
4 
8 More timely, accurate and comprehensive requirements will lead to more timely, accurate 
and comprehensive system design. 
16 
10 More timely, accurate and comprehensive system design will lead to more timely and 
sounder decisions. 
15 
11 More timely, accurate and comprehensive modelling, simulation and analysis will lead to 
more timely and sounder decisions. 
12 
12 More timely and accurate cost estimates will lead to more timely and sounder decisions. 3 
13 More timely and sounder problem reports will lead to more timely and sounder decisions. 1 
X1 Efficient, co-operative commercial arrangements between the parties involved in a project 
lead to more timely and sounder decisions. 
14 
X2 Having sufficient skilled people available leads to more timely and sounder decisions. 3 
X3 Having clarity of funding for the project leads to more timely and sounder decisions. 4 
The corroborated causal mechanisms are indicated on Figure 15. New mechanisms are 
highlighted by using red ovals. Arrows for which at least ten changes provided evidence are 
drawn thicker than other arrows. 
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Figure 15: Causal mechanisms corroborated by data collected from projects 
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10.7 Further analysis 
The analysis of the previous section suggests that the effect of SE on change latency is 
principally concerned with two processes: 
 Manage requirements and specify the system (MR&StS); and 
 Model, simulate and analyse the system (MS&AtS). 
In order to investigate the question that I have set for myself, I carried out both quantitative 
and qualitative analysis into the effects of adoption of good SE practice for these processes 
on change latency. 
10.7.1 Quantitative analysis 
Correlations between adoption of SE and change latency 
Under the quantitative heading, I explored the correlations between the figures of merit for 
MR&StS and MS&AtS on the one hand and average change latency on the other hand. Of 
course, because I collected no data that could be used to construct a figure of merit for 
CONTR, I could not explore this quantitatively. 
The scatter graphs below between the figures of merit with change latency and with 
detection latency and decision latency are shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17 below. 
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Figure 16: Correlation between MR&StS and change latency and its components 
 
 
Figure 17: Correlation between MS&AtS and change latency and its components 
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Notes. 
 I excluded project 3 from the graphs because I only looked at some of its phases. As a 
consequence change latency was therefore constrained to the length of these phases 
and its inclusion could have skewed the results. 
 I had previously calculated figures of merit for both the initial and final tranches of 
project 2. As the only change whose latency I was looking was associated with the 
first tranche, I used the figures of merit for the first tranche in the graphs. 
Of course, the number of data points is too low and the number of confounding factors too 
high to expect to draw any conclusions from this graph and, indeed, there are no compelling 
correlations visible. 
The scattering of the points on the graphs does make clear, if there was ever any doubt, that 
change latency is a function of other variables in addition to those plotted on the X axes. I 
suggest that one significant potential value of quantitative analysis of this sort is to allow the 
principal additional factors to be understood but several dozen data points are required to 
do this and, if research does continue in this area, I think it will require sponsorship from a 
rail projects organisation, probably in the context of a process improvement initiative. 
Contemplating the absence of any clear correlations has led me to one realisation about the 
limitations of using average change latency as a measure. That may be most clearly 
explained by considering a thought experiment. Suppose that we came into possession of 
some limited form of time travel and chose to use it by going back to the start of one of the 
projects whose statistics are plotted in Figure 16 and correcting some deficiencies in the way 
in which it managed requirements. As we watched the effects of this intervention ripple 
through the time space continuum we would see the project’s data point on Figure 16 move 
to the right because the figure of merit for MR&StS would be increased. But even if the 
effects on change were beneficial the data point would not necessarily move downwards. It 
would move downwards if the effects of the improvement were to make changes earlier but, 
if the effects were to forestall changes then the set of changes for which an average change 
latency is calculated would become smaller and the average might rise or fall. 
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I do not retract my assertion that change latency is a useful measure for researcher and 
practitioner alike (see key points 6G and 6H) but when it comes to calculating statistics for 
the changes undergone by a project, it seems to me that it would be valuable to supplement 
average change latency by a measure of aggregate change latency, for example the result of 
summing the change latencies of all changes weighted by their effect on overall cost 
expressed as a percentage of the total budget for the project. This, admittedly more 
complex, statistic, is still a quantity with a time dimension and retains the advantages of 
average change latency but would be guaranteed to fall if change were either accelerated or 
forestalled. 
I did not collect enough data from the projects concerned to calculate aggregate change 
latency. 
Estimating the ‘reach’ of SE 
The project data does provide evidence that SE can reduce change latency but it also 
suggests that, because there are other factors that affect change latency, no amount of 
investment in SE could eliminate change latency. 
I estimated the proportion of the latency that SE could do away with as (l×m)/n, where l is 
the change latency for the change, n is the total number of generic factors for the change 
and m, is the number of generic factors for the change that are associated with SE core 
processes. 
On the average, I found that this statistic was 15.0 months, almost exactly half total change 
latency, suggesting that SE’s reach, in terms of the proportion of change latency that it could 
be used to eliminate, is significant but far from universal. 
10.7.2 Qualitative analysis 
Under the qualitative heading, I looked at the accounts of the changes for which the 
MR&StS, MS&AtS and CONTR general factors were found to be causal factors and sought 
insight into the manner in which the causal mechanisms work. 
Testing the tentative theory against data collected from projects Chapter 10 
146 
Qualitative investigation of the effects of the ‘Manage requirements and specify the 
system’ process 
There is evidence that the way in which the MR&StS core process area is implemented 
affects change latency but the analysis so far has not revealed the mechanisms that produce 
this effect. To investigate this, I looked at the accounts of the 16 changes for which the 
MR&StS process was found to be a generic factor and reviewed the specific factors and 
opportunities related to this generic factor. I found that these specific factors and 
opportunities were generally concerned with one or more of the following deficiencies in 
requirements management: 
 failure to take proper account of the needs of operators and maintainers; 
 failure to take proper account of an external interface; and 
 unclear specification. 
I reviewed the list of statements about SE good practice that I used in the questionnaire and 
found items capable of mitigating or eliminating each of these deficiencies17: 
 N. Stakeholders were consulted to establish their requirements 
 U. Scenarios of typical use were defined and used to establish and/or check 
requirements 
 V. Users of the system were identified and treated as stakeholders 
 J. Key interfaces between system and external entities were defined and 
documented 
 OO. Each requirement was checked for verifiability, unambiguity and atomicity 
I looked at the average figures of merit for these statements and found two of them to be 
significantly below the overall average for all statements. 
I conclude that adopting good SE practices in areas where the current level of adoption was 
low could have reduced the latency of several changes. 
                                                     
17
 The initial letters refer to the identifiers of these statements in Table 27 in Appendix A 
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Qualitative investigation of the effects of the ‘Model, simulate and analyse the system’ 
process 
I reviewed the accounts of the 11 changes for which the MS&AtS process was found to be a 
generic factor and in 10 of these cases the account suggested strongly that further 
modelling, simulation and analysis could have identified the need for the change earlier. 
It is tempting to jump from this finding to the (tentative) conclusion that doing more 
MS&AtS would have been a better strategy for the projects concerned. The conclusion may 
well be true but it is not a necessary inference from the finding. This is because doing more 
modelling, simulation and analysis would only have been a better strategy if it had been ‘the 
right sort’ of modelling, simulation and analysis, that is to say, modelling, simulation and 
analysis which focussed on the issues that later drove change. The difficulty lies in knowing 
in advance what the right sort is. 
It may be that many rail project changes can be foreseen by modelling, simulation and 
analysis but the project will not have the time or budget to carry out all possible modelling, 
simulation and analysis activities and will have to decide which ones to perform before it is 
known where the issues will be. 
The optimal strategy is likely to be risk-based: performing modelling, simulation and analysis 
in areas where issues are most likely to occur or where their consequences would be most 
severe, or both. 
Qualitative investigation of the effects of contractual and quasi-contractual arrangements 
There are 15 changes for which CONTR was found to be a generic factor. I reviewed the 
specific factors and opportunities related to this generic factor. I discerned the following 
general categories (some changes were associated with more than one): 
A. the time taken to conclude contractual discussions (8 occurrences); 
B. lack of clarity about availability or apportionment of funding, including disagreement 
about who should pay for a change (4 occurrences); 
C. lack of agreement about who was responsible for a technical issue (2 occurrences); 
D. an adversarial relationship between parties (in one case leading to a reluctance to 
make a change because it might be taken as admitting liability) (2 occurrences); 
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E. constraints on the time available for SE in the pre-tender period (1 occurrence); 
F. a contract that meant that no benefit was enjoyed by one party as a result of savings 
enjoyed by the other party (1 occurrence); and 
G. a contract whose provisions did not align with what stakeholders actually required (1 
occurrence). 
It is arguable that the item in category G should be allocated to MR&StS but, in the case 
concerned, I concluded that it was a product of the contracting strategy rather than the way 
in which requirements were set. 
Each of these specific factors and opportunities reveals a plausible and general mechanism 
whereby contractual and quasi-contractual arrangements might be expected to delay 
decision making and thereby impede the effects of SE on change latency. 
10.8 Reflections 
The data collected from projects have not contradicted any of the causal mechanisms 
affecting change latency included in the tentative theory and have corroborated several of 
them. The data have suggested that there are additional causal mechanisms with a 
significant effect on change latency on the projects studied. 
A small subset of the causal mechanisms appears to operate significantly more often than 
the remaining mechanisms. 
The picture in Figure 15 is consistent with the findings of the previous section, which is 
unsurprising as they derive from the same base data. The picture may be considered as a 
map of the principal issues that a project manager determined to reduce change latency on 
a project should tackle. 
There are a number of causal mechanisms in the tentative theory for which little or no 
corroboration was found. With such a small sample, one must be cautious about drawing 
conclusions from the absence of corroboration. For Verify and Validate the System, the fact 
that there was little variation in uptake of good practice between the projects may have 
hidden this mechanism. However, if no corroboration was found for a causal mechanism for 
an extended period, it would be necessary to reconsider that mechanism.  
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There was no direct corroboration for the causal mechanisms by which greater adoption of 
good SE practices in core SE processes leads to these processes becoming more effective. 
This is probably the consequence of the way in which data was collected. Having remarked 
that change latency was increased by weaknesses in requirements management, or reduced 
by strengths in requirements managements, an interviewee would have felt no need to 
point out that requirements management is a part of SE. The interviewees knew that I was 
looking at the effects of SE on change latency and expected me to look for the causal 
mechanisms. 
In some cases there are good logical arguments from the definition of good practice to 
believe that the mechanisms operate. There is, also, indirect evidence (see the previous 
section) that some of these mechanisms operated. 
Of course, for reasons explained earlier, these data do not, on their own, allow conclusions 
to be drawn about the general population of rail projects from the data collected because: 
 the sample size is small; 
 the sample of projects is not drawn randomly from the population of projects as I 
knew that the interviewees had an interest in SE and related topics; 
 in some cases, the survey process obtains the interviewees' perceptions of the 
projects rather than the facts directly; and 
 in some cases, records were incomplete. 
However, despite these limitations it is considered that the data had provided insights of 
value regarding rail projects and the effects of adopting SE on them. 
10.9 Key points 
10A The projects studied are a diverse representation of medium-sized and large rail 
projects – probably as diverse as a sample of five projects could be – and the 
challenges that they faced were of the same order of magnitude. 
10B The areas in which the projects appeared to adopt good SE practice to the greatest 
extent on average were: 
 identifying stakeholders; 
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 validation; and 
 assessing and monitoring risks. 
10C The areas in which the projects appeared to adopt good SE practice to the least extent 
on average were: 
 managing interfaces; 
 checking and managing requirements; 
 tracking the implementation of change; and 
 modelling the physical structure of the system. 
10D There was significant variation between the projects studied in the uptake of SE 
practices in five of the six core SE processes – all apart from Verify and validate the 
system. 
10E On four of the five projects looked at, the change records were incomplete enough to 
affect my data collection. 
10F Postponing a decision to make a change is a reasonable strategy for some changes and 
therefore reduced change latency is not always a benefit to projects. 
10G Average change latency was 30 months, more than a third of the average duration of 
the projects studied. 
10H Average detection latency was more than 50% of average change latency. 
10J About three quarters (74%) of the changes in the projects studied were latent when 
the root document was issued. 
10K The most important generic factors affecting change latency on the projects studied 
were found to be: 
 the manner in which the Manage requirements and specify the system core SE 
process was carried out; 
 the manner in which the Model, simulate and analyse the system core SE 
process was carried out; and 
 the nature of the contractual and quasi-contractual relationships between the 
parties involved, including relationships determining the flow of money between 
separately-run departments within one organisation. 
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10L None of the 31 changes analysed appeared to contradict any of the causal mechanisms 
in the tentative theory. The changes corroborated some of them (principally those 
associated with the generic factors listed in the previous point). 
10M The following three causal mechanisms, which are not in the tentative theory, were 
found to have had a significant effect in change latency: 
 X1. Efficient, co-operative contractual and quasi-contractual arrangements 
between the parties involved in a project lead to more timely and sounder 
decisions. 
 X2. Having sufficient skilled people available leads to more timely and sounder 
decisions. 
 X3. Having clarity of funding for the project leads to more timely and sounder 
decisions. 
10N The number of data points is too low and the number of confounding factors too high 
to draw any conclusions from the quantitative analysis carried out but repeating the 
analysis with a larger data set does offer the prospect of allow the effect of different 
factors on change latency to be understood 
10P In carrying out further quantitative analysis, it would be valuable to supplement 
average change latency by a measure of aggregate change latency, for example the 
result of summing the change latencies of all changes weighted by their effect on 
overall cost expressed as a percentage of the total budget for the project. 
10Q SE’s reach, in terms of the proportion of change latency which it could be used to 
eliminate, is significant but far from universal 
10R Adopting good SE practices in areas where the current level of adoption was low could 
have reduced the latency of several changes 
10S Performing additional modelling, simulation and analysis could have reduced the 
latency of several changes, but the most cost-effective modelling, simulation and 
analysis is likely to be one that is risk-based. 
Testing the tentative theory against data collected from projects Chapter 10 
152 
10T The responses from the interviewees did not explicitly corroborate the causal 
mechanisms by which greater adoption of good SE practices in core SE processes leads 
to these processes becoming more effective, probably as a consequence of how the 
data were collected. However, there is indirect evidence for these mechanisms. 
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11 TESTING THE TENTATIVE THEORY AGAINST PUBLISHED DATA 
In this chapter, I describe an exercise to test the tentative theory by analysing published data 
concerning four further railway projects (or, in one case, an account of a project provided to 
me by a member of the project). During the discussion, I reflect upon the degree to which 
the data confirm the tentative theory, the degree to which they contradict it and 
refinements to the tentative theory that the data suggest. I summarise these reflections at 
the end. 
11.1 Testing the tentative theory using published data on railway projects 
Four case studies were analysed. Each section below is devoted to the discussion of one case 
study as described in one or more public-domain documents, or as arising from an interview. 
Each section has the following sub-sections, which follow the structure of the analysis 
performed: 
 Introduction contains a top-level description of the project concerned and the scope 
of the case study. 
 The way in which the project was run contains a summary of information available 
on the adoption of SE ideas in the project’s processes, supplemented by relevant 
information about other aspects of the project, focussing on management, 
governance and contracting arrangements. 
 The changes that were made contains a summary of information about significant 
changes made on the project, including a description of each change and, where 
possible, an indication of its latency. 
 Analysis and conclusions contains the result of a search for: 
o any evidence contradicting the causal mechanisms postulated in the tentative 
theory; 
o any evidence corroborating the causal mechanisms postulated in the 
tentative theory; and 
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o any evidence suggesting additional causal mechanisms affecting change 
latency. 
Additional sub-sections are added where this helps to clarify the account and supporting 
detail is provided in appendix B. This appendix has the same section headings as this 
chapter. For additional information about any of the sections below, please refer to the 
corresponding section of appendix B. So, for example, for information on section 11.6, refer 
to B.6. 
When I look at the evidence referred to above, I classify it as ‘weak’ or ‘strong’. To be 
classified as strong the evidence must: 
 be more than just the personal opinion of someone directly involved in the project; 
and 
 must show that the upstream parameter was a significant factor 18  for the 
downstream parameter. 
Four cases are studied: 
 The West Coast Route Modernisation Project19 
 The Jubilee Line Extension Project20 
 The Channel Tunnel Rail Link Project21 
 Acquisition of High-Output Ballast Cleaning Plant22 
Each case study is discussed in turn. 
                                                     
18
 A factor is significant if no other factor has been identified which dominates it. 
19
 Drawn from (NAO, 2006; Dick, 2000) and various articles in ‘Modern Railways’ magazine. 
20
 Drawn from (Mitchell, 2003; Arup, 2001; UCL, 2009). 
21
 Drawn from (Steer Gleave Davies, 2004; NAO, 2005; NAO, 2012) and various articles in ‘Modern Railways’ magazine. 
22
 Drawn from an interview with a senior member of the project. 
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11.2 Case Study 1: The West Coast Route Modernisation Project 
11.2.1 Introduction 
This project was already discussed in chapter 8 as an example of the case study method. The 
discussion in chapter 8 was focussed on one aspect of the project. This section contains a 
more general analysis. 
To recap: the West Coast Main Line connects many of the largest cities in the UK including 
London, Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow and Edinburgh. The West Coast Route 
Modernisation (WCRM) project carried out a significant volume of modernisation work 
between 1998 and 2008, delivering increased capacity and reduced journey times as well as 
replacing worn-out parts of the railway. The cost of the project rose very significantly during 
this period and as a consequence the scope of the works had to be cut back (NAO, 2006). 
The project appears to be an example of a very problematic project for which the problems 
were mitigated by remedial actions that included strengthening aspects of project 
governance and SE. There is clear evidence that change latency was very expensive and 
some suggestion that weaknesses in project governance and SE in the earlier phases of the 
project contributed to this. 
This case study is drawn from a report into the project published by the UK National Audit 
Office (NAO) (2006), a magazine article (Dick, 2000), describing the requirements 
management performed on the project and various articles in the trade magazine, ‘Modern 
Railways’. 
The case study is mainly concerned with events in the period 2001 until 2003 inclusive. The 
following description of this period in the life of the project is adapted from text in the 
summary of the NAO report. 
In January 2002, the Secretary of State instructed the Strategic Rail Authority to intervene 
and find a way forward for the program to renew and upgrade the West Coast Main Line. 
The upgrade was being undertaken under a 1998 agreement between Railtrack, the private 
sector owner and operator of rail infrastructure, and Virgin Rail Group, which operated the 
West Coast passenger rail franchise, and involved the introduction of new signalling 
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technology to allow improved services delivered by new trains running at 140 miles per 
hour. 
By 2001, neither the rail infrastructure upgrade nor the new trains were on course for 
delivery as set out in the 1998 agreement. In October 2001, Railtrack went into Railway 
Administration and by May 2002 its projection of the programme's final cost had risen from 
£2.5 billion (in 1998) to £14.5 billion. Railtrack had spent £2.5 billion on the program by 
March 2002, and had committed some £500 million of further works, but had delivered only 
a sixth of its scope. There had been substantial abortive costs to the programme. 
The Strategic Rail Authority clarified the direction, scope and expected outputs of the 
program in the June 2003 West Coast Main Line Strategy and the project was completed by 
Network Rail, the not-for-profit organisation that inherited the railway assets from Railtrack. 
11.2.2 The way in which the project was run 
Because the NAO report is the principal source for the case study, it is useful to describe how 
it is structured. The most relevant part of the report is considered to be Part 1, “The 
Strategic Rail Authority and Network Rail turned around delivery of the West Coast 
programme”. This lists five key weaknesses and then describes action taken to remedy these 
weaknesses. 
The weaknesses were: 
1. a lack of clear governance arrangements and direction for the programme; 
2. failure to engage stakeholders in support of the programme; 
3. a lack of tight specification and change control; 
4. the use of untried and unproven new technology; and 
5. failure to effectively manage and monitor programme delivery through contractors. 
The NAO concludes that these weaknesses had led to “scope creep”, delays and increase in 
costs. 
The NAO describes improvements resulting from the SRA intervention that included: 
 setting a clear direction for the project; 
 establishing clear programme governance structures; 
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 achieving ‘buy in’ from stakeholders to decisions on scope, access and timetables, 
through better consultation and communication; 
 developing a clear, measurable set of programme outputs and a series of functional 
specifications to translate the programme’s scope into detailed requirements; 
 building the internal capacity to write specifications, and to review and approve 
project designs and then inviting contractors to make fixed-price proposals for 
completing the design and delivering the physical works; 
 appointing Bechtel Ltd to provide “leadership, direction and clarity” to the 
management of programme delivery; and 
 restructuring the programme organisation, so that decisions could be taken more 
quickly. 
The NAO concludes that these improvements had led to benefits that included: 
 facilitating a more intrusive regime of obtaining possession of the track, which was 
crucial to delivery of the project; and 
 identifying opportunities to reduce the programme cost by over £4 billion. 
The project had adopted some aspects of good SE practice before the intervention by the 
SSRA. Dick reports that, in 2000, the project had adopted the principles of requirements 
management including the use of proprietary requirements management software, a 
structured approach, translating high-level business needs into detailed requirements that 
were traced to business benefits and removing unnecessary requirements. The “detailed 
requirements” to which Dick refers were, however, presumably not detailed enough as the 
SRA found that it was desirable to prepare more detailed requirements. 
11.2.3 The changes that were made 
Significant changes made by the project during its lifetime included: 
 The increased use of blockades. 
 Removing from the scope of the programme the European Rail Traffic Management 
System (ERTMS), new signalling technology, and the Network Management Centre. 
This is of itself a major change and one that clearly illustrates the huge potential costs 
of change latency. The NAO reports that Railtrack had spent £350 million on these 
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items. Had they been omitted from the start, the cost of the programme would have 
been reduced by at least this much. 
 Identifying that “faster running north of Preston could be achieved without the need 
to replace the signalling”. 
 Using a better value solution to the upgrade of the route’s power supply using 
autotransformers rather than booster transformers. 
 Using a different layout at Rugby in which a non-standard arrangement of the traffic 
across the four tracks was tolerated for a short distance. 
 Removing an expensive underpass at Nuneaton station and requiring passengers that 
would have travelled on trains through this underpass to change trains at Nuneaton. 
 Reversing a decision to limit widening in the Trent Valley and reverting to a scheme 
with four-track line throughout. 
 Adopting a simplified layout at Stafford. 
 Adopting a change of policy for the Northern section of the line in which the project 
would try to raise the 90 mph speed limits to 110 mph rather than trying to raise the 
110 mph speed limits to 125 mph. 
11.2.4 Analysis and conclusions 
Discussion of changes 
It is useful to reflect first upon the changes described in the previous section. In the most 
general terms, it seems reasonable to conclude that each of the changes was desirable 
because the previous plans that the project was following failed to meet at least one of the 
following criteria: 
 they could be relied up to support the desired timetable; 
 they could be relied upon to be completed by the deadlines defined; or 
 there was no cheaper but acceptable alternative. 
There is one small caveat to be made regarding this assertion. The removal of the underpass 
at Nuneaton presumably did not allow the desired timetable to be run. However a saving of 
tens of millions of pounds was found to outweigh the inconvenience to a limited number of 
passengers who would now have to change at Nuneaton. 
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However, since reliably delivering the desired timetable by the defined deadlines at 
minimum risk was clearly a major part of the underlying objective for the project, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the majority of the changes were required because the project 
was not heading towards this objective. There is no suggestion in the material that I have 
read that the desired timetable had been subject to fundamental change since the start of 
the project and, as the NAO report records, aspects of this timetable had been defined in a 
contract with the Virgin Group. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that sufficient 
information was available when the project started to establish that the majority of the 
changes made in 2003 and 2004 were desirable. Presumably the project took some time to 
specify exactly what it intended to do but Dick’s account suggests that this process was well 
advanced by 2000 and therefore typical latency for the changes discussed would have been 
3 years or more. 
Contradiction of the tentative theory 
Nothing has been identified in the report that appears to contradict the causal mechanisms 
postulated in the tentative theory. 
Corroboration of the tentative theory 
There is strong evidence from the NAO report that improving the way in which the project 
drew up specifications of what it was trying to achieve resulted in better specifications that, 
in turn, resulted in better designs and supported better decisions, contributing to decisions 
to make changes that had been desirable for some time. The improvements in the way in 
which the project specified what it was trying to achieve clearly included improved 
consultation of stakeholders and appeared to include adopting other good SE practices. 
It is clear from the project history that Railtrack was unable to obtain accurate cost 
estimates for the work that it had commissioned and it is likely that Railtrack would have 
brought forward some of the decisions arising from the SRA intervention if it had had more 
accurate estimates. 
There is some evidence from the NAO report that improving change control resulted in 
lower cost and reduced timescales and it is considered reasonable to presume that at least 
some of these benefits are the result of sounder and more timely change decisions. 
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The decision to replace booster transformers with autotransformers was taken in part, 
according to the NAO, because the challenge team identified that the booster transformers 
would have insufficient capacity to cope with future traffic increases, which suggests that 
Railtrack had insufficient modelling capability in this area. 
Given the impartial and authoritative nature of the NAO report, it is considered that there is 
strong evidence for the following causal mechanisms in the tentative theory:23 
 2. More timely and greater adoption of good SE practice will lead to more timely, 
accurate and comprehensive requirements. 
 6. More timely and thorough consultation with stakeholders will lead to more timely, 
accurate and comprehensive requirements. 
 9. More timely, accurate and comprehensive requirements will lead to more timely 
and sounder decisions. 
 12. More timely and accurate cost and timescale estimates will lead to more timely 
and sounder decisions. 
It is considered that there is weak evidence for the following causal mechanisms in the 
tentative theory: 
 11. More timely, accurate and comprehensive modelling, simulation and analysis will 
lead to more timely and sounder decisions. 
 15. More efficient change management arrangements will lead to more timely and 
sounder decisions. 
Additional causal mechanisms 
It is clear that the decision to adopt a blockade strategy was delayed by dysfunctional 
relationships between Railtrack and the operators. The NAO report says that changing the 
programme organisation led to quicker decisions. There is also some evidence from the NAO 
report that deficiencies in the skills and knowledge of the project team contributed to 
unsound decisions. 
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It is considered that there is strong evidence for the following causal mechanism which is not 
in the tentative theory but which was suggested by the findings of chapter 10: 
 X1. Efficient, co-operative contractual and quasi-contractual arrangements between 
the parties involved in a project lead to sounder and timelier decisions. 
It is considered that there is weak evidence for the following causal mechanism which is not 
in the tentative theory but which was suggested by the findings of chapter 10: 
 X2. Having sufficient skilled people available leads to more timely and sounder 
decisions. 
The conclusions of the previous two sections are illustrated in Figure 18. Corroborated 
causal mechanisms are shown in blue and additional causal mechanisms are shown in red. 
Thick lines indicate strong evidence while thin lines indicate weak evidence. 
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Figure 18: Causal mechanisms corroborated by the West Coast Route Modernisation project case study 
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11.3 Case Study 2: The Jubilee Line Extension Project 
11.3.1 Introduction 
The Jubilee Line Extension (JLE) project extended the Jubilee Line from Charing Cross to 
Stratford. The project started in October 1993 with a planned timescale of 53 months and an 
approved budget of £2.1 billion. When it was completed in December 1999, it had taken 74 
months and was forecast to cost £3.5 billion. The final cost included some elements not 
allowed for in the budget and the project was beset by some significant events beyond its 
control, including: 
 The entry into administration of the Canary Wharf developers who, it was planned, 
would contribute to the cost. This delayed the start of the project. 
 A collapse in a tunnel being built by another project using the same tunnelling 
method. This resulted in an interruption to tunnelling activities. 
 The decision by the government to hold national Millennium celebrations in North 
Greenwich. This placed an absolute deadline of 31st December 1999 on the opening 
of the line and removed from the project the option of dealing with problems by 
extending timescales. 
This case study is drawn from a report produced by Arup acting as Agent to the Secretary of 
State for Transport (Arup, 2001), the book ‘Jubilee Line Extension from concept to 
completion’ by Mitchell (2003) and a Project Profile for the JLE Project published by 
University College, London (UCL, 2009). 
11.3.2 The way in which the project was run 
Systems Engineering 
I found no use of the phrase ‘systems engineering’ in any of the three source references 
above. The project belongs to an age before the phrase entered the railway engineer’s 
vocabulary. The project certainly carried out activities within the scope of the core SE 
processes that I have defined but these activities appear to have been drawn from the 
tradition of large civil engineering projects at the time and I have found no evidence of any 
systematic attempt to adopt good SE practice. 
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Project Management 
There is evidence that weaknesses in project management were causal factors for project 
problems in general and for change latency specifically. Weaknesses recorded in the source 
references included: 
 letting contracts before the design was complete; and 
 reporting on the unduly optimistic basis that historical delays would be made up. 
The source references claim that these weaknesses led to delays and an increased volume of 
change. 
Contract Management 
Two criticisms of the contractual arrangements have been identified that could have 
increased change latency: 
 Failure by the overall project to put in place adequate mechanisms for co-ordinating 
contracts. Instead the project required contractors to co-ordinate themselves. 
 The use of ‘punitive’ forms of contract, which created adversarial relationships and 
created incentives for contractors to avoid co-ordinating their activities with other 
contractors. 
11.3.3 The changes that were made 
In order to identify changes it is necessary to set a baseline. I choose to use as a baseline the 
scheme defined in the London Underground Bill 1989, as deposited in November 1989. A 
change, then, must either differ from this baseline or be a deviation from a definite 
subsequent commitment. 
There were a number of changes to the design of the stations but the changes are complex 
enough and the available information about them is limited enough that I have found it 
impractical to analyse them. 
Leaving these aside, the following five changes are significant enough that their 
consequences would be readily apparent to a user of the line: 
1. The decision to change the route so that it included North Greenwich. 
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This change was made to promote regeneration of areas of South London. Had the 
decision been taken by the project in order to meet criteria defined by parliament, 
this change would have been considered to be of relevance to the research being 
conducted. However, as parliament was directly involved in the decision, it is 
considered to fall into the realm of political science rather than project delivery and it 
is not considered further. 
2. The decision to greatly increase the works on the existing portion of the Jubilee Line. 
This change appears to have been required because the project regarded its scope as 
being concerned with building a new line and did not properly consider what work 
was required on the existing part of the line. Necessary work costing about £100 
million was omitted from the original change. The latency for the change to 
incorporate this additional work was at least 16 months. 
The adoption of good SE practice in the area of managing requirements and 
specifying the system forces consideration of the questions, ‘What system are we 
building?’, ‘What systems will the new system interface with?’ and ‘What outcomes 
do we wish to enjoy as a result?’. It is considered that any serious investigation of 
these questions would have revealed the oversight and allowed the latency for this 
change to have been reduced. It is noted (Mitchell, 2003; page 345) that there was 
no full client brief document until 1995. However, an initial Operating Plan was put 
together for the extended line in early 1991 (Mitchell, 2003; page 126) so it is 
possible that the late adoption of some aspects of good SE practice did in fact reveal 
the omissions. 
3. The decision to replace the existing train fleet rather than supplementing it. 
The decision was made because replacement was found to be a cheaper way of 
achieving adequate reliability and conforming to recently introduced safety 
regulations than modifying the existing fleet. The account suggests that change 
latency was at least 24 months. It is not clear that greater adoption of SE practices 
would have reduced this latency nor that the latency had any significant 
consequences for the project. 
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4. The decision to open the line in phases. 
This decision appears to have been made to increase the manageability of the 
operational change. It had been championed by operational staff for at least 24 
months before the decision was made. It seems likely that better liaison with the 
operators and better consideration of operational requirements would have reduced 
the change latency. 
5. The decision to abandon the planned moving block signalling system and revert to a 
fixed-block signalling system with reduced capacity. 
It was appreciated at the outset of the project that the technology used for the 
moving block signalling system was immature and an option was included in the 
contract to fall back to a fixed block signalling system. After reassurances from the 
supplier, this option was allowed to lapse in 1996. However, in September 1997, a 
decision was taken to abandon the moving block solution and fall back to the fixed 
block alternative. It seems likely that, in 1996, if the London Underground project 
team had had mechanisms to inform itself better about the state of play, the option 
would have been exercised at that stage. While good SE practice might have 
supported such mechanisms, it is not considered that there is evidence that good SE 
practice on its own could have reduced the latency of this change. 
There does appear to have been a great deal of change on the project. Mitchell (2003; page 
298) says that 48,000 instruments of change were issued on one contract and Arup (2001; 
page 7) reports that that 70 per cent of the initial value of the works was accounted for by 
variations and ascribes this to the incompleteness of the design information issued to 
contractors. The implication is that further attention to system design activities would have 
forestalled a great deal of the change described. 
The fact that 70% of the initial cost was accounted for by variations does not mean that the 
cost of the change latency was 70% of the initial cost. If all the changes referred to had been 
incorporated into the design from the start, then the initial value would have been higher, 
although presumably not 70% higher. 
Chapter 11 Testing the tentative theory against published data 
167 
The accounts of the project do however provide evidence that change latency can be 
expensive. Mitchell (2003; page 344) estimates that £600 million is attributable to the costs 
of delay, disruption and acceleration. 
However, the costs of change latency are not necessarily the same for all changes. Mitchell 
(2003; page 194) asserts that, “The amount of site investigation is always a compromise as 
the time and cost involved in collecting and interpreting the information has to be balanced 
against the risk of encountering unknown or unexpected conditions during tunnelling.” This 
implies that there are circumstances when the cost of change latency arising from 
incomplete information is less than the costs of obtaining that information, at least on the 
average. This corroborates key point 10F, above. 
11.3.4 Analysis and conclusions 
Contradiction of the tentative theory 
Nothing has been identified in the report that appears to contradict the causal mechanisms 
postulated in the tentative theory. 
Corroboration of the tentative theory 
It is considered that the case study provides weak evidence for the following causal 
mechanisms for change latency from the tentative theory: 
 2. More timely and greater adoption of good SE practice will lead to more timely, 
accurate and comprehensive requirements (see change 2). 
 6. More timely and thorough consultation with stakeholders will lead to more timely, 
accurate and comprehensive requirements (see change 4). 
 9. More timely, accurate and comprehensive requirements will lead to more timely 
and sounder decisions (see change 2). 
 10. More timely, accurate and comprehensive system design will lead to more timely 
and sounder decisions (see other changes). 
 12. More timely and accurate cost and timescale estimates will lead to more timely 
and sounder decisions (see section 11.3.2 and change 5). 
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Additional causal mechanisms 
It is considered that there is weak evidence for the following causal mechanism which is not 
in the tentative theory but which was suggested by the findings of chapter 10: 
 X1. Efficient, co-operative contractual and quasi-contractual arrangements between 
the parties involved in a project lead to sounder and timelier decisions (see section 
11.3.2). 
These conclusions are illustrated in Figure 19, using the same conventions as in the previous 
section. 
Chapter 11 Testing the tentative theory against published data 
169 
9
Timelier, greater 
adoption of good SE 
practice
More timely and 
thorough 
consultation with 
stakeholders
More timely, 
accurate and 
comprehensive 
requirements
2
6
More timely, 
accurate and 
comprehensive 
system design
More timely, and 
sounder decisions
10
More timely, and 
accurate cost and 
timescale estimates 12
X1Efficient co-operative 
contractual and 
quasi-contractual 
arrangements
 
Figure 19: Causal mechanisms corroborated by the Jubilee Line Extension Project case study
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A final thought 
UCL (2009; page 30) states that the JLE project was initially approved with a benefit cost 
ratio of 0.95 but that, after the project, this ratio was estimated at 1.75. As the costs of the 
final costs of project were more than 50% higher than those approved, it follows that the 
benefits must have turned out more than 170% higher than estimated at the time of 
approval. 
The JLE supported the regeneration of East and South East London, facilitated the expansion 
of London’s financial services industry and delivered a very useful link into a network of new 
transport links. In the long run, it must be regarded as a success. 
Had good SE practices been adopted from the start, it should have been possible to produce 
a far more accurate estimate of the cost at the start. It is intriguing to wonder whether, had 
that been done, the project would have been approved. 
If that leads to questioning the value of accurate estimates, it should be noted that, in the 
long run, inaccurate estimates are self-defeating. As a consequence of experience on 
projects such as the JLE project, the UK Department for Transport (2014; section A1.2, 
paragraph 1.1.2) recommends adding an allowance for optimism bias to cost estimates for 
transport schemes in order “to reflect the well-established and continuing systematic bias for 
estimated scheme costs and delivery times to be too low and too short, respectively.” 
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11.4 Case Study 3: The Channel Tunnel Rail Link Project 
11.4.1 Introduction 
The project being studied here is the construction of the high-speed rail link between the 
English end of the Channel Tunnel and London. The case study excludes the construction of 
the tunnel itself, the procurement of the rolling stock and the works required to allow that 
rolling stock to run over existing tracks into London. 
The information in this case study is drawn from a UCL Project Profile for the CTRL Project 
(UCL, 2008), two NAO reports (NAO, 2005; NAO, 2012), a report by the consultancy Steer 
Davies Gleave (2004) and a number of articles in the trade magazine ‘Modern Railways’. 
The Channel Tunnel opened in 1994. Passenger travel was carried through the tunnel on 
Trains à Grande Vitesse (TGVs) and there was a Ligne à Grande Vitesse (LGV) connecting the 
French end to Paris but construction of a high-speed link to London did not start until 1998. 
The link was constructed in two sections. Section 1, connected the tunnel to Fawkham 
Junction, where trains joined the existing network in order to reach Waterloo International 
station. Section 1 opened in 2003. Section 2 carried the line all the way to St Pancras station, 
whose reconstruction was included within the project. Section 2 opened in 2007. 
Shortly before section 2 opened, the line was rebranded ‘High Speed 1’ or ‘HS1’ but, for 
clarity, I will refer to the project as the ‘Channel Tunnel Rail Link’ project, or ‘CTRL’ for short, 
throughout its lifetime. 
The intention was that both sections should be built entirely by the private sector. A private 
sector company, called London and Continental Railways (LCR), raised funds and contracted 
another private sector company, Rail Link Engineering (RLE) to build first Section 1 and then 
Section 2. Section 1 was built under these arrangements and then bought by Railtrack. The 
collapse of Railtrack forced a restructuring in which public funds had to be made available in 
order to complete the project. 
There were only three rail mega-projects carried out in the UK between 1990 and 2010 and 
all three are case studies in this report. Case Study 1 – the JLE project – was nearing 
completion when work started on the CTRL. Case Study 2 – the WCRM project – started and 
finished around the same time. CTRL is the third member of the group. 
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JLE and WCRM suffered significant delay and overspend and the scope of both projects was 
cut back. CTRL is strikingly different: 
 Both sections opened within the agreed timescales (NAO, 2005; page 16; NAO, 2012; 
page 13). 
 Section 1 was completed within budget, at a cost of £1.92 billion against a 
contractual target cost of £1.93 billion (NAO, 2005; page 16). 
 Section 2 was completed at a cost of £4.24 billion against a target cost of £3.30 billion 
(NAO, 2012; page 15). £0.47 billion of this was for extensions to scope (a new depot 
and additional passenger and retail facilities at stations). The remaining overspend, 
which was incurred in delivering the originally agreed scope, was less than the 
contingency reserve held by LCR. 
 So, while the CTRL project did exceed its target cost, it did so by a very significantly 
smaller margin than the JLE and WCRM projects. 
 The CTRL project experienced a significantly lower volume of major change than the 
JLE and WCRM projects and this change did not include any significant reductions in 
scope. 
Moreover, the final product performed well. During 2010-11, only 0.43% of services on the 
line were delayed by incidents attributable to the infrastructure (NAO, 2012; page 13). 
The project, including its initial planning stages, is not however beyond criticism: 
 Passenger volumes were significantly below (about half of) those initially forecast, 
leading the NAO to question whether the project represented good value for the 
money spent on it (NAO, 2012; page 14). 
 It was also very expensive. Steer Gleave Davies (2004; page 35) compared the cost of 
HS1 against 11 other European and Asian high-speed lines. The authors acknowledge 
that the cost of high-speed lines is very sensitive to the nature of the terrain over 
which they run but, even after allowing for that, the authors find that the cost per 
kilometre of HS1 was about 30% more than that of the next most expensive line and 
more than three times the cost of a Spanish high-speed line built around the same 
time. 
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11.4.2 The way in which the project was run 
Systems Engineering and Project Management 
I can find no clear statement of the degree to which the CTRL adopted SE ideas but, from the 
absence of any evidence of a concerted and explicit attempt to adopt the ideas of SE, I 
conclude that the project made no such attempt and instead drew upon the traditions of 
project management alone for its system-level thinking. 
The project team certainly put a great deal of effort into meticulous planning and 
preparation and into consulting stakeholders. So, while the project may not have explicitly 
adopted SE, it appears to have adopted several of its underlying tenets: ‘left shift’, the value 
of stakeholder consultation, the value of meticulous planning and the value of paying 
attention to interfaces. 
General approach to engineering 
The project had a very clear and explicit commitment to using proven technology where 
possible. 
Contract management 
The project team made extensive use of a target-price form of contract that more closely 
aligned the incentives for client and contractor. The NAO (2005; page 12) reports that LCR 
and Union Railways considered that the contracting strategy contributed to meeting the 
budget for Stage 1. 
The project created several joint teams in order to reduce the number of interfaces to 
manage. 
11.4.3 The changes that were made 
I am not sure at what precise dates the project committed to various aspects of the scheme 
so I consider changes from the start of construction. 
There were at least three major changes. 
Firstly, in November 2005, a decision was taken to add the construction of a depot at Temple 
Mills to the scope of the project. When the Minister for Transport announced this decision, 
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he said that it had “always been envisaged as part of the final plan” for WCRM and that the 
decision had just been brought forward. 
The project had been proceeding under the assumption that trains would continue to be 
serviced at their existing North Pole depot in West London, even though it was becoming 
increasingly evident that the increase in traffic resulting from the completion of the London 
Underground orbital route would not leave enough capacity for the necessary train 
movements. 
I have insufficient information to estimate latency for this change. I suspect that planning for 
the London Overground orbital route had advanced to the point where it would become 
clear that there was insufficient capacity for channel tunnel trains to use it before November 
2005 but I cannot be sure of this and, in any case, if there was a delay, it may well have been 
the result of waiting for the completion of political processes that are not susceptible to 
reduction through SE. 
Secondly, significant changes were made to the layout of St Pancras station, which are 
considered to have improved the passenger experience. 
Thirdly, the NAO (2012; page 15) reports that LCR funded investment of £109M on 
additional passenger and retail facilities at St Pancras, Stratford and Ebbsfleet international 
stations that were not in the original scope. The project would have created significant retail 
opportunities and I suspect that this investment represented the decision to exploit some of 
these opportunities. I do not know when the decision to make this investment was taken 
and so cannot estimate change latency. 
There were also a number of smaller but still significant changes, including: 
 changing construction methods to reduce costs; 
 raising the maximum line speed in order to increase service reliability; 
 changing the tunnel portal design after aerodynamic modelling; 
 adding sidings for storing on-track equipment; and 
 at St Pancras, changing the rail type. 
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11.4.4 Analysis and conclusions 
Discussion of changes 
The list of changes above stands in sharp contrast in some ways to the corresponding lists 
for the JLE and WCRM projects: 
 In contrast to the JLE and WCRM projects, none of the changes were made as a 
consequence of a crisis – they were generally introduced in an orderly fashion and by 
the existing management without needing to bring in a new organisation to run the 
project. Several were the result of proactive value engineering. 
 In contrast to the JLE and WCRM projects, none of the changes resulted in a visible 
reduction in the quality of service offered to the users of the railway. 
 With the exception of the construction of the Temple Mills depot, where a foreseen 
addition was brought forward, and the additional passenger and retail facilities, none 
of the changes were significant enough to figure on the final summary accounts for 
the project. 
 In contrast to the JLE and WCRM projects and with the exception of the construction 
of the Temple Mills depot, none of the changes resulted in the unexpected 
demolition or decommissioning of existing assets. Indeed there is no evidence of 
significant lost work as a result of any of the changes. 
Contradiction of the tentative theory 
The project as a whole does appear to provide a counter-example to the tentative theory as 
a whole, because: 
 there is evidence to suggest that there was scope for the project to adopt SE 
practices to a considerably greater scope than it actually did, but 
 there is no evidence that there was scope for significant reductions in change latency 
on the project arising from greater adoption of SE practices. 
It therefore appears that there are rail projects for which the marginal effects on change 
latency of adopting SE compared with a rigorous approach to project management are 
limited. If so, the question arises: what attributes of the CTRL project qualify it for this class? 
Testing the tentative theory against data published data Chapter 11 
176 
The following attributes of the CTRL project set it apart from both the JLE project and the 
WCRM project and are candidate answers to the question: 
 The CTRL project made extensive use of a target-price form of contract. We have 
already seen evidence that contractual relationships are a significant factor affecting 
change latency and the target-price form of contract, in which purchaser and supplier 
share overspends and underspends, is designed to improve co-operation and simplify 
decisions to make changes. 
 The CTRL project was building a new railway. This was similar to the JLE but in 
contrast to the West Coast Main Line, where some changes to the scheme were 
required in order to balance the conflicting needs of construction and operating the 
existing railway. It may be noted that the two of the areas where significant change 
did occur – St Pancras and Temple Mills Depot – were concerned with the points at 
which the CTRL interfaced with the existing railway network. 
 The CTRL project chose to introduce no new technology. It was, to a first 
approximation, simply an extension of the French LGV on the other side. This was in 
contrast to both the JLE and WCRM where changes were required because new 
technology disappointed. 
Projects that construct simple, routine, new sections of railway and already adopt good 
project and contract management practice may see limited benefits in terms of reduced 
change latency as a result of adopting additional good SE practices because: 
 SE delivers benefits, in large part, by identifying and resolving system-level issues; 
 a simple section of railway will have fewer systems-levels issues and,  
 on a routine project, a greater proportion of these issues will have been encountered 
and solved before. 
This does not mean that they will see no benefits from adopting additional good SE practice 
because reduced change latency is only one of the mechanisms by which SE may deliver 
benefits. SE may allow such projects to find and exploit opportunities to increase value for 
money that they might otherwise have missed. 
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I note that the CTRL project was well-funded, which arguably allowed it to apply its ‘no 
change’ policy to greater effect than the JLE and WCRM projects. It may be noted that the 
project spent a considerable amount of additional money on building the line to carry 
freight, see Modern Railways (2007; page 45) for example, with no guarantee that this 
capability will ever be used. Maybe there were changes that a less well-funded project might 
have sought to make in order to reduce cost but that CTRL could afford to let pass. 
Corroboration of the tentative theory 
Nothing has been identified in the case study that appears to corroborate the causal 
mechanisms in the tentative theory. 
Additional causal mechanisms 
It is considered that there is strong evidence for the following causal mechanism which is not 
in the tentative theory but which was suggested by the findings of chapter 10: 
 X1. Efficient, co-operative contractual and quasi-contractual arrangements between 
the parties involved in a project lead to sounder and timelier decisions. 
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11.5 Case Study 4: Acquisition of High-Output Ballast Cleaning Plant 
Although information about this project was collected via interview, rather than by 
inspecting published data, there was no opportunity to structure that interview in the 
manner described in chapter 10. The nature of the analysis carried out was similar to that for 
projects investigated via published data and so the project is included in this section. 
11.5.1 Introduction 
This case study concerns the acquisition of high-output plant24 to clean ballast25. The 
acquisition was eventually abandoned after a significant period of ultimately fruitless 
endeavour to get the plant to meet its requirements. 
This case study is drawn from a conversation with an ex-member of the British Rail 
(BR)/Railtrack project team. The conversation was held on 14th December 2011. I prepared 
notes of the conversation which the interviewee reviewed and corrected. 
In the mid 1980's British Rail held an ambition to change from the current traditional 
method of ballast cleaning (and track relaying), mainly at weekends, to a method which used 
short single line midweek night possessions26 (each lasting approximately 6 to 8 hours) 
cleaning up to 1000m of track in each possession. This pattern of work was to be repeated 
on up to 6 occasions per week. It was also intended to change the crewing from traditional 
operators to a dedicated crew of maintainer/operators who would travel with the machine 
throughout the rail network. 
For this revised method of ballast cleaning to be successful, the reliability, availability and 
output of the machines had to be high. 
In order to clean ballast on successive nights, the track must be left in a suitable condition to 
allow trains to immediately run at relatively high speed. The ballast cleaning machine was 
                                                     
24
 ‘Plant’ is used here to mean large mobile machines. 
25
 ‘Ballast’ comprises the piles of large gravel in which most railway tracks are laid. 
26
 Taking a ‘possession’ on a part of a railway line means taking it out of use and placing it under the control of maintenance 
or project staff.  
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therefore only a part of a total system of work, where all equipment needed to be carefully 
matched in not only rate of work but also in quality of output. 
Achieving this ambition required automation in several areas. This case study describes a 
project to introduce automation in one area - ballast cleaning. 
In 1989, British Rail entered into a contract with a US supplier to develop and supply an 
automated high-output ballast cleaning machine. The quoted delivery period was about one 
year. 
The supplier had supplied machines of the required type for use in North America. Two 
separate machines were used in concert and these machines were proven in use and 
demonstrated to BR. Some of the requirements specified by BR had not been met before by 
the supplier, for example; self-propulsion at 100 km/h; the ability to feed new ballast into 
the process; the ability to continuously lift the rail to maintain track height; and profiling of 
the returned ballast under the sleepers for good geometry behind the machine. 
Furthermore, the supplier had no experience in designing machines to meet the prescriptive 
BR rolling stock standards. To fit within the UK loading gauge27, the original two machines 
were to be combined into a single machine comprising six semi-permanently coupled 
vehicles. 
In late 1992, the prototype machine was demonstrated in the US to BR's satisfaction. In early 
1993 it was shipped to the UK. It was trialled on the West Coast Mainline but the trials were 
unsuccessful and it was transferred to the Old Dalby test track for further testing and 
development. In 1994, Railtrack took over the project and a period of contractual dispute led 
to a restructuring of the contract in 1995. In 1997, after four years of development in the UK, 
the machine was handed over to one of Railtrack's track maintenance contractors. However 
it never achieved its performance requirement to clean ballast at an average rate of 400m/h; 
the best it could achieve was 300m/h and even at this rate was prone to stoppage. The 
                                                     
27
 The ‘loading gauge’ is a profile around the tracks, inside which all rail vehicles must fit. The loading gauge in the UK is 
unusually small by international standards. 
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machine was cut up for scrap in 2009. Railtrack acquired a replacement machine from 
another supplier in 2004, and subsequently purchased more machines from that supplier. 
11.5.2 The way in which the project was run 
There were a number of differences between the US and UK operating contexts that 
required changes to the design of the machine. The differences in environment and the 
differences in design led to a number of practical problems with deployment. 
The specification against which the machine was procured was not above criticism but the 
problems encountered were clearly associated with failures to meet it and so poor 
specification cannot be regarded as a cause of the problems. 
The US trials were intended, of course, to convince BR that the machine was ready to ship to 
the UK and they were successful in this regard. There is no need to believe that there was 
any intention to deceive to believe this – the objectives to achieve milestones and to please 
the customer are perfectly honourable. 
BR failed to require a set of tests and checks that comprehensively covered the 
requirements and did so under realistic conditions (so, for example, night-time operation 
and remote sensing of conveyors). Had such an approach been taken to the US trials, it is 
considered that they would have revealed the extent of further development needed to 
meet the requirements whereupon it is possible that the parties would have agreed to 
abandon the project. 
11.5.3 The changes that were made 
There is only one significant change associated with this case study and that is the decision 
2004 to replace the machine with a machine from another supplier. 
The case study provided by the interviewee provides strong grounds for believing that, in 
1992, when the machine was demonstrated to BR, it was possible to establish that the path 
being followed by the project would not lead to a machine that met all the requirements 
within acceptable timescales and acceptable cost. This would imply that the latency of this 
decision was of the order of 12 years. 
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11.5.4 Analysis and conclusions 
Contradiction of the tentative theory 
Nothing has been identified in the report that appears to contradict the causal mechanisms 
postulated in the tentative theory. 
Corroboration of the tentative theory 
It is considered that, had good practice associated with the Verify and Validate the System 
core SE process area been adopted during initial field trials, then the magnitude of the 
inherent problems with the design could have been revealed and this latency could have 
been significantly reduced. 
Note. It is acknowledged however, that the difficulties in proceeding with the project could 
also have been identified earlier by the application of common sense and good management 
practice. 
It is considered that there is weak evidence for the following causal mechanisms in the 
tentative theory: 
 5. More timely and greater adoption of good SE practice will lead to more timely and 
sounder problem reports. 
 13. More timely, and sounder problem reports will lead to more timely and sounder 
decisions. 
The case study is described from the acquirer’s view point. It may be suspected that full 
implementation of core SE processes by the contractor would have reduced change latency. 
However there is no direct evidence of this. 
No evidence has been identified that removing deficiencies in the requirements would have 
shortened change latency. 
Additional causal mechanisms 
Nothing has been identified in the report that appears to suggest additional causal 
mechanisms. 
The conclusions of the previous section are illustrated in Figure 20.  
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Figure 20: Causal mechanisms corroborated by the Acquisition of High-Output Ballast Cleaning Plant case study 
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11.6 Key points 
11A Change was pervasive and expensive on two of the projects studied. On JLE, 4,800 
instruments of change were issued on one contract, 70% of the initial value of the 
works was accounted for by variations and an estimate of £600 million is made for the 
costs of delay, disruption and acceleration 
11B Change latency was long and expensive on several projects. On a project to acquire 
high-output ballast cleaning equipment, the decision to abandon the attempt to make 
one model work had a latency of more than 10 years. Latency for other changes is 
typically measured in years. On WCRM, £350M had been spent on items that were 
removed from the project scope. 
11C Evidence was found to corroborate the mechanisms in the tentative theory numbered 
2, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 13 and 15. 
11D Evidence was found for causal mechanisms which are not in the tentative theory, by 
which change latency can be reduced by: 
 Efficient, co-operative contractual and quasi-contractual arrangements between 
the parties involved 
 Having sufficient skilled people available 
11E On CTRL, the uptake of formal SE was relatively low and yet there is no evidence that 
there was scope for significant reductions in change latency on the project arising from 
greater adoption of SE practices. It is hypothesised that projects that construct simple, 
routine, new sections of railway and already adopt good project and contract 
management practice may see limited benefits in terms of reduced change latency as a 
result of adopting additional good SE practices. 
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12 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter has four sections: 
 In the first section, I recall my research objectives, summarise my findings and assess 
whether or not I have met my objectives. 
 In the second section, I reflect on my findings and formulate recommendations for 
researchers investigating the benefits of SE. 
 In the third section, I reflect again on my findings and formulate recommendations 
for people working on rail projects. 
 In the fourth section, I present my final conclusions. 
12.1 Research findings and progress against research objectives 
12.1.1 Research objectives 
I defined two generic objectives for the research (see key point 1B): 
 To demonstrate that SE can be used to build better rail systems and to build rail 
systems better, aiming for measurable improvement. 
 To gain an improved understanding of how to adapt SE to yield optimum results in 
major rail projects. 
These objectives were intended as general indicators of the direction to be followed and to 
be refined later. After preliminary investigations, I defined the following specific objectives 
(see key points 2C and 6J): 
 To demonstrate that core SE can be used to reduce change latency in major rail 
projects. 
 To gain an improved understanding of how to adapt core SE to produce the greatest 
reduction in change latency in major rail projects. 
 To carry out my research in a way that helps others to refine and build upon my 
findings. 
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In these objectives: 
 ‘core SE’ describes a set of activities that concern the production, update and 
checking of intellectual artefacts that I consider to be indubitably within the province 
of SE; and 
 ‘change latency’ is a measure of unnecessary delay in deciding to make a change. 
12.1.2 What I have learnt about changes on railway projects 
Because the specific objectives are focussed on change, I need to discuss what I have learnt 
about changes on railway projects before I can clearly evaluate progress against these 
objectives. I have reviewed relevant literature and studied more than a dozen railway 
projects by interviewing project members, inspecting project records and by reviewing 
publicly-available accounts of the projects. 
I cannot be certain that the sample of railway projects that I looked at is representative of 
the population of railway projects at large and that my findings can be generalised across the 
entire population. The projects that I looked at all delivered ‘hard systems’, that is to say 
engineered, technical systems, and the findings may not generalise to ‘soft’ projects which 
deliver organisational change. However, the sample does cover a broad range of types and 
sizes of projects that deliver hard systems and some consistent themes emerge. On the 
projects that I studied: 
 The volume and cost of change was high (see key points 4B, 4C and 11A). Similar 
results are reported in other sectors (see key point 6B). 
 The latency of changes was high – often well over a year (10G, 11A). 
 The majority of significant changes could have been avoided entirely, in principle, if 
the information available at the outset had been fully exploited (see key point 10J). 
 About half of change latency was concerned with detecting that some sort of change 
is required while the other half was concerned with deciding what should be done, 
obtaining the necessary agreement from interested parties and then deciding to do it 
(see key point 10H). 
 Engineering changes were not carefully tracked and engineering change metrics were 
not calculated (see key point 10E). 
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From first principles one would expect that the cost of a change will rise rapidly with delay in 
deciding to make it and such cost escalation is reported in several engineering sectors (see 
point 6C). 
It follows that reducing change latency could deliver significant potential improvement in rail 
projects. 
12.1.3 Progress against objective to demonstrate that SE can be used to build better rail 
systems and to build rail systems better 
My literature search has revealed that: 
 There is a large and growing body of empirical evidence that SE can deliver benefits 
on engineering projects across a wide range of sectors (see key points 3C and 3D). 
 There a number of hypotheses that explain why these benefits are to be expected 
(see key point 3B) and these hypotheses suggest that some of these benefits should 
be enjoyed as a result of reduced change latency. 
In chapter 9, I presented a model that describes how core SE interacts with other project 
activities in which SE affects the project primarily by providing information in support of 
decision making. It follows that, if the decision-making process used on the project is broken 
and it is unable to reach timely, rational decisions about the project then it is unlikely that 
increasing the effort spent on SE will deliver increased benefits until this process is fixed. The 
findings of my studies of rail projects, described shortly, corroborate this (see below). 
My tentative theory of how core SE contributes to reduced change latency may be 
summarised as follows: 
Core SE contributes to reduced change latency by providing the people taking decisions 
about the system design and process model with timely, accurate and comprehensive 
information (including proposed specifications, design and process models) and 
effective change management arrangements. 
The full tentative theory contains 15 more detailed causal mechanisms. 
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The process of testing the tentative theory against data from real projects has suggested 
that three additional causal mechanisms should be added and has provided evidence that 
some of the postulated mechanisms have actually occurred in practice. 
Table 11, which is a revision of Table 10, provides an indication of the strength of the 
evidence available for each mechanism. In Table 10, the numbers in the Changes column 
indicate the number of changes studied in the projects which I studied directly that 
appeared to corroborate that mechanism. In Table 11, this number has been increased by 
the number of projects for which I inspected published data, where that published data 
appeared to corroborate the mechanism.  
Figure 21 shows the same information diagrammatically. Arrows for which at least ten 
changes provided evidence are drawn thicker than other arrows. The numbers on the arrows 
refer to the serial numbers in Table 11, below and also in Table 6, which contains the original 
statement of the causal mechanisms 
Table 11: Corroboration of causal links 
Id Causal mechanism Changes 
2 Timelier, greater adoption of good SE practice will lead to more timely, accurate and 
comprehensive requirements 
2 
5 Timelier, greater adoption of good SE practice will lead to more timely, and sounder 
problem reports 
1 
6 More timely and thorough consultation with stakeholders will lead to more timely, accurate 
and comprehensive requirements. 
6 
8 More timely, accurate and comprehensive requirements will lead to more timely, accurate 
and comprehensive system design. 
16 
9 More timely, accurate and comprehensive requirements will lead to more timely and 
sounder decisions. 
3 
10 More timely, accurate and comprehensive system design will lead to more timely and 
sounder decisions. 
16 
11 More timely, accurate and comprehensive modelling, simulation and analysis will lead to 
more timely and sounder decisions. 
13 
12 More timely and accurate cost estimates will lead to more timely and sounder decisions. 5 
13 More timely and sounder problem reports will lead to more timely and sounder decisions. 1 
15 More efficient change management arrangements will lead to more timely and sounder 
decisions. 
1 
X1 Efficient, co-operative contractual and quasi-contractual arrangements between the parties 
involved in a project lead to more timely and sounder decisions. 
17 
X2 Having sufficient skilled people available leads to more timely and sounder decisions. 4 
X3 Having clarity of funding for the project leads to more timely and sounder decisions. 4 
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Figure 21: Cumulative evidence for operation of causal mechanisms
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Figure 21 highlights graphically that the corroboratory evidence is mostly concerned with a 
relatively small number of causal mechanisms, suggesting that the primary factors affecting 
change latency are (see key point 10K): 
 the manner in which the Manage requirements and specify the system core SE 
process is carried out; 
 the manner in which the Model, simulate and analyse the system core SE process is 
carried out; and 
 the nature of the contractual and quasi-contractual relationships between the parties 
involved, including relationships determining the flow of money between separately-
run departments within one organisation. 
The history of the CTRL project (see key point 11E) appears to contradict the theory. The 
uptake of formal SE was relatively low and yet there is no evidence that there was scope for 
significant reductions in change latency on the project arising from greater adoption of SE 
practices. It is hypothesised that projects that construct routine new sections of railway and 
already adopt good project and contract management practice will see limited benefits in 
terms of reduced change latency as a result of adopting additional good SE practices. 
The sample is considered too small to draw firm conclusions from the absence or limited 
volume of corroboratory evidence for the other proposed mechanisms. 
The analysis of the data leads me to conclude that the following refinements to the theory 
are desirable: 
 To add mechanisms X1, X2 and X3 as defined above. 
 To add the following additional proviso to mechanisms 9 to 14, inclusive: The project 
is delivering a system which is not both simple and routine. 
12.1.4 Progress against objective to understand better how to adapt core SE to produce 
the greatest reduction in change latency in major rail projects 
The findings of the research do provide corroboration of the working assumption that 
focussing SE upon change latency is valuable. While, from a strictly logical point of view, this 
does not progress the specific objective, “To gain an improved understanding of how to 
adapt core SE to produce the greatest reduction in change latency in major rail projects” it 
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does progress the generic objective, “To gain an improved understanding of how to adapt SE 
to yield optimum results in major rail projects”. 
The research suggests that, for a major rail project employing current practice in SE and 
project management, the greatest reduction in change latency can be achieved by focussing 
investment in SE upon requirements engineering and upon modelling, simulation and 
analysis. 
The research suggests (see key point 10Q) that the proportion of change latency that SE 
could be used to eliminate is significant but well below 100%. Moreover, the research 
suggests that, in order to maximise the reduction in change latency that SE can deliver, it is 
important to ensure that the contractual and quasi-contractual relationships between 
parties to the project, including separately-run departments within one organisation, are set 
up in a way that allows them to collaborate effectively towards common goals and to take 
decisions quickly. 
The research also suggests that there are intrinsic reasons why core SE practices developed 
in other sectors should be adapted for rail projects, including the following: 
 The rail sector already has established processes that overlap the areas claimed by SE 
and that should not be unnecessarily disrupted. 
 Vehicles traversing across a network introduce long-distance dependencies between 
parts of a railway and this means that rail projects typically have to think of the 
whole railway as the system. 
 Rail projects typically have to change the railway while it remains in service. 
The research suggests (see key point 4F), in order to maximise their effectiveness, core SE 
practices developed in other sectors should be adapted for rail projects in the following 
additional ways: 
 look for proven practices in use within the organisation that deliver the same 
objectives as the ‘foreign’ SE practices and retain existing practices unless there is a 
clear benefit in changing; 
 be prepared to be flexible about the scope of what is referred to as SE and to exclude 
functions that are satisfactorily performed by existing rail disciplines; 
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 plan to expand significantly the ‘foreign’ functions concerned with migration from 
one stage to another; and 
 take account of the fact that many design decisions about the structure of the system 
will already have been taken in the context of the railway as a whole (and often 
recorded in standards) and adjust the ‘foreign’ design processes to reflect this. 
12.1.5 Progress against specific objective to carry out my research in a way that helps 
others to refine and build upon my findings 
I consider that the research approach that I used was appropriate to the nature of the 
research problem. In particular: 
 Formulating a tentative theory helped focus the research and made it possible to 
combine circumstantial evidence from a variety of sources, including from single case 
studies. The approach could clearly be continued by other research, building upon 
what has been achieved so far. 
 The construction of a model that is focussed upon the interaction between SE and 
the rest of the project, rather than upon SE itself, generated useful insights. 
 Change latency has been shown to be a fruitful thing to measure. It is a measure that 
can be applied to all changes, without having to discriminate between those changes 
that are corrections to faults and those that are improvements or adaptations to 
external change, which is of value because this discrimination can be fraught. 
 Case study analysis was carried out rigorously and delivered understanding of causal 
mechanisms that quantitative methods generally do not deliver. 
The quantitative analysis that I used in the research yielded little value. This was not 
unexpected, given the small number of projects studied. However I have indicated how it 
could be usefully applied by researchers who have access to data on larger populations. 
However, in performing such analysis, it would be important (see key point 10P) to 
supplement average change latency with a measure of aggregate change latency, for 
example the result of summing the change latencies of all changes weighted by their effect 
on overall cost expressed as a percentage of the total budget for the project, in order to be 
able to measure benefits associated with changes that have been avoided rather than just 
accelerated. 
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12.1.6 Assessment of progress against the research objectives 
The research has substantially met the specific objectives defined. 
12.2 Recommendations for researchers 
I make the following recommendations to readers who are carrying out research into the 
benefits of SE: 
R1 Face squarely the challenges that the field of study places in the way of research (see 
key points 2A, and 2B) and consider a broad range of research methods before 
selecting those that are most appropriate. 
R2 When modelling SE, consider the interactions with the rest of the project as well as 
the internal structure of SE. 
R3 Consider the use of case study research, which can be applied rigorously but allows 
small increments in learning to be accumulated over time. 
R4 Articulate a tentative theory before collecting data, in order to focus the collection 
and to provide a starting point for incremental refinement. 
R5 Consider using change latency as a convenient means of measuring some important 
effects of SE. Average change latency should be supplemented (see key point 10P) by 
a measure of aggregate change latency, for example the result of summing the 
change latencies of all changes weighted by their effect on overall cost expressed as a 
percentage of the total budget for the project. 
R6 The factors that influence change latency are not yet understood fully and, given the 
importance of change latency to the outcome of projects, this appears to be a fruitful 
area for further research and one in which there is synergy with the objectives of 
practitioners (see recommendation P2 in the next section) that may support 
collaboration between academia and industry.  
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12.3 Recommendations for practitioners 
I make the following recommendations to readers who are taking senior roles on rail 
projects: 
P1 When thinking about SE, bear in mind that its contribution to project success is by 
providing timely and accurate information. Although this is not a deep insight, it has 
corollaries that, in my experience, are not always understood. For instance (key point 
9D), those performing SE need to write at least some of their documents in a way 
that can be easily understood by the non-specialist. 
P2 Calculate statistics for change latency on projects, try to understand the factors that 
influence these statistics and set targets for reducing these statistics over time. This 
appears to be a fruitful approach for delivering meaningful process improvement and 
one in which there is synergy with the objectives of researchers (see 
recommendation R6 in the previous section). 
Note. Average change latency is a useful statistic but it should be supplemented (see 
key point 10P) by a measure of aggregate change latency, for example the result of 
summing the change latencies of all changes weighted by their effect on overall cost 
expressed as a percentage of the total budget for the project. 
P3 If your projects suffer from high change latency then invest in SE. 
P4 In making this investment, focus effort upon requirements engineering and upon 
modelling, simulation and analysis. The aspects of requirements engineering where 
uptake of SE is least on rail project appear to be checking and managing 
requirements (see key point 10C). 
P5 Ensure that the contractual and quasi-contractual relationships between parties to 
the project, including separately-run departments within one organisation, are set up 
in a way that allows them to collaborate effectively towards common goals and take 
decisions quickly. 
P6 Adapt SE practices developed in other sectors for rail projects in the manner 
described in section 12.1.4 above. 
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12.4 Conclusions 
The findings of my research lead me to four principal conclusions: 
 There are difficulties in determining the success of a project, and thus the impact of 
SE, by simply measuring its cost and duration and assessing the performance of the 
system that it delivers. Change latency is a measure which may be used by 
researchers and practitioners to make some of the benefits of SE visible in a manner 
which overcomes these difficulties. 
 The volume and latency of change on railway projects is often high and reducing 
change latency has the potential to deliver significant benefits on these projects. 
 Rigorous case study analysis can deliver useful increments in our understanding of 
causal mechanisms by which SE delivers benefits. 
 But these increments are small and sustained improvement in understanding 
requires that the research community find ways of consolidating these increments. 
Articulating tentative theories before collecting data provides a basis for this 
consolidation. 
This research was prompted by two questions that I could not properly answer (see key 
point 1A). I can now offer the following answers to these questions. 
Question: ‘If I apply SE to this project, will I see benefits that justify the cost?’ 
Answer: ‘You will see benefits if the contractual and quasi-contractual relationships between 
the parties to the project, including separately-run departments within one organisation, are 
set up in a way that allows them to collaborate effectively towards common goals and take 
decisions quickly. The benefits may be lower on projects that construct simple, routine, new 
sections of railway and already adopt good project and contract management practice but, if 
your projects suffer from high change latency, the cost of focussed improvements in SE is 
likely to be justified by the benefits that they deliver.’ 
Conclusions and recommendations Chapter 12 
196 
Question: ‘How should I adapt SE practices that have been developed in other sectors to 
make them work well on my project?’ 
Answer: ‘To maximise the benefits of SE practices on rail projects, you should maximise their 
ability to reduce change latency by focussing, at least initially, upon requirements 
engineering and upon modelling, simulation and analysis and by adapting good SE practice 
to suit the nature of rail projects, as recommended above’. 
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A APPENDIX: DETAILED ANALYSIS OF DATA COLLECTED 
DIRECTLY FROM RAILWAY PROJECTS 
This appendix provides additional information about the exercise, described in chapter 10, to 
collect data directly from rail projects and to analyse these data. 
To make it easier for the reader to cross refer between this appendix and the body of the 
thesis, this appendix has the same top-level section headings as chapter 10. That is, section 
A.n has the same title as section 10.n. 
A.1 Conduct of the survey and data collection exercise 
There is no additional information to provide. A full account was provided in the body of the 
thesis. 
A.2 Data collected about projects in general 
This section records the questions and requests for information made about the nature of 
the projects investigated (reproduced in bold text) and records the range of responses 
provided. 
Q1.1.1: Please describe the project that I will talk about. You and I need to be clear about 
the scope of the project that I are discussing. For instance, if you were working for a 
supplier or contractor, I need to agree whether I are talking about your organisation’s 
activities only or those of the customer as well. 
The full details are not recorded here, in order to preserve the anonymity of the data 
providers. However, the following general remarks may be made: 
 Project 1, 2 and 3 were concerned with upgrading existing infrastructure while 
project 4 was concerned with introducing a new fleet of trains. 
 Project 2 had to make a number of similar infrastructure improvements at different 
locations that were grouped, for management purposes, into a number of ‘tranches’. 
Knowing that this opened up the possibility of comparing early and later stages of the 
project, the survey and data collection was limited to the first and last tranches but 
data for these tranches were collected separately. 
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 Project 3 was associated with one change that was of significantly greater magnitude 
than all other changes made – a decision, taken part way through design to radically 
reduce the scope of the project. Knowing that this change would be the focus of the 
exercise, the survey and data collection for this project were limited to the design 
phase. 
 Project 5 carried out an upgrade to a metro line in order to enhance capacity and 
performance. 
Q1.1.2: Is the project still underway? 
Four projects were still underway but all of these had commissioned deliverables and for all 
projects the non-recurring engineering was largely complete. 
One project was reported as completed but snagging work continued. 
Q1.1.3: Is the project part of a larger programme of work? If so, please explain how its 
scope relates to the larger whole. 
All projects could be considered as part of larger programmes of work but could also be 
considered as coherent packages of work on their own. 
Q1.1.4: In what industry sector is the project? 
All projects were in the rail sector. 
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Q1.1.5: What sort of railway(s) did it involve? Please select all that apply. Please ignore 
this question if your project was not a railway project. 
Interviewees were asked to select all responses that applied from a list of alternatives. 
Responses were as follows: 
Table 12: Responses to Q1.1.5 
Response Count 
01) Tramway or light rail (eg Docklands Light Rail) 0 
02) Metro 3 
03) Heavy rail (passenger traffic) 0 
04) Heavy rail (freight traffic) 0 
05) Heavy rail (mixed passenger and freight traffic) 2 
06) Other, please specify 0 
TOTAL 5 
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Q1.1.6: Which parts of the railway were components of the system? Please select all that 
apply. Please ignore this question if your project was not a railway project. 
Interviewees were asked to select all responses that applied from a list of alternatives. 
Responses were as follows: 
Table 13: Responses to Q1.1.6 
Response Count 
01) Permanent way 3 
02) Stations 2 
03) Structures (such as bridges, embankments, viaducts) 4 
04) Rolling stock 2 
05) Signalling 3 
06) Electrification 2 
07) Telecommunications 4 
08) Tunnels 0 
09) Lifts and/or escalators 1 
10) Level crossings 1 
11) Operational procedures 5 
12) Maintenance and asset management procedures 5 
13) Control facilities 4 
14) Other, please specify 3 
Note: Other components included mechanical and electrical systems, signalling power 
supplies and depots. 
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Q1.1.7: In which of the following lifecycle stages did or will the project carry out work? 
Please select all that apply. 
Interviewees were asked to select all responses that applied from a list of alternatives. 
Responses were as follows: 
Table 14: Responses to Q1.1.7 
Response Count 
01) Concept and feasibility (initial scoping, exploration of alternatives, establishing feasibility and outline business 
case) 
5 
02) Requirements definition 5 
03) Design development 5 
04) Implementation 4 
05) Transition to service 4 
06) Operations and maintenance 2 
07) Decommissioning and disposal (of system concerned) 0 
08) Decommissioning and disposal (of system being replaced) 4 
09) Other please specify 0 
Note: For reasons described in chapter 10 above, the data collection for Project 3 was 
restricted to the first three stages and this was reflected in the answer given to this question, 
although in fact work had continued into stages (4), (5) and (8). 
Q1.1.8: When did the project start? Please answer to the nearest month, if possible? 
Q1.1.9: When did/will the project finish? Please answer to the nearest month, if possible? 
The duration of the projects varied between 5 and 10 years with a mean average of 7 years. 
Note: Some interviewees were unable to provide dates to the nearest month and provided 
years only. All durations were rounded to the nearest year. 
Note: All projects had less than a year to run except for the rolling stock project where the 
remaining duration was concerned with commissioning of run-on vehicles. 
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Q1.1.10: At peak, how many people worked on the project? Please count everyone who 
carried out activities that fell within the scope of the project as you described it to me in 
Q1.1.1. 
Interviewees were asked to select one response from a list of alternatives. Responses were 
as follows: 
Table 15: Responses to Q1.1.10 
Response Count 
01) Less than 10 0 
02) 10 to 49 0 
03) 50 to 199 3 
04) 200 or more 2 
05) Other response, please specify 0 
TOTAL 5 
Q1.1.11: How many person years were expended on the project? Please count everyone 
who carried out activities that fell within the scope of the project as you described it to me 
in Q1.1.1. 
Interviewees were asked to select one response from a list of alternatives. Responses were 
as follows: 
Table 16: Responses to Q1.1.11 
Response Count 
01) Less than 10 0 
02) 10 to 49 0 
03) 50 to 199 1 
04) 200 or more 4 
05) Other response, please specify 0 
TOTAL 5 
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Q1.1.12: How many stages are involved in the project? (Please select one response.) 
 
By a stage, I mean a significant change to the railway after which the railway is returned to 
service 
Interviewees were asked to select one response from a list of alternatives. Responses were 
as follows: 
Table 17: Responses to Q1.1.12 
Response Count 
01) 1 0 
02) 2-4 2 
03) 5 or more 2 
04) Other response, please specify 1 
TOTAL 5 
Note: The “other response” was that there were 13 commissionings in all but none were 
considered to constitute a significant change to the railway. 
Q1.1.13 Please indicate the degree to which the following statement is an accurate 
characterisation of the system? 
 
“The system relies entirely upon well-tried technology in an application in which it has 
been used before” 
Interviewees were asked to select one response from a list of alternatives. Responses were 
as follows: 
Table 18: Responses to Q1.1.13 
Response Count 
1) Wholly true 0 
2) Mostly true 3 
3) Partly true and partly untrue 2 
4) Mostly untrue 0 
5) Wholly untrue 0 
6) Other, please specify 0 
TOTAL 5 
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Q1.1.14: Please indicate the degree to which the following statement is an accurate 
characterisation of the system? 
 
“The design, construction, installation and testing methods used on the project were 
standard methods, used routinely by the organisation performing the project” 
Interviewees were asked to select one response from a list of alternatives. Responses were 
as follows: 
Table 19: Responses to Q1.1.14 
Response Count 
1) Wholly true 1 
2) Mostly true 3 
3) Partly true and partly untrue 0 
4) Mostly untrue 1 
5) Wholly untrue 0 
6) Other, please specify 0 
TOTAL 5 
Note. The ‘Wholly untrue’ response concerned a project that was executed by a newly 
created organisation. The project members did have some personal experience of the 
methods used. 
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Q1.1.15: How experienced were the people leading the systems engineering functions? 
(Please select one response. If your answer would depend upon what time in the project 
that you considered, answer for the end of the project start-up phase and describe in your 
own words how things varied over time.) 
Interviewees were asked to select one response from a list of alternatives. Responses were 
as follows: 
Table 20: Responses to Q1.1.15 
Response Count 
1) The people leading the systems engineering functions included few or no members with at least 5 years of 
experience performing these function 
2 
2) A significant proportion of the people leading the systems engineering had at least 5 years of experience 
performing these functions but in a non-rail context 
0 
3) A significant proportion of the people leading the systems engineering had at least 5 years of experience 
performing these functions in a rail context 
3 
4) Other, please specify 0 
TOTAL 5 
Note: One interviewee who selected response (3) commented that the situation moved 
towards (2) as the project proceeded. 
Q1.1.16: To what degree were the systems engineering functions integrated with the rest 
of the project functions? (Please select one response. If your answer would depend upon 
what time in the project that you considered, answer for the end of the project start-up 
phase and describe in your own words how things varied over time.) 
Interviewees were asked to select one response from a list of alternatives. Responses were 
as follows: 
Table 21: Responses to Q1.1.16 
Response Count 
1) The people performing the systems engineering functions worked with little or no interaction with the 
rest of the team 
0 
2) The people performing the systems engineering functions worked with limited interaction with the rest 
of the team 
2 
3) The people performing the systems engineering functions worked as an integral part of team as a whole 3 
4) Other, please specify 0 
TOTAL 5 
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Note: Both interviewees who selected response (2) commented that the situation moved 
towards (3) as the project proceeded. 
Q1.1.17: Please indicate the degree to which the following statement is an accurate 
characterisation of the project? 
 
“The system as built is or will be consistent with the final versions of the design documents 
and drawings for it” 
Interviewees were asked to select one response from a list of alternatives. Responses were 
as follows: 
Table 22: Responses to Q1.1.17 
Response Count 
1) Wholly true 4 
2) Mostly true 1 
3) Partly true and partly untrue 0 
4) Mostly untrue 0 
5) Wholly untrue 0 
6) Other, please specify 0 
TOTAL 5 
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Q1.1.18: Please indicate the degree to which the following statement is an accurate 
characterisation of the project? 
 
“The technical strategy at the end of the project was substantially the same as the 
technical strategy at the beginning of the project.” 
Interviewees were asked to select one response from a list of alternatives. Responses were 
as follows: 
Table 23: Responses to Q1.1.18 
Response Count 
1) Wholly true 1 
2) Mostly true 3 
3) Partly true and partly untrue 0 
4) Mostly untrue 0 
5) Wholly untrue 1 
6) Other, please specify 0 
TOTAL 5 
Note: Response (5) was given on Project 3, which was subject to radical reduction in scope 
as mentioned in the Introduction. 
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Q1.1.19: Please indicate the degree to which the following statement is an accurate 
characterisation of the project? 
 
“The project organisational structure was reasonably stable throughout the duration of 
the project.” 
Interviewees were asked to select one response from a list of alternatives. Responses were 
as follows: 
Table 24: Responses to Q1.1.19 
Response Count 
1) Wholly true 1 
2) Mostly true 2 
3) Partly true and partly untrue 2 
4) Mostly untrue 0 
5) Wholly untrue 0 
6) Other, please specify 0 
TOTAL 5 
A.3 Analysis of data collected about projects in general 
I carried out analyses in order to determine whether any project was significantly more 
challenging than the others. The analyses were in two parts. 
Firstly, I looked to see whether any project was significantly more difficult (large, complex or 
volatile) or easy that the others. If a project was unusually difficult, I might expect it to have 
a higher than average change latency despite justifying higher than average adoption of SE 
practices. 
I inspected the responses to the following questions, each of which sought information on a 
parameter that might affect difficulty: 
 Q1.1.10. At peak, how many people worked on the project? 
 Q1.1.11. How many person years were expended on the project? 
 Q1.1.13. Please indicate the degree to which the following statement is an accurate 
characterisation of the system? “The system relies entirely upon well-tried 
technology in an application in which it has been used before” 
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 Q1.1.14. Please indicate the degree to which the following statement is an accurate 
characterisation of the system? “The design, construction, installation and testing 
methods used on the project were standard methods, used routinely by the 
organisation performing the project” 
 Q1.1.17. Please indicate the degree to which the following statement is an accurate 
characterisation of the project? “The system as built is or will be consistent with the 
final versions of the design documents and drawings for it” 
 Q1.1.18. Please indicate the degree to which the following statement is an accurate 
characterisation of the project? “The technical strategy at the end of the project was 
substantially the same as the technical strategy at the beginning of the project.” 
Please indicate the degree to which the following statement is an accurate 
characterisation of the project? “The project organisational structure was reasonably 
stable throughout the duration of the project.” 
I assigned each project a “+” score if the response indicates that, in this dimension, the 
project is above the median in difficulty and a “-“ score if the response indicates that it is 
below the median. 
The scores according to this method are as follows: 
Table 25: Factors increasing and decreasing difficulty. 
Project + - 
Project 1 0 0 
Project 2 1 2 
Project 3 2 2 
Project 4 1 1 
Project 5 4 0 
Secondly, I looked to see whether any project team had an SE capability significantly greater 
or less than the others. This might affect the effectiveness of the SE practices adopted. 
I inspected the responses to the following questions: 
 How experienced were the people leading the SE functions? 
 To what degree were the SE functions integrated with the rest of the project 
functions? 
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Project 5 gave a more positive overall response to these questions but there was no 
significant variation between the other projects. 
So there was no overwhelming difference in technical difficulty between projects 1, 2 3 and 
4 and project 5, which faced the greatest technical challenges, had the most experienced 
and integrated SE team. If one takes the common-sense view that the effect of the more 
experienced and integrated SE team on change latency is to compensate, to some degree, 
for the effect of the greater technical challenges then it is reasonable to conclude that the 
sample of projects contained none for which the combined effect of the two factors on 
change latency was overwhelming. 
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A.4 Data collected about the SE performed on the projects 
The following request was made to the interviews. 
Q1.2.1: Please consider each of the following statements and tell me to what degree they 
fairly represent what happened on the project 
The interviewees were provided with the statements listed in Table 27. For each statement 
the interviewee was asked: 
Q1.2.1 (cont.): Please select one of the following options. If your answer would depend 
upon what time in the project that you considered, answer for the end of the project start-
up phase and describe in your own words how things varied over time. 
1) Wholly true 
2) Mostly true 
3) Partly true and partly untrue 
4) Mostly untrue 
5) Wholly untrue 
6) Other, please specify 
In selecting one of the options above, do not take account of any reservations that you 
may have had about how the activities concerned were performed. So, if a comprehensive 
requirements specification was prepared but after the system was built, answer ‘Wholly 
true’. 
The response provided to each statement was converted to a figure of merit (FoM) in the 
range 0.0 to 1.0 as follows: 
Table 26: Figure of Merit by response 
Response Figure of Merit 
1) Wholly true 1.0 
2) Mostly true 0.75 
3) Partly true and partly untrue 0.5 
4) Mostly untrue 0.25 
5) Wholly untrue 0.0 
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Table 27 also lists the statements whose representativeness for the project interviewees 
were asked to assess and shows the core SE process to which they are considered to 
contribute, using the following acronyms: 
 MP: Model (the project) Processes 
 MR&StS: Manage Requirements and Specify the System 
 DtS: Design the System 
 MS&AtS: Model, Simulate and Analyse the System 
 V&VtS: Verify and Validate the System 
 MC: Manage Change 
Note. The model was revised after the list of questions had been finalised. One question – 
with identifier C – was subsequently found not to relate to any core SE process. 
Where response (6) was given, no figure of merit was calculated and the combination of 
project and core SE process was excluded from any subsequent calculation of mean 
averages. 
Project 2 carried out a number of similar tasks, grouped into three ‘tranches’. The 
interviewee on project 2 provided responses for the initial tranche and also indicated where 
a different response was relevant to the final tranche. This enabled the calculation of 
separate figures of merit for “Project 2 (early)” and “Project 2 (late)”. 
Mean average figures of merit were calculated across the projects and are presented in 
Table 27. In the calculation, the early results were used for Project 2 as these are the most 
comparable with other projects. Across the statements, the average FoM ranges from 0.40 
to 1.00. The 80th percentile value is 0.88 and the 20th percentile value is 0.65. 
Rows containing figures at or above the 80th percentile value are highlighted in blue. Rows 
containing figures at or below the 20th percentile are highlighted in pink. 
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Table 27: Statements about SE with Figures of Merit and mapping to core SE processes 
 Statement Ave FoM Core SE 
Process 
 Process Definition   
A. The project wrote down a description of the processes used to define, design, 
implement, build and commission the system 
0.75 MP 
B. This description was used as input to the planning of the project 0.80 MP 
 Technical Reviews   
C. The output from each phase of the lifecycle was subject to multidisciplinary review  0.85 None 
 Configuration Management and Change Control   
D. The project placed key documents or components of the system under configuration 
control  
0.85 MC 
E. Once an item was brought under configuration management, all changes to it were 
done under the authority of an approved change request 
0.80 MC 
F. Baselines were established such that each item was placed under formal change 
control after it was entered in a baseline  
0.75 MC 
G. There was a process to define, assess and approve change requests  0.85 MC 
H. There was a process to track the implementation of approved change requests  0.65 MC 
 Interface Management    
I. Key interfaces between components of the system were defined and documented 0.63 DtS 
J. Key interfaces between system and external entities were defined and documented 0.65 MR&StS 
 Requirements Management   
K. The requirements that the system must meet were written down 0.85 MR&StS 
L. Each requirement was given a unique identifier 0.75 MR&StS 
M. Requirements were traced to the sources of stakeholder need 0.65 MR&StS 
N. Stakeholders were consulted to establish their requirements 0.75 MR&StS 
O. Facts about legacy systems and other parts of the environment of the system 
pertinent to the achievement of the requirements were collected and written down 
0.75 MR&StS 
P. Individual stakeholders or stakeholder classes who had a legitimate interest in the 
system throughout its life cycle were identified 
0.90 MR&StS 
Q. Unavoidable constraints (for instance legislation, applicable standards) were 
identified and recorded 
0.85 MR&StS 
R. The scope of the system to be built or changed was defined 0.75 MR&StS 
S. The functions that the system must exhibit were defined together with the 
conditions under that each function must be available 
0.70 MR&StS 
T. The needs of validation were considered as a potential source of system 
requirements 
0.55 MR&StS 
U. Scenarios of typical use were defined and used to establish and/or check 
requirements 
0.80 MR&StS 
V. Users of the system were identified and treated as stakeholders 0.95 MR&StS 
W. Critical requirements (for instance relating to safety) were identified as such 0.70 MR&StS 
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 Statement Ave FoM Core SE 
Process 
X. Performance measures were defined that would allow the degree to which the 
system met its needs to be measured. 
0.85 MR&StS 
Y. Assumptions relevant to the requirements were written down, checked and tracked. 0.65 MR&StS 
 System Design   
Z. The requirements were used as input to the specification of sub-systems and/or the 
design of the systems 
0.85 DtS 
AA. System requirements were traced to the specification of sub-systems and/or the 
design of the systems 
0.65 DtS 
BB. The design was checked against the requirements as the design process proceeded 0.75 DtS 
CC. Models of the physical structure of the system were created and maintained 0.65 DtS 
DD. Functions of the overall system were allocated to or decomposed into functions of 
the sub-systems 
0.75 DtS 
 Simulation and Modelling   
EE. Simulations or models were made in order to estimate emergent properties of the 
system (such as reliability and performance) 
0.70 MS&AtS 
FF. The results of these simulations were used to improve the design. 0.75 MS&AtS 
 Trade-off Analysis   
GG. A search was made for options that were likely to meet the requirements  0.75 MS&AtS 
HH. The benefits and dis-benefits of each option were assessed 0.75 MS&AtS 
II. The choice between options was informed by an assessment of the benefits and dis-
benefits of each option 
0.75 MS&AtS 
 Risk Analysis   
JJ. An analysis was done to identify the main risks to the project 0.90 MS&AtS 
KK. The potential severity and likelihood of each risk was assessed 1.00 MS&AtS 
LL. Action was taken to control the risks 0.85 MS&AtS 
MM. The risks were monitored throughout the project 0.95 MS&AtS 
 Requirements Validation   
NN. The requirements were checked for completeness, conflicts, overlap and feasibility 0.50 MR&StS 
OO. Each requirement was checked for verifiability, unambiguity and atomicity  0.40 MR&StS 
PP. There was an explicit process to identify and resolve conflicting requirements  0.40 MR&StS 
QQ. Requirements were checked with stakeholders 0.75 MR&StS 
 System Validation   
RR. Compliance of the built system with each requirement that affected it was checked  0.69 V&VtS 
SS. The method of checking compliance with a requirement was specified at the same 
time as or shortly after the requirement was written down 
0.69 V&VtS 
TT. The results of validation were recorded 0.88 V&VtS 
UU. A strategy for validation was defined 0.94 V&VtS 
VV. There was a programme of activities to ensure that the necessary facilities, 
equipment and operators to conduct the validation were prepared 
0.94 V&VtS 
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 Statement Ave FoM Core SE 
Process 
WW. Discrepancies and corrective actions arising from validation were analysed, recorded 
and reported 
0.94 V&VtS 
XX. The results of validation contained sufficient information to support the definition of 
corrective actions 
0.88 V&VtS 
YY. The availability of the services delivered by the system that were required by 
stakeholders was confirmed during validation 
0.88 V&VtS 
The FoMs that were at or above the 80th percentile fall naturally into three groups as listed 
below. 
 Identifying stakeholders 
o P: Individual stakeholders or stakeholder classes who had a legitimate interest 
in the system throughout its life cycle were identified 
o V: Users of the system were identified and treated as stakeholders 
 Validation 
o TT: The results of validation were recorded 
o UU: A strategy for validation was defined 
o VV: There was a programme of activities to ensure that the necessary 
facilities, equipment and operators to conduct the validation were prepared 
o WW: Discrepancies and corrective actions arising from validation were 
analysed, recorded and reported 
o XX: The results of validation contained sufficient information to support the 
definition of corrective actions 
o YY: The availability of the services delivered by the system which were 
required by stakeholders was confirmed during validation 
 Assessing and monitoring risks 
o JJ: An analysis was done to identify the main risks to the project 
o KK: The potential severity and likelihood of each risk was assessed 
o MM: The risks were monitored throughout the project 
Detailed analysis of data collected directly from railway projects Appendix A 
226 
The FoMs that were at or below the 20th percentile fall naturally into four groups as listed 
below. 
 Managing interfaces 
o I: Key interfaces between components of the system were defined and 
documented 
o J: Key interfaces between system and external entities were defined and 
documented 
 Checking and managing requirements 
o M: Requirements were traced to the sources of stakeholder need 
o T: The needs of validation were considered as a potential source of system 
requirements 
o Y: Assumptions relevant to the requirements were written down, checked 
and tracked 
o AA: System requirements were traced to the specification of sub-systems 
and/or the design of the systems 
o NN: The requirements were checked for completeness, conflicts, overlap and 
feasibility 
o OO: Each requirement was checked for verifiability, unambiguity and 
atomicity28 
o PP: There was an explicit process to identify and resolve conflicting 
requirements 
 Tracking the implementation of change 
o H: There was a process to track the implementation of approved change 
requests 
 Modelling the physical structure of the system 
                                                     
28
 A requirement is atomic if it cannot be logically decomposed into multiple requirements. 
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o CC: Models of the physical structure of the system were created and 
maintained 
A.5 Analysis of data collected about the SE performed on the projects 
There is no additional information to provide. A full account was provided in the body of the 
thesis. 
A.6 Data collected about changes and analysis of these data 
A.6.1 The criteria used for selecting changes and the changes selected 
The general criteria used for selecting changes were: 
(a) The change had a significant effect on the cost of the project. 
(b) The change affected either the final built system or the staging of the works. Changes 
that only affected project processes were excluded. 
(c) The change implied some alteration in direction for the project. Changes that 
adjusted the requirements to bring them into line with what the project was already 
doing or planning to do were not included. 
(d) There was sufficient information available to answer the questions about the change 
that I had asked. 
The precise criteria used to select changes for analysis and summary information about the 
changes selected are provided for each project in the sections following immediately. 
Project 1 
In interpreting criterion (a), a significant change was taken to be a change with either an 
increase or decrease in cost that exceeded a threshold set at approximately 1% of the final 
project cost. Only changes that had been agreed after the start of detailed design were 
considered for further analysis. 
6 changes met the criteria and were selected for further analysis but insufficient information 
could be identified from the records to perform any meaningful analysis of 3 of these 
changes so only 3 were actually included in the analysis. 
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Project 2 
Project 2 had to make a number of similar infrastructure improvements at different 
locations, which were grouped, for management purposes, into a number of ‘tranches’. I 
looked only at the initial and final tranches. 
In interpreting criterion (a), a significant change was taken to be a change with either an 
increase or decrease in cost that exceeded a threshold set at approximately 0.5% of the cost 
of one tranche. 
8 changes met the criteria and were selected for further analysis. 
4 of these changes concerned 
consecutive attempts to resolve a 
problem with transmission of 
vibration that were, in the end, only 
partially successful. In accordance 
with the model that is being used 
(see section 6.3), these are regarded 
as one compound change with 
latency as shown in Figure 22. 
A
B
Change 
1 L
a
te
n
c
y
Change 
2
Change 
3
Change 
4
 
Figure 22: Transmission of vibration 
3 of these changes concerned 
attempts to resolve problems with 
the controls specification. These are 
regarded as one compound change 
with latency as shown in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23: Controls specification 
A final change was analysed separately. 
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Project 3 
Project 3 was associated with one change that was of significantly greater magnitude than all 
other changes made – a decision, taken part way through design to radically reduce the 
scope of the project. Knowing that this change would be the focus of the exercise, the survey 
and data collection for this project were limited to the design phase and only this change 
was analysed in detail. The history of the change was as follows. 
The project scope was extended during outline design to deliver some aspirations that were 
not in the original design. At the stage gate review at the end of outline design, the best 
estimate for costs was found to be above the target. The cost estimate was discounted on 
the assumption that future savings would be identified and the discounted figure was 
presented to the review. 
However, the cost estimate rose rather than fell during the course of detailed design for two 
reasons. 
Firstly, additional scope was added. It was appreciated when scope was added that the costs 
would rise. However, the apportionment of these additional costs between the three budget 
holders was not made explicit and the budget holders held views of what their shares were 
that did not add up. 
Secondly, the full cost implications of scope decisions that had already been taken emerged 
during the design process. 
When the project completed detailed design, the costs had risen by 50% since outline 
design. The project was refused authority to proceed as currently scoped. The project was 
radically de-scoped and detailed design was repeated. 
A decision has since been that some of the works that had been removed from the project 
scope should be carried out as part of a separate project. 
The overall trajectory of events is illustrated in Figure 24. 
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Figure 24: Increasing, decreasing and then increasing scope 
Project 4 
The project was delivered by a contractor but the interviewee represented the customer and 
had access to price rather than cost data. In interpreting criterion (a), a significant change 
was taken to be a change with either an increase or decrease in price that exceeded a 
threshold set at approximately 1% of the final price. Design or manufacturing changes found 
necessary by the contractor in order to meet the specification would therefore be excluded. 
Only changes that had been agreed at the time of data collection were considered for 
further analysis. 
Note. There were a few occasions when one piece of scope was bartered for another 
without affecting the price. By definition, the changes concerned could not meet this 
criterion but the interviewee’s opinion was that none of these changes would have met the 
price threshold had they been paid for in money. 
15 changes met the criteria and were selected for further analysis but insufficient 
information could be identified from the records to perform any meaningful analysis of one 
of these changes so only 14 were actually analysed. 
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Project 5 
The records available to the interviewee were not sufficient to establish the precise financial 
impact of each change because contractual variations sometimes covered more than one 
technical change and because the system integrator’s costs, particularly prolongation costs, 
were not accurately apportioned to changes. The interviewee attempted to apply criterion 
(a), using his knowledge and judgement to select the changes that were most significant 
either in terms of changes to the project cost or in terms of work abandoned. It appears that 
this exercise selected changes that affected the cost of the project by at least 0.2%. 
10 changes were selected for further analysis. 
A.6.2 Data collected on the reasons for the change and on change latency 
There is no additional information to provide. A full account was provided in the body of the 
thesis. 
A.6.3 Data collected on the factors affecting change latency 
Table 28 contains the results of the analysis described in section 10.6.3 to associate changes 
with generic factors. A ‘1’ is placed in a cell if I found that the generic factor for the column 
affected the change in the row. The number of times that each generic factor was found to 
affect a change is shown in a row at the bottom of the table. 
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Table 28: The generic factors affecting change latency 
Id Description of change 
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A.  With regard to one sub-system, the customer needed three in quantity and 
believed that they had contracted for three but the supplier believed that 
they had contracted for one only. A contract variation was raised and so 
presumably there was ambiguity in the contract.  
 1     1    1  
B.  Buttons which passengers could press to raise the alarm were removed 
because the dis-benefits of malicious and inadvertent operation outweighed 
the safety benefits. 
 1     1     1 
C.  The contract included like-for-like replacement of telecommunications 
facilities while, under another contract, the customer was replacing them with 
new technology. The like-for-like replacements were not in fact needed but 
the contract gave the customer no automatic benefit for reducing scope and 
the facilities were removed from scope after most of them had been installed. 
      1      
D.  Additional facilities were needed to ensure satisfactory performance at an 
interface between the system and another system. 
 1           
E.  Additional facilities were needed to ensure satisfactory performance at an 
interface between the system and another system. 
 1     1      
F.  The cables used allowed potentially dangerous crosstalk and had to be 
replaced. The crosstalk could have been predicted theoretically. 
   1   1      
G.  Egress doors had to be modified to ensure satisfactory evacuation rates in an 
emergency. 
 1           
H.  A scenario was discovered where the system operator could be misinformed 
in a way that could lead to an accident. 
   1         
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Id Description of change 
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I.  An option, introduced into the contract at the outset, to extend some train 
lengths, was taken up. 
   1   1      
J.  An option, introduced into the contract at the outset, to provide air 
conditioning to improve passenger comfort was taken up. 
   1   1 1    1 
K.  Multiple changes were made to the design of the controls for some 
equipment in order to deliver something that was operable. The need for 
change was ascribed to a requirements specification that was unclear and 
incomplete. 
 1           
L.  Additional facilities were needed to ensure satisfactory performance at an 
interface between the system and another system. 
 1  1         
M.  The order in which parts of the system were installed was found to be sub-
optimal and was changed to minimise delays to the project. 
      1     1 
N.  Multiple changes were made to reduce the transmission of vexatious 
vibration to neighbours to an acceptable level. The transmission of vibration 
to neighbours was not initially discussed in the requirements. 
 1  1    1     
O.  Change made to comply with revisions of standards that had been made since 
the start of the project. 
           1 
P.  The train roof was lowered because some infrastructure was found to infringe 
the gauge and changing the train was cheaper than changing the 
infrastructure. 
      1      
Q.  An aspect of the system design was found to be more extensive than was 
required and was cut back to save costs. 
 1      1  1  1 
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Id Description of change 
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R.  The change added scope to the project in order to remove gaps at the 
interface between the project and a project to upgrade an adjacent part of 
the railway. 
   1        1 
S.  Back-up control facilities were added in order to provide acceptable system 
resilience. 
 1     1      
T.  The order in which parts of the system were installed was found to be sub-
optimal and was changed to minimise delays to the project. 
      1      
U.  The system being delivered used different technology from which assumed by 
the customer's standards and changes to both the system and the standards 
were required to align them. 
  1        1  
V.  Communications antennae were moved to avoid radio dead spots.     1    1   1 
W.  The change concerns adjustments to the outline design, carried out by one 
contractor, after claims by another contractor performing detailed design that 
the outline design was not fit for purpose. 
   1   1      
X.  The project was de-scoped because its projected cost exceeded the budget 
available. This was partly ascribed to inaccurate cost estimates and partly to 
the fact that the apportionment of the costs between budget holders was 
unclear and budget holders thought that their shares were lower than they 
actually were. 
 1    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Y.  The original design would have degraded maintainability and the design was 
changed to restore maintainability to the levels before the project was made. 
 1  1         
Z.  Additional telecommunications facilities were added because the 
telecommunications needs of another system were found to be greater than 
anticipated. 
     1       
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Id Description of change 
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AA.  Additional telecommunications facilities were added because the 
telecommunications needs of another system were found to be greater than 
anticipated. 
 1      1   1 1 
BB.  The procurement of another system being procured at the same time was 
cancelled and the contract for the system in question had to be adjusted as a 
result. 
      1      
CC.  Distributed control facilities were collected in one place in order to deliver 
acceptable response times for faults. 
 1    1       
DD.  Telecommunications facilities were upgraded to give acceptable fidelity.  1  1   1      
EE.  Changes to the system being delivered were required because the customer 
changed the supplier for another system. 
 1  1         
 Totals 0 16 1 11 1 3 15 5 2 2 4 9 
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A.7 Further analysis 
A.7.1 Quantitative analysis 
There is no additional information to provide. A full account was provided in the body of the 
thesis. 
A.7.2 Qualitative analysis 
Qualitative investigation of the effects of the ‘Manage requirements and specify the 
system’ process 
There are 16 changes for which the MR&StS process was found to be a generic factor, of 
which at least one change is associated with each project. I reviewed the specific factors and 
opportunities related to this generic factor. All concerned deficiencies in the specification. I 
grouped them into categories and I considered those categories that contained at least two 
changes. For each such category, I found one or two aspects of good SE practice in this area 
that I considered had the potential to forestall deficiencies within this category. This was 
done by reference to one of the statements of good practice used to collect information 
about the SE performed on the project. A full list of these statements is provided in Table 27. 
I then looked at the figures of merit associated with these statements for all 5 projects 
concerned and calculated mean averages for the statements. The results are shown in Table 
29 below29. 
                                                     
29
 The initial letters refer to the identifiers of these statements in Table 27 
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Table 29: Analysis of the effects of MR&StS on changes 
Deficiency #Changes 
affected 
SE good practice Average 
FoM 
Failure to take proper account of 
the needs of operators and 
maintainers 
6 N. Stakeholders were consulted to 
establish their requirements 
0.75 
U. Scenarios of typical use were defined 
and used to establish and/or check 
requirements 
0.80 
V. Users of the system were identified 
and treated as stakeholders 
0.95 
Failure to take proper account of 
an external interface 
4 J. Key interfaces between system and 
external entities were defined and 
documented 
0.65 
Unclear specification 3 OO. Each requirement was checked for 
verifiability, unambiguity and atomicity 
0.40 
  Overall average 0.59 
The overall average figure of merit for statements J and OO is significantly lower than the 
average for the process as a whole, which is 0.78 (see Table 7 above). While the average 
figure of merit for statement N is above the average, a figure of 0.75 suggests gaps in the 
consultation of stakeholders. 
I conclude that there are plausible detailed mechanisms through which greater adoption of 
SE practice in the MR&StS process areas might, under other circumstances, have reduced 
the latency of the changes considered. 
The contribution of the Managing Requirements and Specifying the System process to 
change latency appeared to be primarily concerned with its ability to avoid the need for 
changes at all rather than its ability to increase the responsiveness to external changes. 
Qualitative investigation of the effects of the ‘Model, simulate and analyse the system’ 
process 
There are 11 changes for which the MS&AtS process was found to be a generic factor. I 
reviewed the specific factors and opportunities related to this generic factor. 
In one case the process was a contributor to change latency – a decision on the change had 
to wait until a study had completed. Two cases concerned the decision to take up a 
contractual option. In the remaining eight cases, it was suggested that additional modelling, 
simulation and analysis could have revealed the need to make a change that was latent at 
the time that the root documents were issued. 
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This suggests that a number of the changes made on the projects studied could have been 
foreseen and incorporated into the original specification and design if more modelling, 
simulation and analysis had been done. 
Qualitative investigation of the effects of contractual arrangements 
There is no additional information to provide. A full account was provided in the body of the 
thesis. 
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B APPENDIX: DETAILED ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTED CASE 
STUDIES 
B.1 Testing the tentative theory using published data on railway projects 
This appendix provides additional information about the exercise, described in chapter 11, to 
collect data directly from rail projects and to analyse these data. 
Four cases are studied: 
 The West Coast Route Modernisation Project 
 The Jubilee Line Extension Project 
 The Channel Tunnel Rail Link Project 
 Acquisition of High-Output Ballast Cleaning Plant 
Each case study is discussed in a separate section of this appendix. To make it easier for the 
reader to cross refer between this appendix and the body of the thesis, this appendix has the 
same top-level section headings as chapter 11. That is, section B.n has the same title as 
section 11.n. 
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B.2 Case Study 1: The West Coast Route Modernisation Project 
B.2.1 Introduction 
There is no additional information to provide. A full account was provided in the body of the 
thesis. 
B.2.2 The way in which the project was run 
Before the SRA intervention 
Dick (2000) reports that, in 2000, the project: 
 had adopted “the principles of systems engineering, and particularly requirements 
management” and deployed a proprietary requirements management software; 
 was adopting a “structured approach” that included “establishing clarity of 
requirements, having traceability, ensuring that we have all the essential elements 
contributing to business benefits”; 
 was working to “ensure that high-level business leads were translated into detailed 
requirements for each system element”; and 
 had determined “which conditions are essential” to meet high-level requirements as 
well as “those that contributed little and might have been over-specified” and had 
been able to “make adjustments as necessary”. 
The NAO report (NAO, 2006) describes the following conditions before the SRA intervention: 
 Key Weakness 1: A lack of clear governance arrangements and direction for the 
programme 
The NAO says that “The programme lacked direction and leadership. Railtrack had 
been both commissioner and contractor and did not have a delivery strategy and 
central point for responsibility and communication across the programme”. 
 Key Weakness 2: Failure to engage stakeholders in support of the programme 
The NAO says that, “There was a lack of openness and communication of the 
programme to interested parties […] and a lack of stakeholder management.” One 
specific area where stakeholder management is criticised is in the area of 
Appendix B Detailed analysis of documented case studies 
241 
possessions: whether to try and do the work in short periods at weekends and 
overnight or whether to use blockades, that is to close a part of the line for an 
extended period to allow work to continue uninterrupted. The NAO notes that, as a 
result, work on the railway was being performed almost entirely in short possessions. 
 Key Weakness 3: There had been ‘scope creep’, arising from a lack of tight 
specification and change control 
The NAO says that changes to scope arose from the lack of “an agreed specification 
which matched required outputs with inputs” and from Railtrack’s “poor knowledge 
of West Coast asset condition” The NAO concludes that the WRCM alliancing 
contracts did not work well “because Railtrack lacked the engineering expertise to be 
able to participate in Alliances as an informed and equal partner and to challenge 
contractor-developed scope”. 
 Key Weakness 4: The use of untried and unproven new technology 
The NAO says that, “Technology issues, in particular Railtrack’s decision to replace 
conventional signalling with unproven moving block signalling, introduced major risk 
into deliverability and cost before 2002.” 
 Key Weakness 5: Failure to effectively manage and monitor programme delivery 
through contractors 
The NAO says that, “Railtrack’s programme management was weak, with a lack of 
senior management skills, too many changes in personnel and ill-defined and 
fragmented roles and responsibilities” and that Railtrack “did not have an integrated 
delivery plan and had limited oversight of its Alliance contractors”.  
The NAO concludes that these weaknesses contributed to delay and increase in costs. 
After the SRA intervention 
The NAO report describes the following improvements resulting from the SRA intervention: 
 Key Weakness 1: A lack of clear governance arrangements and direction for the 
programme 
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The NAO says that the SRA “set a clear direction for the project […] specifying what it 
wanted to achieve” and put in place “clear programme governance structures” with a 
Project Board and a Project Development Group. The NAO “found a consensus that 
the arrangements had worked well” and concluded that this resulted from board-
level engagement, “continuity of leadership”, “having a small, but high calibre, team 
dedicated to the programme” and challenge from independent observers on the 
Project Development Group. 
 Key Weakness 2: Failure to engage stakeholders in support of the programme 
The NAO says that the SRA “consulted widely, both formally and informally, to 
achieve a Strategy which better balanced interests between high-speed long distance 
trains, local and regional passenger services and freight” and that stakeholders were 
kept informed about progress. The NAO found that this engagement with 
stakeholders “facilitated the more intrusive regime of obtaining possession of the 
track for engineering work through extended blockades”, a regime which was crucial 
to delivery within time and budget constraints. 
 Key Weakness 3: There had been ‘scope creep’, arising from a lack of tight 
specification and change control 
The NAO reports that: 
 expert teams were formed to challenge the existing baseline; 
 “a clear, measurable set of programme outputs, along with more detailed 
infrastructure requirements” was developed; 
 detailed requirements were captured in a series of functional specifications;  
 the alliance contracts were progressively replaced with a new contracting 
approach, which was, where possible, to invite fixed-price tenders against 
detailed requirements; and 
 “systematic change control and monitoring procedures” were put in place to 
control changes to the functional specifications. 
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 Key Weakness 4: The use of untried and unproven new technology 
This was dealt with by removing most instances of untried and unproven new 
technology from the programme. 
 Key Weakness 5: Failure to effectively manage and monitor programme delivery 
through contractors 
The NAO says that 
 Bechtel Ltd was appointed “to provide ‘leadership, direction and clarity’ to 
the management of programme delivery”;  
 the programme was reorganised “so that decisions could be taken more 
quickly and closer to key worksites in the regions;  
 the number of support and technical services staff was increased; 
 an integrated plan was created allowing the project management to make 
informed trade-offs and to prioritise work, and 
 Network Rail made greater use of fixed-price contracts, challenged a greater 
proportion of claims from contractors and introduced productivity incentives 
into contracts. 
B.2.3 The changes that were made 
The increased use of blockades was a major change in strategy. 
The NAO also reports that “The 2003 Strategy appropriately removed from the programme 
the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS), new signalling technology, and the 
Network Management Centre, on which Railtrack had spent £350 million, to reduce these 
major risks to programme delivery.” This is of itself a major change and one which clearly 
illustrates the huge potential costs of change latency. Had these items been omitted from 
the start, the cost of the programme would have been reduced by at least £350 million. 
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The NAO asserts that opportunities were found “to reduce the programme cost by over £4 
billion”. The report says that these opportunities included: 
 Finding a way of allowing trains to run faster north of Preston without replacing the 
signalling. 
 Finding a better way of upgrading the power supply for the route. There is more 
description of this in Appendix 3 of the NAO Report where it is explained that 
Railtrack had abandoned its original plan to use an autotransformer system, as used 
on French high-speed lines, and decided to retain a booster transformer feeder 
system. However this decision was reversed after a challenge team had identified 
that an autotransformer system was required in order to support future traffic levels 
and could be delivered a lower cost than previously thought. 
 Remodelling of the track layout at Rugby. The NAO reports that “constructive 
challenge” had led to “an improved scheme with better outputs than Railtrack’s 
previously proposed scheme” and “which did not require demolition of the station and 
brought down the project’s planned cost from the original £350 million to £190 
million.” 
However, this is clearly not a comprehensive list. For further details, I reviewed the issues of 
‘Modern Railways’ magazine in 2003 and 2004. ‘Modern Railways’ is a trade magazine for 
the UK railway industry and, during this period, carried a series of extended articles 
describing evolution in the scheme design at a level of detail suitable for the interested 
enthusiast. The articles make clear that the changes to plans continued to be refined after 
the period covered by the NAO report. 
In the June 2003 edition, Gough (2003) describes the first phase of changes made at Rugby. 
He writes, “Work on the preparation of the West Coast Strategy began in April 2002 with a 
detailed re-examination of existing plans in order to define the exact scope of the specified 
work and cost that work as accurately as possible. This exercise showed that the project was 
not only expensive but was also very slow, with an expected completion date of about 2013.” 
He goes on to say that, “examination of the Rugby plans indicated that the expenditure of a 
great deal of money was going to buy remarkably few benefits. When track speed was 
matched with signal sighting and overlap questions, it appeared that speed on the through 
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main lines could rise only from 75mph to 85mph, with no change in speeds to and from 
Birmingham. And although the new layout gave some improvement in capacity, considerable 
numbers of conflicts remained. Even before the SRA's additional freight objective was taken 
into consideration, it was clear that neither in terms of line-speed nor in throughput did the 
planned new Rugby meet the required outputs for the route. This location would remain a 
low-speed bottleneck. As if all that were not enough, the new layout was going to be difficult 
to build, and it would probably be quite difficult to own and maintain.” 
Gough describes how a more careful analysis led to a different layout in which a non-
standard arrangement of the traffic across the four tracks was tolerated for a short distance, 
the station was demolished and rebuilt to put the through lines where the old platforms 
were and a flyover viaduct was rebuilt. 
Gough’s comparison of the old and new ways of working is interesting. He writes, “This 
process of starting with a definition of the functionality required and then asking how that 
can be achieved, rather than adopting the older approach of looking at what is already there 
and asking how best it can be adapted to get as close as possible to what is wanted, would 
be normal for projects in many other fields. But it is novel on the railway: this has been partly 
because of the constraints that have long been imposed by somewhat shorter-term planning 
and financing.” 
Gough is back in January 2004 (Gough, 2004a). He describes how the SRA found that the 
works planned at Nuneaton station were expensive and would take too long. A proposed 
underpass was removed from the new layout and a new and cheaper method was found of 
routing freight traffic that would have used this underpass through the station instead while 
passengers that would have travelled on trains through this underpass would now have to 
change trains at Nuneaton. 
Gough also describes changes in the Trent Valley. Railtrack had originally planned to make 
this part of the line four-track throughout but had limited widening as part of a cost-cutting 
exercise. The SRA reversed this decision “in the light of its assessment of future needs”. So, in 
this case, the SRA added scope. 
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Gough notes that aspects of the scheme between Stoke and Norton Bridge remained under 
review by the SRA at the time of writing. 
Gough returns again in September 2004 with a pair of articles (Gough, 2004b, 2004c). He 
discusses further evolution of the plans for Rugby and reports that, with attention to detail, 
it has been found that it is possible to achieve the desired lines speeds while retaining the 
existing platforms and parts of the structure of the flyover being replaced, with savings to 
cost as a result. 
At Stafford, Gough reports that, “a completely new and very much simplified layout” is being 
adopted, although he does not describe the reasoning behind the change in detail. 
Gough discusses sections further north and writes, “Over the Lancaster & Carlisle and 
Caledonian sections the nature of the railway changes completely as it makes its way 
through the northern fells and then through the lowland hills of Scotland. There are no major 
schemes. There has, however, been a major change of policy. Instead of trying to bring every 
possible short section of line up to a 125mph enhanced permissible speed, often giving a saw-
tooth speed profile that would be very difficult to drive to, the aim will now be to set a 
maximum of 110mph on the more curved sections and to bring as much of the line as 
possible up to that level. It is far better value to bring the 90 speed limits to 110 than to bring 
the 110s to 125. This decision saves money and accelerates delivery by avoiding a lot of the 
extra re-laying that would have been required for a 125mph line-maximum.” 
B.2.4 Analysis and conclusions 
There is no additional information to provide. A full account was provided in the body of the 
thesis. 
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B.3 Case Study 2: The Jubilee Line Extension Project 
B.3.1 Introduction 
There is no additional information to provide. A full account was provided in the body of the 
thesis. 
B.3.2 The way in which the project was run 
Project Management 
There is clear evidence that weaknesses in project management were causal factors for 
project problems in general and for change latency in particular. 
Mitchell (2003; page 298) writes: 
“It was always the intention to have a full 'engineer's design' for the civil works with full 
working drawings produced to form part of the tender package-albeit contractors were 
also encouraged to submit alternative design and construction proposals. The very 
tight timescales for the original design phase and the changing requirements meant 
this objective was ambitious and, in practice, could not be realised. Consequently the 
working drawings issued at contract award, despite the moratorium, remained 
incomplete in terms of both number and substance. This was highlighted on one 
contract where the contractor stated that they had been issued with 48000 instruments 
of change by the time the work was complete.” 
It seems as though a high volume of change was the result of incomplete designs that were 
in turn the result of working towards a programme that was not met and arguably could not 
have been met. If so, then the project management decision to force the pace early on may 
well have resulted in the project taking longer than it would otherwise have – a 
corroboration of the ‘left shift’ hypothesis by counter-example. 
Arup (2001; page 8) suggests another deficiency. 
“JLEP’s initial practice of reporting to LUL on progress and cost to date, but not 
forecasting on eventual programme and budget for completion, was also a 
shortcoming of this approach to management. Its basis was the premise by JLEP that 
mitigation and recovery measures, introduced to regain lost time, would work and that, 
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as a consequence, the situation would always improve. We believe this created 
optimism within LUL and JLEP that was not properly justifiable. This in turn, introduced 
high risk to both programme and cost targets.” 
The problem is ascribed partially to a lack of expertise and partially to an unwillingness to 
countenance the possibility of slippage, which appears to be ascribed, in turn, to a lack of 
independence that was eventually overcome by Bechtel’s “fresh thinking”. 
Without accurate cost and timescale forecasts, it must have been difficult to balance 
options. It seems likely that better cost and timescale forecasting would have resulted in 
reduced change latency. 
Contract Management 
Two criticisms of the contractual arrangements have been identified that could have 
increased change latency. 
Mitchell (2003; pages 297ff) criticises the arrangements for co-ordination of contracts when 
he writes: 
“The Contractor was required to co-ordinate his own work with that of all the 
Designated Contractors. The Contractor was also required to provide attendance (all 
reasonable facilities and opportunities for carrying out their work) on the Designated 
Contractors and any other contractors and workmen of the Employer. The inclusion of 
this contractual obligation still left the Project team with the sizeable task of managing 
the interfaces directly and ensuring co-ordination of all the contractors with the overall 
master programme for the Project. Managing the interfaces was a key factor in the 
increased costs incurred by the Project as will be seen later.” 
Arup (2001; page 17) corroborates this criticism and provides evidence that it was a source 
of delay. 
“Works contractors were also procured individually, and management of interfaces 
between them was not defined. This was particularly relevant to the Railway controls 
contractors, where absence of early interface management delayed this package by 
many months.” 
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Mitchell (2003; page 306) also reports the following criticism from a civil engineering 
contractor: 
“The form of contract discouraged collaborative working by being severe and punitive if 
a party got into trouble. The procurement strategy for the stations was flawed insofar 
as the form of contract encouraged non-contracting parties to be wary of one another 
and to leave the co-ordination between the building works and the E&M works to the 
Project team.” 
Arup (2001; page 17), corroborates this criticism as well with the following observation: 
“The form of contract and the documentation was common to both the Civil and E&M 
works contractors, and became adversarial under the circumstances under which it was 
applied and used.” 
B.3.3 The changes that were made 
In order to identify changes it is necessary to set a baseline. I choose to use as a baseline the 
scheme defined in the London Underground Bill 1989, as deposited in November 1989. This 
is described in Mitchell (2003; pages 329ff). Mitchell (2003; page 19) says when discussing 
this period that, “It was always intended to open the extension in one go – the big bang 
approach.” 
A change, then, must either differ from this baseline or from be a variance from a definite 
subsequent commitment. 
There were a number of changes to the design of the stations but the changes are complex 
enough and the available information about them is limited enough that I have found it 
impractical to analyse them. 
Leaving station changes aside, the following five changes meet the criteria above and are 
significant enough that their consequences would be readily apparent to a user of the line: 
1. to change the route so that it included North Greenwich; 
2. to greatly increase the works on the existing portion of the Jubilee Line; 
3. to replace the existing train fleet rather than supplementing it; 
4. to open the line in phases; and 
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5. to abandon the planned moving block signalling system and revert to a fixed-block 
signalling system with reduced capacity. 
Each of these changes is considered in turn followed by some general remarks and 
conclusions. 
Change 1: Change of route 
In the scheme originally deposited with the parliamentary bill, the line crossed the Thames 
twice and remained North of the Thames from Canary Wharf. In May 1991 (Mitchell, 2003; 
page 33), the House of Commons select committee approved the proposals for the Project 
but decided upon an alternative route that crossed the Thames twice more in order to 
connect the Greenwich peninsula to the Underground network and promote its 
regeneration. The decision took account of the fact that British Gas had also agreed to make 
a multi-million pound contribution to the scheme if it took the North Greenwich route, 
including provision of a site for the station at North Greenwich, a worksite and an area for a 
park and ride facility adjoining the station (Mitchell, 2003; page 333). 
Change 2: Works on the existing portion of the Jubilee Line 
Mitchell says (2003, p33) that, “Very little provision had been made in the original Project 
cost and programme estimates for any works on the basis that the extension was really a 
'bolt-on' to the existing railway. A figure of £15 million was included for some works at Green 
Park station to cope with increased passenger flows and some upgrading to the signalling.” 
However, Mitchell (2003, p33) says that, in Spring 1991, the project started to realise that it 
needed to carry out work on the existing line including: 
 Additional signalling equipment; 
 A new service control centre; 
 Changes to sidings to accommodate longer trains; 
 Changes to stations; 
 Additional electrical power equipment; and 
 Additional communications equipment. 
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In the final reckoning, according to Mitchell (2003, p33), the works on the existing line cost 
well over £100 million. 
The latency for the change to add the necessary additional works then was at least 16 
months. The primary reason for this latency appears to be framing the problem incorrectly 
and regarding it, as Mitchell is quoted above as saying as “a 'bolt-on' to the existing railway”. 
Mitchell (2003; page 362) expands on this point later in his book: 
“If the scope of the Project had been considered as the Extended Jubilee Line from the 
start as opposed to the Jubilee Line Extension, it would have brought about a more 
holistic approach to planning and design and a more realistic assessment of the costs 
and risks involved. As it was, the Project team initially took an entrenched view 
(understandably) that the existing line was nothing to do with them.” 
Arup (2001; page 6) makes a similar point: 
“The fundamental objective that LUL set out to achieve in 1989 was building, 
equipping, commissioning and opening a new Railway. To achieve this objective, LUL 
needed to decide not only on the strategy and management structure of the new 
construction (that is the Project) but, equally important, the strategy and management 
structure for the delivery of the Railway. The two are not the same. The latter appears 
to have not been given sufficient consideration when the arrangements were first set 
up.” 
Change 3: Replacing the train fleet 
The original plan was to strengthen the existing fleet of 31½ trains of ‘1983’ stock that had 
only been in service for two to six years. However in October 1993 (UCL, 2009; page 91), a 
contract was let to Alstom to supply an entirely new replacement fleet of 59 trains (UCL, 
2009; page 9). 
The reasons for the change of direction were, according to Mitchell (2003; pages 128ff): 
 the need to meet new requirements for fire safety and evacuation following the 
Fennell report into the Kings Cross fire of 1987 and a serious incident at Bethnal 
Green in February 1991; 
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 dissatisfaction with the reliability and doors of the existing fleet; and 
 the opportunity to introduce regenerative braking. 
The precise point at which there was sufficient information to determine that the fleet 
replacement was desirable is unclear but Mitchell (2003 page 128) reports that the decision 
was the result of a “lengthy debate” that “wasn’t concluded for over two years”. If there was 
a debate then at least one party to the debate must, presumably, have been aware of the 
benefits of replacing the trains and, as there is no reason to believe that these benefits 
changed materially during the period leading up to October 1993 so it seems reasonable to 
conclude that change latency was at least 24 months. 
The precise reasons for the latency could not be established but the embarrassment 
involved in replacing newly-acquired rolling stock may have been a factor. It may be noted 
(Mitchell, 2003; page 134) that delays in the infrastructure project meant that storage 
locations had to be found for some of the later trains while they awaited their chance to 
enter service so it is not clear that the delay in procuring the trains had any significant 
consequences for the project as a whole 
Change 4: Phased opening of the line 
It has already been noted that the original plan was to open the extension in one go. 
According to Mitchell (2003; page 147), the General Manager of the Jubilee and East London 
Lines was never keen on the 'big bang' line opening and the operations business unit came 
up with its own phased opening plan in late 1996. 
According to Arup (2001; page 6): 
“Recognising the importance of access to North Greenwich, JLEP [JLE Project] adopted 
and published a strategy in December 1997 to open the Stratford to Waterloo section 
as an ‘incremental railway’, separate from the existing line, in order to meet the then 
published September 1998 opening date. This was still to be a single event opening. 
The strategy was again changed in February 1998 with a reversion to an end-to-end 
Stanmore to Stratford single event opening, but with the opening date deferred to 
‘Spring 1999’.” 
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In September 1998, after reviewing the project, Bechtel recommended that the opening of 
the extension should be phased. Bechtel were subsequently hired as project managers for 
the JLE project and this recommendation was implemented. 
I have not been able to establish the precise reasons for this decision. In the UCL report 
(2009 page 86), the strategy is described as breaking the commissioning schedule into “three 
manageable pieces” suggesting that the ‘big bang’ approach was unmanageable. If so, then 
this was presumably known by the operations business unit in 2006 in which case, it may be 
concluded that: 
 change latency was about 24 months; and 
 this could have been reduced by better liaison with the operators and better 
consideration of operational requirements. 
This, admittedly provisional, diagnosis has further support in Mitchell (2003; page 147) 
where John Self is reported as saying that “a breakthrough, in his eyes, was that Bechtel 
involved the line management much more in project matters and viewed John as the 
'ultimate client' - the person who would ultimately have to weld the people, assets and 
systems into an operational business” and in (Arup, 2001; page 4), which contains the 
following observation: 
“LUL lacked the strategy and the structure and continuity of management that would 
ensure the delivery of a working Railway and not just the construction Project.” 
Change 5: Falling back to a fixed block signalling system 
Mitchell (2003; page 233) notes that there were concerns about whether the moving-block 
signalling system could be installed within the programme when the signalling contract was 
let in November 1993 and that LU kept an option to trigger fall back to a fixed block system 
which was valid until the 23rd month of the contract. 
Mitchell continues: 
“By the start of 1996, the Project was expressing concern over the development and 
testing of the moving block processor and asked for sufficient evidence of progress to 
be demonstrated to avoid the fall-back solution being instructed. […] A series of tests 
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were carried out to establish the state of play and the contractor was able to provide 
sufficient reassurance that development was sufficiently advanced to allow the 
contractual fall-back solution to lapse.” 
However, in September 1997, a decision was taken to abandon the moving block solution 
and fall back to the fixed block alternative. 
As the concerns of 1993 turned out to be well-founded in 1996, it is hard to believe that the 
decision to allow the contractual fall-back solution to lapse could have been truly justified by 
the facts and some degree of wishful thinking must surely have taken place. Others seem to 
agree. Ralph Mason of Bechtel is reported by Mitchell (2003; page 362) as commenting, “'let 
the buyer beware' - ensure you have the mechanisms in place to test that your suppliers are 
informing you of the true situation with progress at all times.” 
The tentative conclusion is that, had the project had such mechanisms in place, the fall-back 
decision would have been taken earlier. While good SE practice might have supported such 
mechanisms, it is not considered that there is evidence that good SE practice on its own 
could have reduced the latency of this change. 
Other changes 
There does appear to have been a great deal of change on the project. As has already been 
noted above, 48,000 instruments of change were issued on one contract. 
Arup (2001; page 7) reports that: 
“In the six years of the construction phase between late 1993 and late 1999, there was 
a significant increase in the estimated final cost of the major construction contracts. 
This arose from variations to the scope of the works on which the contractors tendered, 
the instructions issued to accelerate the works and the extended time for completion. 
The total value of this change amounted to 70 percent of the initial value of the works 
in 1993 and the administration of this overwhelmed the cost management process, 
turning it into a ‘catch-up’ monitoring process rather than the advance control process 
it was intended to be. This high value of change largely came about as a consequence 
of the incompleteness of the design information issued to contractors for bidding 
purposes in late 1991. This was governed by the need to meet the then timetabled 
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award of the major construction contracts at the latest by mid-1992. These, and other 
matters, resulted in JLEP becoming reactive in its management, not the proactive force 
it needed to be.” 
There is very clear evidence here that further attention to system design activities would 
have forestalled a great deal of the change described. 
B.3.4 Analysis and conclusions 
There is no additional information to provide. A full account was provided in the body of the 
thesis. 
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B.4 Case Study 3: The Channel Tunnel Rail Link Project 
B.4.1 Introduction 
There is no additional information to provide. A full account was provided in the body of the 
thesis. 
B.4.2 The way in which the project was run 
Systems Engineering and Project Management 
I can find no clear statement of the degree to which the CTRL adopted SE ideas. However, it 
does seem reasonable to draw some conclusions from the absence of information in the 
following channels: 
 I have chaired the INCOSE UK Rail Interest Group since 2006, during which time there 
have been more than 50 presentations to the group, none of which has discussed 
CTRL. The publications database maintained by INCOSE at an international level 
contains 45 papers and presentations that contain the word “rail” in their abstracts 
but none of these discusses CTRL. Nor can I recall any other INCOSE paper or 
presentation that discussed SE on CTRL. 
 Systems engineering is not mentioned in any of the sources referred to for this case 
study. 
 Professor Andrew McNaughton, who became chief engineer and technical director 
for HS2, the UK’s second high-speed line in 2009, gave a presentation at an IET 
seminar on railway systems engineering shortly after his appointment. I chaired this 
seminar. At the seminar, Professor McNaughton asserted that HS2 would follow an 
SE approach, an assertion that he has subsequently repeated. However I can recall 
him making no reference to such an approach being used on CTRL and his slides 
(McNaughton, 2009) contain no such reference. 
It seems beyond the limits of plausibility that the CTRL project could have made a concerted 
and explicit attempt to adopt the ideas of SE and still have missed all these opportunities to 
tell the SE community about it. This leads me to conclude that the project made no such 
attempt and instead drew upon the traditions of project management of large civil 
engineering projects alone for its system-level thinking. 
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Of course the traditions of SE and project management do overlap. Moreover, the project 
team certainly put a great deal of effort into the project. Steer Gleave Davies (2004; page 38) 
reports that professional staff costs, associated with project management, planning, design 
and legal issues, were estimated to amount to more than 25% of the total cost of the CTRL 
project. Startlingly, they estimate, on a Spanish high speed line project total project planning 
and management costs were less than 3% of the total cost of a Spanish high speed line. So 
the CTRL project invested about eight times as much effort in project management, 
planning, design and legal issues as the Spanish project did. Some of this effort must 
presumably have been expended on activities that fall within the scope of the 6 core SE 
processes that I have defined. 
The project team certainly professed a belief in meticulous preparation. In Modern Railways 
(2007; page 40), Mike Glover, RLE’s Technical Director is reported as saying, “one of the 
underlying principles in our eleven and a half years of work has been to plan, plan and plan 
again – I wouldn’t pretend we haven’t had any shocks or surprises, but our planning has 
thrown up many issues before they really become issues, and helped put any unusual event 
into context”. 
This commitment to planning seems to have been present from the outset. In Modern 
Railways (2000; page x), Bob Doty, RLE’s Contract Manager explains that the absence of 
storage space on the construction sites require a ‘just in time’ approach that requires a high 
level of planning. He is reported as saying, “We’re examining details day-by-day. Over two 
years ahead […] we already have daily programmes for all the contractors”. 
However the planning approach appears to have been developed to involve the contractors 
more over time. In Modern Railways (2002; page 36), Roger Picard, RLE’s Project Director is 
reported as saying that, after learning lessons from section 1, RLE had put in place a six-
month pre-construction period of planning in conjunction with the contractors during which 
“interface and construction design” were refined. Five years later, In Modern Railways 
(2007), Mike Glover is reported as claiming that this decision was a major factor in the 
success of the project and saying, “A conventional client might expect you to be out digging 
the day after contract signature, and would worry about six months lost on programme […] 
but I’d say you’ve probably gained a year.” 
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Co-ordination seems to have acquired extra attention over time. Modern Railways (2003; 
page 45) says that, “Lessons drawn from Section One are being applied in the way 
procurement, contracts and management of contractors are handled on Section Two, with 
URN and RLE taking a much more hands-on, co-ordinating role.” 
Moreover, there does seem to have been consultation with stakeholders where this was 
required. In Modern Railways (2006; page 46), David Pointon, Managing Director of RLE’s 
subsidiary, Union Railways, is reported as saying about the new depot at Temple Mills, 
“Eurostar [the train operator] have had operational staff working alongside at Temple Mills 
almost from the start to ensure that they are getting what they want.” 
So, while the project may not have explicitly adopted SE, it appears to have adopted several 
of its underlying tenets: ‘left shift’, the value of stakeholder consultation, the value of 
meticulous planning and the value of paying attention to interfaces. 
General approach to engineering 
The project had a very clear and explicit commitment to using proven technology where 
possible. 
 In Modern Railways (2000; page xiv), Walt Bell, then Managing Director of Union 
Railways (North) is reported as saying, “It's a tenet of this project not to experiment." 
 In Modern Railways (2002; page 44), it is asserted that “The logistics of construction 
have, as far as possible, been carried wholesale from French high-speed lines, and 
indeed the overhead catenary system and track design are licenced French designs, 
while the signalling system follows the design used for the June 2001 opening of TGV 
Mediterrannée.” 
 In Modern Railways (2006; page 43), David Bennett, the project’s Implementation 
Director, is quoted as saying, “We followed our general principle of trying not to 
invent anything new, and use proven technology wherever possible." 
 In Modern Railways (2007 page 37), Rob Holden, Executive Chairman of LCR is 
quoted as saying, “The choice of proven French TGV technology was another factor in 
the success of the railway.” 
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Contract management 
In Modern Railways (2000; page v), Roger Picard is reported as saying that the RLE and URS 
team had adopted a partnering approach encouraged by an appropriate form of contract, to 
keep the focus on resolving issues more than contractual battles. 
The NAO (2005; page 12), reports that, in the views of LCR and Union Railways, one key 
factor in bringing Section 1 in on budget was extensive use of a target-price form of contract 
that had been developed by the Institution of Civil Engineers in consultation with industry 
experts. Under this form of contract, contractors shared in cost savings or overruns against 
the target price. The benefits of this were considered to include: 
 allowing and incentivising the contractors to propose lower cost methods of 
construction; 
 a significant reduction in the number of contractual disputes compared with the 
norm; 
 encouraging collaboration between contractors; and 
 allowing construction to start with some issues unresolved. 
In Modern Railways (2007; page 45), Brian Sedar, who was RLE’s Project Manager for part of 
the lifetime of the project, is reported as saying that he believed that “the project’s 
structure, with intermediary client organisations, was conducive to the type of work involved 
- allowing day-to-day decisions to be taken by the client, which would be difficult for a 
government agency to take”. 
In Modern Railways (2002; page 40), Ian Galloway, RLE’s Section Two Operations Manager, 
describes an initiative to form a joint venture to carry out the works at Stratford, creating a 
single team for design, procurement and construction because “With fewer interfaces, you 
are usually more likely to succeed.” 
B.4.3 The changes that were made 
I am not sure at what precise dates the project committed to various aspects of the scheme 
so I consider changes from the start of construction. 
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In Modern Railways (2007; page 45), Brian Sedar is reported as saying that a ‘no change’ 
policy was adopted with the principal exceptions of changes that were safety critical or 
necessary for the opening because “change could have killed the project if not kept in check”. 
In practice, this policy appears to have been flexible – there certainly were changes made 
that did not fall into the exempted categories. Three significant changes were the addition of 
a new depot at Temple Mills, changes to the layout at St Pancras and provision of additional 
passenger and retail facilities at stations. These changes are discussed in the next three sub-
sections but there were a number of other changes, which are discussed in the sub-section 
after that. 
The Temple Mills depot 
Hansard (House of Commons, 2004) records that, on 15 November 2004, Tony McNulty, the 
Minister of State at the Department for Transport made the following written statement to 
parliament: 
“The Department has agreed with London & Continental Railways to bring forward the 
construction of a Eurostar maintenance depot on existing railway lands at Temple Mills 
in east London. A depot at Temple Mills has always been envisaged as part of the final 
plan for the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) and bringing it forward will provide for a 
much more efficient operation of the complete CTRL and the Eurostar trainsets. This 
decision will enable the new depot to be provided in time for commencement of 
Eurostar services on CTRL Section 2 in 2007. 
“Original plans envisaged Eurostar trains gaining access from St Pancras to the existing 
North Pole International depot via the North London Line, but further investigation 
indicated that this would require costly and disruptive infrastructure works and 
significantly reduce capacity on what is already a congested line. Implementing the 
Temple Mills depot straightaway therefore provides a more cost-effective overall 
solution. 
“The Department has agreed in principle with London & Continental Railways to 
provide the funding for the depot as a Government change to the CTRL development 
agreement at a total cost not exceeding £402 million including land acquisition and 
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relocation costs, subject to agreement of the detailed financial and contractual 
conditions.” 
The depot was actually constructed at a cost of £357 million (NAO, 2012; page 15)30. 
In 2001, Modern Railways (2001; page 38) reported that it was still envisaged that CTRL 
trains would continue to be serviced at their existing North Pole depot, which would be 
reached via the North London Line when section 2 opened but that a new depot at Temple 
Mills was being considered and that “strategic decisions on the best use of the North London 
Line’s capacity would be the driver of any change”. 
In 2003, Modern Railways (2003; page 44) reported that a study was underway into the 
design of a depot at Temple Mills even though no commitment had been made to build one. 
Again, the capacity of the North London Line was cited as a potential reason for a move. 
The main reasons for increased traffic on the North London Line of which I am aware is the 
completion of the London Overground orbital route created by the North London Line 
project, which started around 2005, and the East London Line project, which started around 
2007. 
I have insufficient information to estimate latency for this change. I suspect that planning for 
the London Overground orbital route had advanced to the point where it would become 
clear that there was insufficient capacity for channel tunnel trains to use it before November 
2005 but I cannot be sure of this and, in any case, if there was a delay, it may well have been 
the result of waiting for the completion of political processes that are not necessarily 
susceptible to reduction through SE. 
St Pancras station 
Modern Railways (2001; pages 44ff) carries a discussion of significant changes to the layout 
of St Pancras station in which platform 4, which previously ran right into the station, in 
                                                     
30
 This is shown in the table of final financial figures as one of two items under the heading, “Work outside original contract 
scope”. The other is “Station fit-out: Passenger and retail facilities at St Pancras, Stratford and Ebbsfleet international 
stations funded by LCR.” This item is not commented on in the body of the report, so I assume that it reflects some change in 
funding arrangements rather than a change in the project’s technical scope. 
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parallel with the international platforms, was moved back to align with the other regional 
platforms. This left space to open up ‘light wells’ in the first floor deck within the existing 
train shed - a change that is applauded by the magazine. 
The magazine ascribes the change to “reflection”, suggesting that the new layout had always 
been better than the original one. The point at which the project committed to the original 
layout is unclear but if it was included in the plans that were in place when construction 
started then change latency may have been more than two years. However, as the change 
was made six years before the international station opened, it seems unlikely that the 
latency had any significant effect on the project. 
The CTRL project was responsible for building the box for a new Thameslink station below 
the main station and there was a change to the method of construction used for that, but 
that is discussed in a later sub-section. 
Provision of additional passenger and retail facilities 
There is no additional information to provide. A full account was provided in the body of the 
thesis. 
Other changes 
For a project, with a ‘no change’ policy, there do seem to have been quite a few changes. 
Several of these were changes to construction methods made in order to save cost and time, 
including: 
 adopting pre-cast roofs for three cut-and-cover excavations (Modern Railways, 2000; 
page v); 
 changing the way in which the Medway viaduct was built (Modern Railways, 2000; 
page v); 
 changing the way in which the tunnel lining was constructed on the North Downs 
tunnel (Modern Railways, 2000; page v); and 
 changing the method of building the box for the Thameslink Station at St Pancras 
from digging a hole and then covering it to constructing the roof and then excavating 
below it (Modern Railways, 2007; page 39). 
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There were also changes to the end-state railway, including the following: 
 raising the maximum line speed from 270 km/h to 300 km/h in order to increase 
service reliability (Modern Railways, 2000; page iii); 
 changes in tunnel portal design after aerodynamic modelling (Modern Railways, 
2000; page x); 
 adding headshunt sidings to freight loops for storing on-track equipment (Modern 
Railways, 2001; page 37); and 
 at St Pancras, changing the rail from standard Railtrack 113lb rail to the new RT60 rail 
throughout (Modern Railways, 2001; page 44). 
B.4.4 Analysis and conclusions 
There is no additional information to provide. A full account was provided in the body of the 
thesis. 
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B.5 Case Study 4: Acquisition of High-Output Ballast Cleaning Plant 
B.5.1 Introduction 
There is no additional information to provide. A full account was provided in the body of the 
thesis. 
B.5.2 The way in which the project was run 
The US machine had to be modified to account for differences between the US and UK 
contexts. These differences included: 
A. Differing climate – it was generally cooler in the UK (especially at night) than was 
normal in the part of North America where the unmodified machine was operated. 
B. Differing loading gauges - the US loading gauge was substantially larger. 
C. Differing permanent way standards - US track tolerances were suited to freight 
railways operations and the US track bed geometry and were unacceptable in the UK. 
D. Differing health and safety standards. 
E. A requirement in the UK to for the machine to move under its own power between 
stabling and the work site. 
F. The need to operate at night. 
These gave rise to significant design differences between US and UK machines: 
a. Whereas the US machine comprised two vehicles travelling in convoy, the UK 
machine comprised six vehicles coupled in a rake [because of B and E]. 
b. The UK machine had significantly smaller conveyors and drive sprockets [because of 
B]. 
c. The UK machine was fitted with additional guards to protect workers on the track 
side [because of D]. 
d. The cab was air-suspended to reduce vibration [because of D]. 
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The differences in environment and design led to a number of practical problems with 
deployment. These included the following: 
 The conveyors' capacity was marginal [because of b]. The equipment was 
hydraulically powered and pressure in the hydraulic system was used for control 
purposes. However, because temperatures were lower [because of A] and hydraulic 
lines were longer [because of a], the delay in the control loop was increased. As a 
result the equipment frequently stalled. This was overcome by increasing hydraulic 
pressure but at a cost in energy efficiency. Later, relay equipment was replaced by 
programmable logic control with a fibre-optic data bus. 
 The guards initially fitted to the machine [c] were destroyed within a few minutes of 
operation and it was obvious that mechanical guards could not be made to work in 
close proximity to the excavating wheels. 
 The machine could not initially meet UK standards for track [C] until the excavating 
equipment and ballast distribution system was redesigned. 
The specification against which the machine was procured was not above criticism. It 
included a requirement that the machine should be capable of moving (without cleaning 
ballast) under its own power at 60 mph, which added significant cost but proved 
unnecessary - the machine was always hauled by a locomotive. With hindsight, it is 
considered that the specification was overly prescriptive in some areas while the 
performance requirements were limited. 
Nevertheless, the specification was such that the problems listed above were clearly 
associated with failures to meet it. The US trials failed to make these problems visible to BR. 
B.5.3 The changes that were made 
There is no additional information to provide. A full account was provided in the body of the 
thesis. 
B.5.4 Analysis and conclusions 
There is no additional information to provide. A full account was provided in the body of the 
thesis. 
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C  APPENDIX: QUESTIONNAIRES USED FOR PRELIMINARY 
SURVEYS 
The questionnaires used for the first and second preliminary surveys are reproduced in this 
appendix. The questions are introduced with a prefix starting with the letter ‘Q’. Other text 
comprises section headings and explanatory notes. 
C.1 Questionnaire used for first preliminary survey 
What sort of a project was it? 
I ask about this in order to see whether there is any evidence that the benefits of systems 
engineering vary between types of projects. 
Q1.1.1 Please describe the project that we will talk about. You and I need to be clear about 
the scope of the project that we are discussing. For instance, if you were working for a 
supplier or contractor, we need to agree whether we are talking about your organisation’s 
activities only or those of the customer as well. 
Q1.1.2 At peak, how many people worked on the project? (Please select one response.) 
01) Less than 10 
02) 10 to 49 
03) 50 to 199 
04) 200 or more 
05) Other response, please specify 
Q1.1.3 Is the project still underway? 
01) Yes 
02) No 
Q1.1.4 In what industry sector is the project? 
01) Rail 
02) Other, please specify 
Q1.1.5 What sort of railway(s) did it involve? Please select all that apply. Please ignore this 
question if your project was not a railway project. 
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01) Tramway or light rail (eg Docklands Light Rail) 
02) Metro 
03) Heavy rail (passenger traffic) 
04) Heavy rail (freight traffic) 
05) Heavy rail (mixed passenger and freight traffic) 
06) Other, please specify 
From now on, I will use the word “system” to describe whatever the project was ultimately 
concerned with building or changing. 
Q1.1.6 Which parts of the railway were components of the system? Please select all that 
apply. Please ignore this question if your project was not a railway project. 
01) Permanent way (track) 
02) Stations 
03) Structures (such as bridges, embankments, viaducts) 
04) Rolling stock 
05) Signalling 
06) Electrification 
07) Telecommunications 
08) Tunnels 
09) Lifts and/or escalators 
10) Level crossings 
11) Operational procedures 
12) Maintenance and asset management procedures 
13) Other, please specify 
14) Other, please specify 
Q1.1.7 What stages in the system lifecycle were involved? Please select all that apply. 
01) Concept and feasibility (initial scoping, exploration of alternatives, establishing 
feasibility and outline business case) 
02) Requirements definition 
03) Design development 
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04) Implementation 
05) Transition to service 
06) Operations and maintenance 
07) Decommissioning and disposal (of the system) 
08) Decommissioning and disposal (of equipment being replaced) 
09) Other please specify 
What systems engineering activities were carried out? 
I ask about this because I am trying to understand what current systems engineering practice 
is and because I am looking for correlations between systems engineering activities that were 
carried out and how successful the project was. 
I have a number of more specific questions about some activities which I think are at the 
heart of systems engineering. 
Q1.2.1 Were you given or did you produce any of the following? Please indicate all that 
apply. 
01) A definition of the requirements of the system that you were building or changing in 
terms of its effects on the wider world (for example reduced journey times, increased 
service reliability, increased capacity; improved ambience for passengers and so forth) 
02) A specification of the form and function of the system that you were building or 
changing 
03) A compilation of significant facts about the environment in which the system must 
operate (for example train characteristics for an infrastructure project; infrastructure 
characteristics for a train project and so on) 
04) An explicit decomposition of the whole system into parts 
From now on, let us refer to these parts of the system as “sub-systems” 
05) Specifications of the form and function of the sub-systems 
06) Specifications of the interfaces between sub-systems 
07) A description of how the sub-systems worked together and fitted together to deliver 
the requirements placed on the system 
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08) A mapping between the statements in the system specifications and the statements 
in the specifications of the sub-systems and the interfaces between themQ1.2.2 To what 
extent was the material listed above kept up-to-date during the project? 
Q1.2.3 Did you or someone else check, for instance by multi-disciplinary review, that the 
design of the overall system was consistent and correct? 
Q1.2.4 Did you or someone else check, through testing, inspection, analysis or some other 
means, that the system met each requirement placed on it? 
Q1.2.5 Did you or someone else plan the introduction of the system into service? 
Q1.2.6 Before introducing the system into service did you or someone else plan out any 
migrationary stages that it must pass through? 
By “migrationary stage” I mean a stage where the system is returned to service although not 
yet complete. 
Q1.2.7 Before introducing the system into service did or someone else check that the 
operator was ready for it? (for instance, that is that they had sufficient trained staff, 
procedures were in place and so on) 
I am also interested in some other activities 
Q1.2.8 Please indicate which of the activities from the list below were carried out on the 
project. 
01) Planning systems engineering activities 
02) Change control 
03) Configuration management 
04) Managing assumptions 
05) Resolving critical technical issues 
06) Electromagnetic Compatibility analysis 
07) Life cycle costing analysis 
08) Reliability, Availability and Maintainability analysis 
09) Safety analysis 
10) Non-safety risk analysis 
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11) Systems modelling 
12) Systems prototyping 
13) Systems simulation 
14) Trade-off studies 
Q1.2.9 Please tell me about any other systems engineering activities which were carried out 
on the project but which we have not discussed. 
I ask about your systems engineering responsibilities because I am interested to see if people 
with different roles on projects have different views on systems engineering. 
Q1.2.10 Please outline for me your responsibilities on the project for planning or carrying 
out the activities that we have been discussing in questions 1.2.1 to 1.2.9. 
I seek your views on the practical value of systems engineering reference documents. 
Q1.2.11 What reference sources (standards, handbooks, manuals, reference books) if any 
did you use for defining your systems engineering processes? 
Q1.2.12 For each reference source that you used, please tell me how useful you found it. 
What were the critical success factors for the project and to what degree where they met? 
I ask about this in order to understand what “success” means and to explore the correlation 
between systems engineering and success. 
Q1.3.1 Please indicate what were the critical success factors for the project, selecting from 
the list below and/or adding as necessary. 
Q1.3.2 For each of the critical success factors, please indicate how the project performed 
against it using the following scale. 
A) Significantly exceeded expectations 
B) Exceeded expectations 
C) Met expectations 
D) Fell below expectations 
E) Fell significantly below expectations 
F) Other, please specify 
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Critical success factors 
01) Cost to complete project 
02) Time taken to complete project 
03) Whole lifecycle cost of system 
04) Compliance with written requirements (in contracts, standards and so on) 
05) Actual performance in the field 
06) Other, please specify 
07) Other, please specify 
08) Other, please specify 
How did systems engineering relate to the project outcomes? 
The next two general questions go directly to the heart of my research. 
Q1.4.1 Please tell me in your own words how the systems engineering activities which were 
actually carried out contributed to the project outcomes (whether positively or negatively). 
Q1.4.2 Do you think that systems engineering activities could have contributed to a better 
project outcome if carried out differently and, if so, how? 
Is there anything else? 
Q1.5.1 Is there anything else which I have not asked about but which you think that I ought 
to take into account? 
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C.2 Questionnaire and data collection procedure used for second preliminary survey 
C.2.1 Questionnaire 
The questions concern a specific project and it is necessary to choose a project before 
proceeding. 
Even when the question has a list of possible answers you are welcome to make additional 
comments if you think that something is important and I will record them. 
What sort of a project was it? 
I ask about this in order to see whether there is any evidence that the benefits of systems 
engineering vary between types of projects. 
Q1.1.1 Please describe the project that we will talk about. You and I need to be clear about 
the scope of the project that we are discussing. For instance, if you were working for a 
supplier or contractor, we need to agree whether we are talking about your organisation’s 
activities only or those of the customer as well. 
Q1.1.2 Is the project still underway? 
01) Yes 
02) No 
Q1.1.3 Is the project part of a larger programme of work? If so, please explain how its scope 
relates to the larger whole. 
Q1.1.4 In what industry sector is the project? 
01) Rail 
02) Other, please specify 
Q1.1.5 What sort of railway(s) did it involve? Please select all that apply. Please ignore this 
question if your project was not a railway project. 
01) Tramway or light rail (eg Docklands Light Rail) 
02) Metro 
03) Heavy rail (passenger traffic) 
04) Heavy rail (freight traffic) 
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05) Heavy rail (mixed passenger and freight traffic) 
06) Other, please specify 
From now on, I will use the word ‘system; to describe whatever the project was ultimately 
concerned with building or changing. 
Q1.1.6 Which parts of the railway were components of the system? Please select all that 
apply. Please ignore this question if your project was not a railway project. 
01) Permanent way (track) 
02) Stations 
03) Structures (such as bridges, embankments, viaducts) 
04) Rolling stock 
05) Signalling 
06) Electrification 
07) Telecommunications 
08) Tunnels 
09) Lifts and/or escalators 
10) Level crossings 
11) Operational procedures 
12) Maintenance and asset management procedures 
13) Control facilities 
Other, please specify 
Q1.1.7 In which of the following lifecycle stages did or will the project carry out work? Please 
select all that apply. 
01) Concept and feasibility (initial scoping, exploration of alternatives, establishing 
feasibility and outline business case) 
02) Requirements definition 
03) Design development 
04) Implementation 
05) Transition to service 
06) Operations and maintenance 
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07) Decommissioning and disposal (of the system) 
08) Decommissioning and disposal (of equipment being replaced) 
09) Other please specify 
Q1.1.8 When did the project start? Please answer to the nearest month, if possible? 
Q1.1.9 When did/will the project finish? Please answer to the nearest month, if possible? 
Q1.1.10 At peak, how many people worked on the project? Please count everyone who 
carried out activities that fell within the scope of the project as you described it to me in 
Q1.1.1. 
01) Less than 10 
02) 10 to 49 
03) 50 to 199 
04) 200 or more 
05) Other response, please specify. (If an accurate figure is available from project records, 
please enter it here). 
Q1.1.11 How many person years were expended on the project? Please count everyone who 
carried out activities that fell within the scope of the project as you described it to be in 
Q1.1.1. 
01) Less than 10 
02) 10 to 49 
03) 50 to 199 
04) 200 or more 
05) Other response, please specify. (If an accurate figure is available from project records, 
please enter it here). 
For some projects, the process of getting the railway from the state it was before the project 
to the final state delivered by the project can be complex. The next question is designed to 
assess that complexity. It counts ‘stages’ that the implementation of the system requires. By 
a stage, I mean a significant change to the railway after which the railway is returned to 
service 
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Q1.1.12 How many stages are involved in the project? (Please select one response.) 
01) 1 
02) 2-4 
03) 5 or more 
04) Other please specify 
The next two questions are designed to assess how much novelty was involved in the project 
technology and processes 
Q1.1.13 Please indicate the degree to which the following statement is an accurate 
characterisation of the system? 
“The system relies entirely upon well-tried technology in an application in which it has been 
used before” 
01) Wholly true 
02) Mostly true 
03) Partly true and partly untrue 
04) Mostly untrue 
05) Wholly untrue 
06) Other, please specify 
Q1.1.14 Please indicate the degree to which the following statement is an accurate 
characterisation of the system? 
“The design, construction, installation and testing methods used on the project were 
standard methods, used routinely by the organisation performing the project” 
01) Wholly true 
02) Mostly true 
03) Partly true and partly untrue 
04) Mostly untrue 
05) Wholly untrue 
06) Other, please specify 
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Q1.1.15 How experienced were the people leading the systems engineering functions? 
(Please select one response. If your answer would depend upon what time in the project 
that you considered, answer for the end of the project start-up phase and describe in your 
own words how things varied over time.) 
01) The people leading the systems engineering functions included few or no members 
with at least 5 years of experience performing these functions. 
02) A significant proportion of the people leading the systems engineering had at least 5 
years of experience performing these functions but in a non-rail context 
03) A significant proportion of the people leading the systems engineering at least 5 years 
of experience performing these functions in a rail context 
04) Other please specify 
Q1.1.16 To what degree were the systems engineering functions integrated with the rest of 
the project functions? (Please select one response. If your answer would depend upon what 
time in the project that you considered, answer for the end of the project start-up phase and 
describe in your own words how things varied over time.) 
01) The people performing the systems engineering functions worked with little or no 
interaction with the rest of the team 
02) The people performing the systems engineering functions worked with limited 
interaction with the rest of the team 
03) The people performing the systems engineering functions worked as an integral part 
of team as a whole 
04) Other please specify 
I ask the next question in order to assess the degree to which measurements of the amount 
of change in project documents are likely to be correlated with amount of change in the as-
built system. 
Q1.1.17 Please indicate the degree to which the following statement is an accurate 
characterisation of the project? 
“The system as built is or will be consistent with the final versions of the design documents 
and drawings for it” 
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01) Wholly true 
02) Mostly true 
03) Partly true and partly untrue 
04) Mostly untrue 
05) Wholly untrue 
06) Other, please specify 
Q1.1.18 Please indicate the degree to which the following statement is an accurate 
characterisation of the project? 
“The technical strategy at the end of the project was substantially the same as the technical 
strategy at the beginning of the project.” 
01) Wholly true 
02) Mostly true 
03) Partly true and partly untrue 
04) Mostly untrue 
05) Wholly untrue 
06) Other, please specify 
Q1.1.19 Please indicate the degree to which the following statement is an accurate 
characterisation of the project? 
“The project organisational structure was reasonably stable throughout the duration of the 
project.” 
01) Wholly true 
02) Mostly true 
03) Partly true and partly untrue 
04) Mostly untrue 
05) Wholly untrue 
06) Other, please specify 
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What requirements management and V&V activities were performed 
I ask these questions because I am trying to understand the relationship between these 
activities and project outcomes. 
Please answer these questions using your knowledge about what was done on the project 
even if you or your organisation did not do it? 
I am using ‘V&V’ to refer to all checking activities on the project including review, testing, 
inspection, survey and demonstration. It does not matter, for the purposes of this 
questionnaire which of these activities are put under the heading ‘validation’ and which are 
put under the heading ‘verification’. 
Q1.2.1 Please consider each of the following statements and tell me to what degree they 
fairly represent what happened on the project 
Please select one of the following options. If your answer would depend upon what time in 
the project that you considered, answer for the end of the project start-up phase and 
describe in your own words how things varied over time. 
01) Wholly true 
02) Mostly true 
03) Partly true and partly untrue 
04) Mostly untrue 
05) Wholly untrue 
06) Other, please specify 
In selecting one of the options above, do not take account of any reservations that you may 
have had about how the activities concerned were performed. So, if a comprehensive 
requirements specification was prepared but after the system was built, answer ‘Wholly 
true’. If you answered (01) or (02) above, please go on to select one of the following options: 
07) I have no reservations about how the activity concerned was performed 
08) I have minor reservations about how the activity concerned was performed 
09) I have major reservations about how the activity concerned was performed untrue 
10) Other, please specify 
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Statement 
Requirements and their structure 
A. The requirements that the system must meet were written down 
B. Each requirement was given a unique identifier 
C. Requirements were traced to the sources of stakeholder need 
Requirements elicitation 
D. Stakeholders were consulted to establish their requirements 
E. Facts about legacy systems and other parts of the environment of the system pertinent to 
the achievement of the requirements were collected and written down 
F. Individual stakeholders or stakeholder classes who had a legitimate interest in the system 
throughout its life cycle were identified 
G. Unavoidable constraints (for instance legislation, applicable standards) were identified 
and recorded 
H. The scope of the system to be built or changed was defined 
I. The functions that the system must exhibit were defined together with the conditions 
under which each function must be available 
J. The needs of V&V were considered as a potential source of system requirements 
K. Scenarios of typical use were defined and used to establish and/or check requirements 
L. Users of the system were identified and treated as stakeholders 
M. Critical requirements (for instance relating to safety) were identified as such 
N. Performance measures were defined that would allow the degree to which the system 
met its needs to be measured. 
Management of requirements 
O. Assumptions relevant to the requirements were written down, checked and tracked. 
Use of requirements 
P. The requirements were used as input to the specification of sub-systems and/or the 
design of the systems 
Q. System requirements were traced to the specification of sub-systems and/or the design of 
the systems 
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V&V Coverage 
R. Compliance of the built system with each requirement that affected it was checked 
S. The design was checked against the requirements as the design process proceeded 
T. The requirements were checked for completeness 
U. Each requirement was checked for atomicity 
V. Each requirement was checked for verifiability 
W. Each requirement was checked for unambiguity 
X. The requirements were checked for conflicts 
Y. The requirements were checked for overlap 
Z. The requirements were checked for feasibility 
AA. There was an explicit process to identify and resolve conflicting requirements and 
infeasible requirements 
BB. Requirements were checked with stakeholders 
CC. The method of checking compliance with a requirement was specified at the same time 
as or shortly after the requirement was written down 
V&V management 
DD. The results of V&V were recorded 
EE. A strategy for V&V was defined 
FF. There was a programme of activities to ensure that the necessary facilities, equipment 
and operators to conduct the V&V were prepared 
GG. Discrepancies and corrective actions arising from V&V were analysed, recorded and 
reported 
HH. The results of V&V contained sufficient information to support the definition of 
corrective actions 
II. The availability of the services delivered by the system which were required by 
stakeholders was confirmed during validation 
What configuration management activities were performed 
I ask these questions because I am trying to understand the relationship between these 
activities and project outcomes. 
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Please answer these questions using your knowledge about what was done on the project 
even if you or your organisation did not do it? 
Q1.3.1 Please consider each of the following statements and tell me to what degree they 
fairly represent what happened on the project 
Please select one of the following options. If your answer would depend upon what time in 
the project that you considered, answer for the end of the project start-up phase and 
describe in your own words how things varied over time. 
01) Wholly true 
02) Mostly true 
03) Partly true and partly untrue 
04) Mostly untrue 
05) Wholly untrue 
06) Other, please specify 
In selecting one of the options above, do not take account of any reservations that you may 
have had about how the activities concerned were performed. So, if a comprehensive 
requirements specification was prepared but after the system was built, answer ‘Wholly 
true’. If you answered (01) or (02) above, please go on to select one of the following options: 
07) I have no reservations about how the activity concerned was performed 
08) I have minor reservations about how the activity concerned was performed 
09) I have major reservations about how the activity concerned was performed untrue 
10) Other, please specify 
Statement 
Planning 
A. A plan was prepared containing a programme of configuration management (CM) 
activities 
B. The project explicitly defined a set of items to place under CM (‘Configuration Items’ or 
‘CIs’) 
C. Requirements were placed under CM 
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D. Key design documents and drawings were placed under CM 
E. Key physical elements of the built system were placed under CM 
F. Software components of the built system were placed under CM 
G. The project defined a structure showing the relationship between configuration items 
Data storage 
H. A CM repository was maintained containing data about CIs and the CIs themselves, if they 
were data items 
I. Project staff worked from data held in the CM repository 
J. Each version of each CI was given a unique identifier 
K. It was possible to obtain reports on the status of CIs 
Change control 
L. Once a CI was brought under change control, all changes to it were done under the 
authority of an approved change request 
M. Baselines were established such that each CI was placed under formal change control 
after it was entered in a baseline 
N. There was a process to define, assess and approve change requests 
O. There was a process to track the implementation of approved change requests 
P. It was possible to obtain reports on the status of change requests 
Audit 
Q. The CM system was subject to audit 
1.4 How much rework was performed on the project? 
We define “rework” to be work done to change a document, drawing or other item of data 
after it has been released to be used as a basis for other work or work done to change a 
component of the delivered system after first delivery 
Q1.4.1 In your judgement, what percentage of the overall effort expended on the project 
was expended on rework 
01) Less than 5% 
02) 6-10% 
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03) 11-20% 
04) 20-40% 
05) More than 40% 
06) Don’t know 
07) Other please specify 
Q1.4.2 How do you come to that judgement? 
1.5 To what extent was the final system fit for purpose? 
Q1.5.1 In your judgement, to what extent was the system fit for purpose (Please select one 
response.) 
01) Completely 
02) Mostly 
03) Partly 
04) Not at all 
05) Don’t know 
06) Other please specify 
Q1.5.2 How do you come to that judgement? 
Q1.5.3 Has the end-customer made any statements concerning their satisfaction with the 
system or their perception of its fitness for purpose? If so what have they said? 
Q1.5.4 Were any measures made of the performance of the system? If so, please describe 
the measures and the results? 
Q1.5.5 What post-implementation changes to the system have been made or are being 
considered or planned? 
Is there anything else? 
Q1.6.1 Is there anything else which I have not asked about but which you think that I ought 
to take into account? 
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C.2.2 Data Collection Procedure 
Estimate of rework by change to key documents 
Pre-requisites for employing this procedure are access to a project repository which contains 
all issue versions of all key project documents and the means to mechanically mark revisions 
between documents. 
1. Obtain a document tree showing the principal requirements and design documents or 
drawings on the project, and the relationships between them. If this is not available, work 
with the project representative to draw such a tree. 
2. Select up to 10 documents drawn randomly from across the project lifecycle, including at 
least one at the most ‘upstream’ end and at least one at the most ‘downstream’ end. 
3. Obtain all issues of these documents which were provided for further work. Note the 
names of the documents and number of issues of each. 
4. Take the final issue of each document and estimate the number of pages of content. 
Ignore front pages, informative introductions, glossaries, contents list, indices and lists of 
abbreviations. For each partially-printed page, estimate the proportion of the page printed 
upon to the nearest 0.1 page. 
5. Obtain a copy of each issue of the document, apart from the first, with revision marked 
relative to the previous issue. Estimate the number of pages of changed content, using the 
same counting rules as for step 4. 
6. Estimate the percentage rework on the project as (Grand total changed pages) / (Grand 
total pages in final versions) 
Estimate of rework by reference to change records 
A pre-requisite for employing this procedure is access to change records which contain an 
estimate of the effort expended on each change. Note that the ‘change records’ may be 
described as test logs, fault management records, contract variations or some combination 
thereof. It is possible to perform this procedure if an estimate of the costs of each change is 
available together with an estimate of the cost of a day’s effort. 
Questionnaires used for preliminary surveys Appendix C 
286 
1. Obtain access to project change records. 
2. Establish what types of changes were recorded in this system 
3. Make an estimate of the proportion of rework which is capture in the change records. If 
the procedure in the previous section has been followed, take a random selection of changes 
and establish what proportion can be related to an entry in the change record systems 
4. Total the effort recorded for each change, or, if this is impractical, select a random sub-set 
of the change, total the effort for these changes and adjust pro rata 
5. Estimate the percentage rework on the project as (Estimated effort for changes) / 
((estimated effort for project) × (proportion rework capture in changes)) 
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D APPENDIX: PUBLISHED PAPER: OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO 
TRANSFERRING SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PRACTICES INTO THE 
RAIL SECTOR 
The text of (Elliott, O’Neil, Roberts, Schmid and Shannon, 2012) is reproduced, with the 
permission of the copyright holder, John Wiley and Sons, on the following pages. 
My co-authors provided advice and criticism during the preparation of this paper and 
provided photographs and information about NYCT SE practices. Apart from this, I wrote the 
paper myself. 
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ABSTRACT
There is increasing interest within the rail sector in applying the concepts of systems engineering. This
paper presents arguments that the balance of concerns differs between a typical project in the rail sector
and one in the domains in which systems engineering was developed and that this difference, together
with a lack of agreement on the scope of systems engineering and differences in tradition between systems
engineering and the established rail disciplines, raise barriers to the effective and efficient importation
of systems engineering ideas into the rail sector. It is suggested that the system engineering community
can lower these barriers by strengthening published systems engineering guidance in certain areas, being
prepared to express themselves in plain language and packaging their practices in a more portable
fashion, while the rail community can help by being prepared to adapt the systems engineering approach
to meet their needs better and introducing new practices in a measured and systematic fashion. The
benefits to both communities are identified and found to justify the investment required to take these
steps. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Syst Eng 15: 203–212, 2012
Key words: formalizing systems engineering practice; rail; systems engineering principles; transferring
systems engineering practice
1. BACKGROUND
Buede [2000] traces the application of Systems Engineering
(SE) in the defense sector back to the 1940s. SE is normal
practice within defense and other sectors and is typically
mandated by the customer’s standards. For most of this pe-
riod, the term “systems engineering” has seldom been used in
the rail sector. The rail sector has faced systems issues and, to
tackle them, has put some of the principles of SE into practice
under other names; but it has no tradition of putting SE into
practice as an integrated whole.
Recently, there have been signs that key players in the rail
industry see SE as an important component of their future
plans:
• London Underground Limited has issued a mandatory
SE standard [London Underground Limited, 2007].
• The Dutch rail infrastructure controller, ProRail, is a
contributor to guidelines on how SE should be applied
to civil works projects [ProRail and Rijkswaterstaat,
2007].
• London Underground Limited, ProRail, New York City
Transit (NYCT), and Britain’s rail infrastructure con-
troller, Network Rail, have all set up SE groups and have
* Author to whom all correspondence should be addressed (e-mail:
bxe523@bham.ac.uk; anne.oneil@nyct.com; c.roberts.20@bham.ac.uk;
f.schmid@bham.ac.uk; ian@systems-innovation.com).
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all engaged in an executive round table session at the
2008 International Symposium of the International
Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE). A similar
round table session at the 2011 INCOSE International
Symposium attracted representatives from rail organi-
zations in at least 8 countries.
The authors are active in performing, teaching, and re-
searching SE in the rail sector. Two of them are members of
the INCOSE Transportation Working Group (TWG), a forum
which attracts senior rail SE practitioners from the US, UK,
the Netherlands, and other countries. Their experience, cor-
roborated by discussions at the TWG, has led them to identify
a number of barriers to the transfer of SE ideas into the rail
sector, arising from the nature of the rail sector and that of SE.
In the remainder of this paper, they discuss attributes of the
rail sector and SE which have created these barriers, identify
the barriers, suggest how to overcome them, and evaluate the
benefits of doing so. One of the authors is working in support
of the introduction of a more rigorous approach to SE within
NYCT and the experience at NYCT is used to illustrate some
of the proposals made.
This paper has been written primarily for the SE commu-
nity. A companion paper addresses the issues from the per-
spective of the rail community. Of course, it is acknowledged
that these communities are not separate: There is a growing
number of people who consider themselves members of both,
and it is hoped that this paper can contribute to increasing that
number.
In this paper, the words “rail” and “railway” will be taken
to cover all forms of railway, including freight, suburban, and
long-distance passenger railways, metro railways, and tram-
ways.
2. THE NATURE OF THE RAIL SECTOR
2.1. Distinguishing Characteristics of Rail
Projects
In many industries, SE is used to deliver complex new systems
on time, to budget and with the desired functionality, gener-
ally working within a range of constraints, but starting with a
clean sheet of paper. Railway project teams have the same
objectives but have to cope with two major complicating
factors.
2.1.1. Rail Projects Are Better Understood in Terms of
Enhancing Existing Systems Rather Than Creating New
Ones
In SE’s traditional domains, it is often possible to draw a
boundary around the system that is being created and to make
progress in a self-contained manner, albeit only with the
proviso that due attention is paid to the interactions with other
systems and with the surrounding environment and respecting
the constraints that these interactions impose.
In contrast, railways are highly-interconnected systems.
Railway infrastructure components have a myriad of me-
chanical and electrical connections between them. Down the
side of most urban railway tracks there runs a thick bundle of
cables that carry power, signaling information, and telecom-
munications signals. Not all the connections are visible or,
indeed, deliberate. For example, modern electric trains draw
enough current to induce dangerous voltages in track-side
fencing, if care is not taken with the manner in which the
fences are grounded.
However, the presence of trains traveling across the net-
work multiplies the complexity by introducing long-distance
interactions. The best known example is “track gauge” (the
distance between the rails) which must be the same across a
network, if trains are to move freely. Inevitably this is defined
in a standard to which trains and infrastructure are then built.
Similar standards may be set for the “loading gauge” (a
2-dimensional profile above the rails which the trains must
stay inside of and the infrastructure must stay outside of); for
the heights of platform; for the electrical supply voltage; and
for the communications interfaces between trains and infra-
structure, among many other things.
Once set, these standards may be very difficult to modify
because changes to them would require coordinated modifi-
cations to the fleet of vehicles and the infrastructure. Chang-
ing the height of the platforms on one line would have to take
into account the design of all the passenger trains that stop at
these platforms, and, if these trains required modification to
accommodate the new platforms, then this would have to take
into account the heights of all the other platforms across the
network at which the trains stopped.
Consequently, it is necessary to consider a significant part
of the whole railway, if not all of it, as the system being
worked upon, and, apart from the very rare projects that create
brand new railways, rail projects are always changing existing
systems.
It may be observed that whether one sees one’s job as
creating a new system or changing an existing one may
depend upon one’s frame of reference. A new system will
generally be inserted into some existing, superordinate sys-
tem. When creating a new railway system, it is generally
necessary to work at the superordinate level and, at this level,
the introduction of the new system is a change.
2.1.2. Rail Projects Generally Have To Change Systems
While They Remain in Service
The difficulty of carrying out rail projects is exacerbated by
the fact that the railway must usually continue to operate as it
is being changed, as illustrated in Figure 1. The project team
must map out a migration path that splits the overall change
down into a sequence of smaller changes, each of which can
be accomplished within a short period, a weekend perhaps,
and each of which will leave the railway in a state that allows
operations to resume.
The same issue arises in SE’s native domains. For example,
a project to upgrade a military communications network also
has to ensure operational availability during the project. How-
ever, this is the exception rather than the rule. A project team
replacing an aircraft carrier would only really appreciate the
sort of difficulty that rail projects face if the team was obliged
to transform the old aircraft carrier into the new one by
replacing components in dry dock every weekend and then
returning the vessel to full service every Monday.
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Some caution is needed at this point. Sheard, Lykins, and
Armstrong [2000] identify “Thinking ‘We’re Different’” as a
potential barrier to SE process improvement if it leads to a
belief that other organizations’ knowledge is inapplicable to
one’s own organization. This paper has been written to help
people reduce barriers, not increase them, and rail exception-
alism is not promoted. Sheard et al. recommend continuing
to apply standard models of SE but focusing on the most
applicable areas and tailoring them to meet business needs.
So acknowledging local peculiarities is part of the process of
overcoming the barrier, which it is suggested could be more
precisely described as “Thinking ‘We’re Fundamentally Dif-
ferent.’”
It is not suggested that rail projects face issues that are
fundamentally different from those in other sectors but only
that, on average, a greater proportion of the difficulties faced
by rail projects is concerned with issues related to migration
and coping with legacy systems.
2.2. A Case Study
An example may help to illustrate the particular challenges of
rail projects. One of the authors was involved with a project
to replace some of the switches and crossings at a major UK
railway station. The specification for the work comprised a
plan of the station with an area marked on it and a requirement
to replace all the switches and crossings within the specified
area, to current standards, unless otherwise agreed. This very
brief specification left no significant ambiguities, although it
did leave some issues explicitly unresolved, for example,
when to apply for waivers from standards.
Although this may appear to be a straightforward and
routine project, it has hidden complexities and is associated
with high consequences of failure to deliver on time. The job
would have been straightforward if the track had been in open
country and there were no deadlines. However, this was not
the case. The track was in tunnels or cut into the ground for
most of the route. Figure 2 shows a different location but
similar stretch of railway.
Moreover, the task had to be completed within 54 h. The
work was in fact completed on time, but, had it not been,
several hundred thousand rail passengers would have been
inconvenienced, and the failure would have been reported on
national news bulletins.
There were a great many cables threaded through plastic
pipes under the tracks, which was no longer in accordance
with current standards. Records were incomplete, and it was
not possible to establish what all these cables did until the
tracks were lifted. A choice had to be made between:
• Seeking a concession from the standards
• Building a tunnel for the cables
• Building a bridge for the cables
• Placing the cables in hollow ties. (The rails are fixed to
the ties which lie under them. Normally the ties are solid
but hollow ties may carry cables as illustrated in Fig.
3.)
Factors relevant to this choice included:
• The construction timetable (and the curing times of
concrete)
• Whether there was space to erect a crane
Figure 1. The railway must usually continue to operate as it is being
changed (Schmid, personal communication, 2005, used with per-
mission).
Figure 2. Urban railways can provide constrained and inaccessible
sites for construction (Jones, personal communication, 2010, used
with permission).
Figure 3. A hollow tie provides one means of routing cables across
railroad tracks.
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• The length of the cables
• The retesting required if a cable was replaced
• The angle at which the rails are fixed to the sleepers
(normally inclined by a few degrees inwards but gradu-
ally returned to vertical on the approach to some
switches)
• The compatibility between sleepers and the type and
angle of the rails required
• The position of drains.
Following a detailed evaluation, a suitable hollow tie product
was identified, and a decision was taken to use that product.
In addition to illustrating the distinguishing characteristics
of a typical rail project introduced above, the case study
illustrates the potential value of SE to the rail sector. The
problem faced by the switches and crossings projects is a true
systems problem in that the difficulties are concerned with
interactions between parts of the system. The problem is a
challenging one, even though its general nature is routine, and
there is every reason to believe that systems engineering
approaches can be applied by the rail sector to reach better
solutions to such problems and to reach them more efficiently
than can be done with more traditional and informal ap-
proaches.
3. THE BARRIERS TO IMPORTING SYSTEMS
ENGINEERING IDEAS INTO THE RAIL SECTOR
Barriers to importing SE ideas into the rail sector have been
identified which arise from three causes:
• The nature of the rail sector
• The nature of SE
• The different traditions of organizations from the two
domains.
Each of these causes is discussed in turn in the following
sections.
3.1. Barriers Arising from the Nature of the Rail
Sector
3.1.1. Barrier 1: Some Aspects of Traditional SE Guidance
Are Difficult To Apply in Rail Projects Because Rail Projects
Are Best Understood in Terms of Making Changes To
Existing Systems
As an example, consider the process for architectural design
described in ISO / IEC [2002, p. 27], which commences:
a) Define appropriate logical architectural designs.
b) Partition the system functions identified in requirements
analysis and allocate them to elements of system archi-
tecture. Generate derived requirements as needed for
the allocations.
c) Analyze the resulting architectural design to establish
design criteria for each element.
[...]
It is difficult to apply this process to an existing system with
an existing architecture, which may not be fully documented,
as in the switches and crossings renewal example, which was
presented in Section 2.2. The logical architectural design for
the station track layout surely exists already; but it is not
documented in the manner described, and it seems unreason-
able to expect the project to create such a description.
The issue is not peculiar to the rail domain—projects in
SE’s traditional domains change existing systems with exist-
ing architectures—but changing existing systems is the rule
rather than the exception for rail projects.
3.1.2. Barrier 2: Traditional SE Guidance Does Not Give
Enough Attention to Overcoming the Difficulties of
Applying Change to Systems Which Must Remain in
Service, with Only Short Interruptions
Many rail systems must remain in service, with only short
interruptions, while they are being changed. The difficulties
that this creates have been seen in the switches and crossings
renewal example presented above.
Defining the migration strategy is a major part of the SE
for such a system. This concern falls within the Transition
phase of the lifecycle used by the INCOSE SE Handbook
[INCOSE, 2010a]. However, the guidance for this phase
comprises less than 1% of the volume of the Handbook.
As an example, the migration strategy for introducing new
trains and signaling onto a new metro line might have the
stages illustrated in Figure 4. At the time of writing, migration
processes of this type were under way on the Victoria and the
Jubilee lines within the London Underground network. Mott
et al. [2005, p. 1] describe the migration strategy for the
Victoria Line and observe: “The trickle of railways requiring
upgrades for a variety of reasons has now become a flood, and
railway suppliers and authorities worldwide increasingly
need to deal with the requirements of metros where signalling
and train control has to be upgraded—without stopping the
running railway.”
3.2. Barriers Arising from the Nature of SE
3.2.1. Barrier 3: The Absence of Precise Agreement on the
Extent and Structure of SE Makes It Difficult To Provide
Members of Traditional Rail Disciplines with The
Understanding of SE That They Need in Order To Play
Their Part in the Effective Implementation of SE
There are differences of opinion within the SE community
about the scope of SE and the way in which it should be
organized.
There are many SE handbooks and standards. Some, such
as ISO/IEC [2002], EIA [1999], IEEE [1998], and INCOSE
[2010a], are independent of any sector, while others, such as
those of the European Co-operation on Space Standardization
(ECSS)[2004] and of London Underground Limited [2007],
are specific to a single sector. These handbooks and standards
embody different views about the extent and structure of SE.
This phenomenon has been well documented. Honour
[2004, p. 2] writes: “In many ways we understand less about
systems engineering than any other engineering discipline.”
This assumes that SE is itself an engineering discipline.
Hitchins [2003, p. 311–312] expresses some doubt about this
when he writes, “Systems engineering, then, is not really
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engineering in the conventional sense that relates only to
machines and other manufactured things. It is, however, en-
gineering in the sense of the planning and bringing about of
something with ingenuity.” Sheard, Lykins, and Armstrong
[2000, p. 61] not only concur that there is “no generally
acknowledged definition of systems engineering,” but iden-
tify this issue as a barrier to SE process improvement.
Sheard, Lykins, and Armstrong [2000] discuss SE process
improvement in general, rather than the transfer of ideas into
a new domain; but the barrier that they identify also stands in
the way of the adoption of SE by the rail sector. SE does not
deliver any components of the railway, and its benefits can
only be realized by assisting and guiding other disciplines in
improving the manner in which they deliver their parts of the
railway. However, to do this effectively, it is necessary that the
other disciplines should have a workable understanding of
what SE is.
3.3. Barriers Arising from Differences in
Tradition between the Rail Sectors and
Traditional SE Domains
3.3.1. Barrier 4: The Overlap between SE and Existing
Disciplines Has the Potential To Lead to Duplication of
Effort, Unnecessary Disruption, and Conflict
“Systems engineering” as a term is generally traced back to
work at the Bell Telephone Laboratories and the RAND
Corporation in the 1940s [Buede, 2000: 6]. By then, railways
had been in existence for over a century and had adopted many
of the features that we recognize today, including track-side
signals, interlockings, electric locomotives, and overhead
electrification. A rail engineer from the era of the birth of SE
would find much of today’s railway familiar.
Rail engineers have faced systems challenges during this
period and have had to tackle them. As a consequence, exist-
ing rail disciplines already perform tasks which deliver some
of the objectives of a traditional program of SE activities.
However, because the rail and traditional SE approaches have
evolved separately, they sometimes deliver the same objec-
tives in different ways:
• There is an overlap between SE tasks and those per-
formed by project management. This overlap is not
specific to the rail sector. If one takes the handbook of
PRINCE2 [Office of Government Commerce, 2002], a
widely-used UK project management methodology, for
instance, one finds tasks described which are concerned
with risk management and configuration management,
topics which are also treated in SE standards, such as
ISO/IEC [2002].
• There is overlap between SE and traditional engineer-
ing disciplines. This again is not specific to the rail
sector. Aslaksen [2007] acknowledges that there is a
debate among senior members of INCOSE about the
degree to which SE has intellectual content of its own,
acknowledging that it shares a lot of its intellectual
content with established engineering disciplines. The
overlap certainly exists in the rail sector. For example,
it has been common practice in multidisciplinary pro-
jects at New York City Transit (NYCT) and in Britain
for some considerable time to subject elements of the
design to an “interdisciplinary check”—a review by all
the disciplines involved. The purpose of this review
clearly overlaps the purpose of the “preliminary design
review,” which is common in multidisciplinary defense
projects.
• Architects (in the non-SE sense) are generally em-
ployed when significant changes are made to a station,
and their responsibilities will generally include coordi-
nation of the designs performed by different disci-
plines—a role normally claimed by systems engineers.
As is noted in Section 4.2.3 below, these overlaps may be
turned to advantage. However, if systems engineers ignore
these overlaps when introducing SE practices, then they may
duplicate existing functions or unnecessarily change effec-
Figure 4. An example migration strategy for the upgrade of a metro line.
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tive, existing processes. Moreover, systems engineers may
find themselves in conflict with existing rail disciplines, if
they are seen as seeking to displace the existing disciplines.
3.3.2. Barrier 5: The Technical Vocabulary of SE Creates
Difficulties in Persuading Those Unfamiliar with SE To Pay
Attention to It and in Explaining to Them What It Is in a
Manner Which Demonstrates That It Contains Something
New and Relevant
It is difficult to sell something if you do not use language
intelligible to your prospective customers. As David Ogilvy,
a respected thinker in commercial advertising, is reported as
saying by Higgins [2003, p. 93]:
If you’re trying to persuade people to do something, or buy
something, it seems to me you should use their language, the
language they use every day, the language in which they think.
The difficulty in explaining SE is exacerbated by the language
used by systems engineers. Traditional rail engineers will find
the language of systems engineers peppered with unfamiliar
terms, such as emergent properties, SEMP, ICD, V&V, and
CONOPS. More baffling still, they hear ordinary words being
used in unfamiliar combinations with meanings that the un-
initiated would find hard to guess. If one were to ask someone
from outside SE what the “Enterprise Environment Manage-
ment Process” of ISO/IEC [2002] was concerned with, they
might guess that the process mitigates the environmental
impact of new business ventures when, in fact, it is concerned
with maintaining an organization’s SE policies and proce-
dures.
4. REDUCING THE BARRIERS TO THE
ADOPTION OF SE BY THE RAIL SECTOR
4.1. Overview
Figure 5 repeats the barriers identified and indicates the
proposed measures for overcoming them. The measures are
divided into those where the SE community should take the
lead and those where the rail community should take the lead.
Each of these measures is now discussed in more detail.
New York City Transit (NYCT) is currently introducing SE
approaches into its business and its experience is used to
illustrate some of the measures.
4.2. Actions That the SE Community Can Take
To Reduce the Barriers
4.2.1. Give More Attention to the In-Service Phase and the
Migration Strategies for Introducing Change
This is a particular issue in the rail sector because rail SE is
to some extent always concerned with this phase. The issue is
encountered in other domains, however, and strengthening SE
in this area also has the potential to deliver benefits in many
other sectors.
Hitchins [2003] coins the phrase “operational systems
engineering” for systems engineering of systems that are in
operation. He makes clear that he considers that it merits
attention when he writes, “Operational systems engineering
is disregarded by some as unimportant, irrelevant and not
really systems engineering. They could not be more wrong.”
(p. 375) He argues that particular attention should be paid to
the complementary systems which support and enhance op-
erational systems.
INCOSE commissioned work in this area. A working
group within the UK chapter of INCOSE, whose members
have significant experience of several sectors including the
military, rail, and air traffic services sectors, delivered a report
with guidance on how to perform SE on systems that are
in-service [INCOSE, 2010b]. This report codifies good prac-
tice on performing SE for systems which have entered service.
This work is being taken forward by an international INCOSE
working group.
4.2.2. Use Plain Language in SE Documents Which May Be
Read by Nonpractitioners
This is just a matter of following Ogilvy’s advice, quoted
above [Higgins, 2003], to use everyday language when trying
to persuade people to do something. Of course, this is no
excuse for imprecision, and expressing complex ideas pre-
cisely with limited use of technical vocabulary is hard. But it
is not impossible. If Richard Feynman, one of the greatest
physicists of the 20th century, could put the theory of quantum
electrodynamics in plain English [Feynman, 1962], then it
must be possible to put SE in plain language.
Some caveats should be placed on this recommendation.
The approach taken by SE practitioners at NYCT is prag-
matic. Where an SE specialist term describes something new
to the sector (for example, a Concept of Operations), they
persevere in using the term. However, in other cases, they will
replace SE jargon with plainer language in order to promote
better communications.
There has been progress on this step. A report by Armitage
et al. [2008] describes a plain English guide to requirements
engineering, produced by an INCOSE working group be-
cause: “[O]ur target audience finds the existing documents too
long, uncomfortably abstract, and written in unfamiliar lan-
guage. We want them to invest in new methods and then we
require them to invest a significant amount of their time and
energy to understand the methods in order to assess their
value. We have created, if not quite a stalemate, then certainly
a serious obstacle to change.” (p. 2)
4.2.3. Be Flexible When Negotiating Boundaries with New
Neighbors
SE overlaps project management, and, on defense projects, it
has been necessary for project managers and systems engi-
neers to agree how to allocate tasks in order to work together
effectively. However, there is no more natural boundary be-
tween SE and project management than there is between Utah
and Colorado—someone has to decide where it goes. We
could draw this boundary at very different places through the
counties of risk management and configuration management.
Similar considerations apply when dealing with architects and
engineers in traditional disciplines.
Systems engineers are ill-advised if they go into the rail
sector and say to colleagues from existing discipline, “We are
systems engineers—this is our territory.” They would do
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better to negotiate the boundaries afresh. By leaving aspects
of SE that are already being effectively performed by others
undisrupted and fitting new aspects of SE within an existing
framework they can turn this barrier into a means of acceler-
ating the adoption of a comprehensive SE approach.
4.2.4. Create a More Portable Expression of SE
Existing SE handbooks and standards embody choices about
how SE principles should be put into practice. These may well
be choices which have been proven to work within SE’s
traditional domains, where there is no reason to challenge
them. However, for the reasons presented above, different
choices may well be justified when implementing the same
principles within a new sector like rail. It would be valuable
to have a top-level articulation of these principles which, as
far as practical, avoids committing to any particular ordering
or structuring of the SE activities or their products. Each
principle would then be linked to the body of knowledge on
proven SE practices. Those faced with the challenge of trans-
ferring SE into a new domain could take each principle in turn
and employ existing practices where there is no good reason
to do otherwise but adapt them where the needs of the domain
are different or where there are different but effective practices
already in use.
The idea of creating a list of SE principles is older than
INCOSE. Such a list was begun in 1991 at the first annual
symposium of INCOSE’s predecessor, the National Council
on Systems Engineering, and published in 1993 [INCOSE,
1993].
Others have identified similar needs. A discussion on the
value of SE, during which the participants seemed to be
talking about entirely different definitions of SE, led Sheard
Figure 5. Barriers and actions for overcoming them.
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to write a pair of papers [Sheard, 1996a, 1996b] in which she
characterizes SE activities in terms of 12 roles that those
performing SE activities would play. She then explores the
way in which each might contribute value to a project. Honour
and Valerdi [2006] overcome the lack of shared conceptuali-
zation on SE by classifying SE activities under the following
headings:
• Mission/purpose definition
• Requirements engineering
• System architecting
• System implementation
• Technical analysis
• Technical management/leadership
• Scope management
• Verification and validation.
Sheard’s 12 roles and Honour and Valerdi’s eight headings fall
short of the articulation of principles suggested, and the
introduction to INCOSE SE Principles Working Group [IN-
COSE, 1993, p. 6] contains the warning that the principles
“should be viewed as pieces of good advice, system engineer-
ing adages, to be taken into account when planning the
engineering of a system not as an outline of a complete
systems engineering process.” However, the work suggests
that it is feasible to create and reach agreement on such a list
of principles.
4.3. Actions That the Rail Community Can Take
To Reduce the Barriers
4.3.1. Be Prepared To Adapt Traditional SE Practices Where
Justified
Changes to traditional SE practices may be justified by the
needs of rail projects or because there are different but effec-
tive practices already in use. We have seen already that Sheard,
Lykins, and Armstrong [2000] recommend tailoring standard
models of SE to meet business needs when trying to improve
SE processes within an organization. The need for such tai-
loring increases when transferring SE processes developed
within one sector to another.
NYCT already had processes in place that implemented
some aspects of SE before embarking on its SE initiative. For
instance, it had processes for the multidisciplinary review of
systems designs. NYCT retains such processes, even if they
differ from the processes used in other sectors, unless there is
a compelling reason to use different processes. Where an
existing process partially implements an aspect of SE, NYCT
builds upon it, where practical, and extends it to implement
the aspect fully.
NYCT is bringing together rail/transit professionals with
SE practitioners from other industries in order to tailor SE
practices, tools, and standards from other sectors when apply-
ing them to its business.
4.3.2. Collaborate with Others Facing the Same Challenges
The adaptation described above could very easily lead to a
fragmentation of rail SE practice as each rail organization
adapts traditional SE approaches differently. This would make
it harder for organizations to share good practice and would
be likely to lead to less effective practices.
NYCT believes that it can achieve more if it works in
cooperation with others in the rail/transit sector, particularly
as it shares a global supply chain with other agencies. It is
developing its approach to SE in partnership with its peers in
the US and benchmarks its practices against those of peers
across the world. The participation from rail organizations in
INCOSE events, which is described in the Introduction to this
paper, demonstrates that many of NYCT’s international peers
take a similar view.
4.3.3. Involve All Parts of the Organization in Defining and
Implementing SE Practices
It has already been observed that SE on its own does not
deliver any components of the railway and that its benefits can
only be realized by assisting other disciplines to improve the
manner in which they deliver their subsystems of the railway.
It follows that the introduction of SE into a rail organization
will entail changes to existing practices and that making these
changes effectively will require working with stakeholders
from all parts of the organization to define and implement the
changes.
NYCT is embedding SE into existing project management,
project planning, design, and project delivery procedures and
setting SE responsibilities for everyone with a role in project
delivery. NYCT invests in engagement with functional stake-
holders as well as key project team members when introduc-
ing new practices in order to optimize these practices and
promote shared ownership of them.
NYCT has formally established SE as a new discipline and
a new division but will not allow it to become a new silo.
4.3.4. Introduce SE Practices Incrementally
The INCOSE UK Rail Interest Group held a 1-day conference
in July 2009 that involved representatives from rail organiza-
tions from the UK and the Netherlands. At this conference
there was a clear consensus that a revolutionary approach to
introducing SE into rail organizations all at once was imprac-
tical and that an incremental approach was required in order
to build the understanding and buy-in necessary to make the
change successful [INCOSE, 2009]. Sheard et al. [2000] are
also party to this consensus. In fact, they identify “Trying to
do it all at once” as a barrier to SE process improvement.
NYCT also agrees. It is introducing SE aspects incremen-
tally. NYCT is continually aligning the priorities of SE as-
pects with the goals that its executives set for the organization
as a whole. For example, when an initiative to mitigate erod-
ing capital funds was launched, NYCT raised the priorities of
change management and standardization of test criteria.
5. BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSALS
Recent events suggest that we are likely to see a comprehen-
sive uptake of SE ideas by the rail sector over the next few
decades, whether the barriers identified are reduced or not.
However, it is argued that reducing the barriers will increase
the rate at which the ideas are adopted, keep rail SE connected
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to SEas applied in other sectors, and shorten the learning
curve for the new rail branch of SE.
Such consequences would lead to the following benefits
for the SE community:
• Greater promulgation of SE ideas across multiple sec-
tors, leading to increased authority for the SE commu-
nity
• Maintaining a common view of SE across these sectors
and avoiding the fragmentation of SE into multiple
disciplines
• Strengthening the SE body of knowledge by importing
good practices from the rail sector.
The benefits to the rail community would include:
• A more rapid ramp-up in the efficiency of rail SE
• Reducing the risk of teething problems leading to dis-
illusionment with the new ideas.
The SE community could help to lower these barriers by:
• Taking pains to put SE documents which may be read
by nonpractitioners in plain language
• Negotiating boundaries afresh with new neighbors
• Paying more attention to the in-service phase
• Creating a more portable expression of SE.
The rail community could then use the portable expression of
SE referred to in the last point as the basis of a process of
reasoned adaptation of SE practices when adopting them.
It is argued that the benefits that both communities would
enjoy would justify the costs of taking these steps.
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